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TANJUG Assesses U.S. Action Against Iraq

LD2906193293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1625 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Report by Vladimir Resetar; TANJUG Headline: "U.S. Acts Like Sheriff of New World Order"]

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—Although the U.S. armed action against Iraq was more or less readily supported by all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council except China, it raises many questions on moral and legal grounds.

First—is it true that the assassination of the former U.S. President George Bush was planned by the Iraqi Government, because if it was not, there was no reason for retaliation.

Second—if the assassination was really planned but not actually carried out, was it a sufficient reason to attack any city or village as, in this case, Baghdad. Bush is safe and sound, thank God, but the eight or more victims in Baghdad are not.

Third—what can possibly justify the firing of 23 lethal missiles with such a purpose and what are the implications of the formula used by President Clinton in his televised statement—that similar attacks would be launched whenever necessary.

Finally, or perhaps, because of the gravity of the matter, in the first place, what purpose was served by informing the U.N. Security Council about the action after it was over. If the U.N. charters, resolutions and other documents are valid only to the extent the great powers deem it necessary, what is the role of the world organization.

The point is simply in dangerous precedents and possible great arbitrariness in taking such decisions, the likes of which already happened in the past [words indistinct] in most cases, had manifold bad consequences, including wars.

From the American standpoint and in view of the right to self-defence turned into a cult, everything could be understood one way or another, but even in the wild west the sheriff did not draw first and certainly not behind somebody's back, at least not in good old westerns.

In the 'cultivated west' there are, obviously, other rules of conduct or, much worse, there are no rules at all. In such a situation, anybody can be the target of the 'American self-defence' when [words indistinct] feels like it.

The CIA will, no doubt, find a way to provide evidence for subsequent justifications.

CSCE Committee To Discuss FRY

LD2906143593 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1241 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Prague, June 29 (TANJUG)—The 22nd regular meeting of the CSCE Senior Officials' Committee began in Prague.

As announced, the two-day meeting is to center on the forum's actions concerning the situation in the former Yugoslavia, especially in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Observers believe that when deciding on the Yugoslav crisis the committee should take into consideration new moments, including the Serb-Croatian initiative presented at the Geneva talks for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into three confederal ethnic units.

Other items on the meeting's agenda are the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and Armenian enclaves in Azerbaijan, for which a peace operation is planned.

For the first time since he assumed the post two months ago the new CSCE general secretary, German Ambassador Wilhelm Hoynck, is to address the meeting and present a report on his first activities.

The delegation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which was admitted into the CSCE two months ago as observer, expects that the committee might decide on Macedonia's request for full membership.

Government Supports U.S. Attack on Baghdad

AU3006102493 Tirana ATA in English 1009 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Tirana, June 30 (ATA)—The Republic of Albania supports the US attack against the Iraqi Intelligence Center in Baghdad and considers it as an act spearheaded against state terrorism, as an act for self-defence pursuant to the Article 51 of the UN Charter. This warns all those who practice state terrorism that the criminal acts and underestimation of the will of international community cannot but be condemned.

Greece's 'Flagrant Violation' of Norms Condemned

AU2906152393 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Statement issued by the Albanian Foreign Ministry in Tirana on 29 June: "Greek Fascist Provocations Against the Albanian Embassy in Athens"]

[Text] On the afternoon of 28 June a group of about 300 Greek hooligans, led by some priests, gathered in front of the Albanian Embassy in Athens, throwing stones at the embassy and shouting anti-Albanian slogans calling for war against Albania.

This grave fascist provocation against the embassy of a neighboring state, organized in the center of Athens, is an escalation of an anti-Albanian hysteria and other criminal acts undertaken recently by Greek chauvinistic political and clerical circles against Albania and the Albanian people. The witch-hunt against the Albanian emigrants, the beatings, the tortures, the stealing of their property, the massive deportations, the uncontrolled and highly irresponsible statements by high-level officials of Athens, and lastly the attack and provocations [word indistinct] against our embassy in the Greek capital [word indistinct], the so-called Greek priest, who instead of [word indistinct] with chauvinism is simply a pretext for implementing a [word indistinct] anti-Albanian policy of the leading Greek circles.

The Greek chauvinist political and clerical circles acting in Greece are intentionally feeding an anti-Albanian hysteria to conceal their systematic interference in Albania's internal affairs and to disguise the continuous efforts to hellenize Albania and the Albanian people. What is being done today to the Albanians and Albania in Athens is a product of government policy and organization, which at the same time rejects the professions of cooperation and good neighborliness that high-level Greek officials use in their meetings with their Albanian counterparts.

The organization of antihuman campaigns against emigrants and the shameful rallies in front of the embassy indicate neither a democratic state nor a civilized and European policy. The obstruction of the normal diplomatic activity of our embassy is a flagrant violation of norms and international agreements and shows that officials in Athens are not interested in maintaining normal relations.

The Albanian Government severely condemns the fascist provocations against the Albanian Embassy in Athens and asks the Greek Government to take measures to punish severely the organizers of these unpleasant anti-Albanian acts.

The Albanian Government will defend its national rights and sovereignty with all the necessary strength and means and will not allow anyone to toy with the sacred interests of Albania.

Envoy to Greece Recalled Over Expulsions

AU2906181093 Paris AFP in English 1743 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Tirana, June 29 (AFP)—Albania recalled its ambassador to Greece Tuesday after its neighbour expelled thousands of Albanian immigrants.

President Sali Berisha, whose poverty-stricken country emerged from decades of communism in 1991, said on national television that the expulsions were illegal and a violation of human rights.

Some 9,700 Albanians have been thrown out of Greece since Saturday and the flow continues, the police chief in the southern Albanian town of Gjirokaster told AFP.

The dispute began last Friday when Albania expelled a Greek Orthodox priest from Gjirokaster. Berisha said Tuesday the priest had been distributing calendars and literature in which southern Albania was proclaimed to be a integral part of Greece.

Greek officials said Monday that 9,000 Albanians had been rounded up as illegal immigrants and would be sent home.

Greek police estimate that 200,000 Albanians live in Greece, most having crossed the border illegally.

The Greek move has outraged Albanians because their compatriots in Greece send money home.

Berisha Comments on Deportation

AU2906202393 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1357 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Interview with President Sali Berisha by unidentified correspondents in Tirana on 29 June—recorded]

[Text] *At the request of Albanian Radio-Television, this morning President of the Republic Sali Berisha made a pronouncement concerning the latest events between Albania and Greece. Representatives from ATA and RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE newspaper participated in the meeting.*

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, what do you think of the sudden change in Albanian-Greek relations?

[Berisha] I think that what is happening is a sad but short-lived moment in the relations between the two countries, which I would say have a long history of cooperation, but undoubtedly of friendship as well, because the peoples who have fought for one another's freedom cannot always preserve the precious friendship between them. This situation, this massive deportation of Albanian emigrants is a massive violation of human rights and freedom by a democratic state. I can say that with this expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Albanian refugees—this collective expulsion—the Greek authorities have effected a complete violation of the European Charter on Human Rights, international agreements on refugees, and the Convention on the Prevention of Torture by the Council of Europe and the United Nations. These agreements prohibit massive expulsion of refugees and in no way allow mistreatment and torture.

What is happening now is truly a dramatic event. However, I would say that the fact that the Greek state is treading on its own laws and institutions is as unacceptable as this drama. Hundreds and hundreds of these emigrants, who are leaving without even being able to take with them what little money they have earned there and their personal belongings, went to Greece with regular visas and passports issued by Greek authorities. Very unexpectedly, they tore up the passports simply because they are Albanians. Thus, I would say that a state that does not respect its own laws and institutions undoubtedly threatens to have the necessary security and credibility of the type needed. This is an unprecedented action.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, in your opinion, what are the reasons for the Greek action against the Albanian refugees?

[Berisha] The departure of the undesirable person, the self-proclaimed Archimandrite of Gjirokaster, served as a pretext for this unequaled treatment of free people. I want to say that this Greek citizen, who came to Albania as a priest, was for a long time involved in activities that did not at all coincide with his religious mission and God's teachings. In various localities and villages he distributed calendars, maps, brochures, and leaflets, sowing segregation and hatred between Albanians and Greeks and proclaiming the south of Albania as an integral part of Greece. Albania's character and integrity were directly attacked.

Under these conditions, Albanian authorities faced two alternatives—to arrest and convict him in conformity with Albanians laws or expel him as an undesirable individual. They chose the second, less dramatic alternative—that of his expulsion as an undesirable person. We announced our inentions in the matter to the Greek consulate in Gjirokaster. In fact, the consulate approved the decision without presenting any objections because, it appears, they knew that he was carrying out activities not in conformity with his religious mission. However, the consulate requested to postpone this decision, if possible, till 1100 [0900 GMT] the next day. Gjirokaster local authorities accepted this request by the Greek consulate in Gjirokaster District. On the next day, when they went to execute the decision, the consul, who apparently had received other instructions by then, unexpectedly wanted to prevent the execution of this decision and actually reached the point where he placed his own body and hands in the way of the door of the house where the self-proclaimed Archimandrite was staying, so as to prevent the police from executing the decision. I think that this was only the pretext.

[Correspondent] I would insist again on the reasons for this.

[Berisha] Yes. Of course, it cannot be accepted that this legal action by the Albanian authorities, accomplished in full conformity with Albanian and international legislation and which presented a case that has occurred and been repeated many times in international practice, serves as a cause for the strong vengeful actions of the Greek Government and state. This can hardly be accepted.

I think that the deep causes of what is happening and what the Albanians in Greece are suffering may have something to do with:

First, certain relations—with a view to the friendship and alliance of Greek and Serbian political circles, as has already become known. Perhaps the Greek political circles are intentionally increasing tension in the south Balkans to relieve their friends Milosevic and Karadzic in carrying out their criminal acts in the south Balkans, specifically the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and in creating a Greater Serbia.

We cannot exclude the possibility that another cause may be the [word indistinct] that these circles brought regarding the Macedonian problem, especially after the deployment of U.S. troops in this republic. However symbolic this deployment might be, in fact it brought forth dreams of creating a joint border with Kosovo. For this reason, they think an Albanian problem should be created now, either for internal or foreign goals. However I think that this a miscalculation, as there is not a single parallel between Albania and Macedonia.

The electoral fevers that may have affected the political forces in Greece are another possible cause. Even in this case, it is a miscalculation, because I believe that it does not do honor to Greek democracy and political forces to think of collecting votes by sowing nationalism and chauvinism against their century-old neighbor, especially when we are definitely determined that despite the Greek political force, the present political forces will not be in power forever, and we will persistently develop friendly and normal relations with the Republic of

Greece. I think that the real cause of what is happening today with the Albanian refugees should be sought in all three of these causes.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, there were many Greek priests in the demonstration in front of the Albanian embassy in Athens a day ago. What is the real role of the Greek Orthodox Church in this problem?

[Berisha] I think it would be a mistake to blame the church on this question, because I personally have a deep respect for God, churches, mosques, and sacred places in which sacred teachings are given. However, I consider it immoral and sinful to use these sacred institutions for political reasons.

[Correspondent] Reports from Greece say that you have violated the Helsinki Accords and the Human Rights Charter insofar as the appointment of Greek clerics in Albania. What is the truth?

[Berisha] In refusing the Greek clerics appointed in Albania, the truth is that this is an absurd claim. I can fully assert here that neither the Helsinki Charter nor any other international document states anywhere that the Albanian Orthodox Autocephalous Church should be run by Greek priests or priests appointed by Athens. On the contrary, there exists an Albanian Autocephalous Church statute dating back to the 1920's-30's that states that the clergy of the Albanian Autocephalous Church should be of Albanian origin and nationality. However, I think that this statute needs to be adapted to Helsinki Accords and I am sure of one thing, that the clergy of the Albanian Autocephalous Church should be of Albanian origin and nationality or that he may come from a minority, be a member of a minority community, or an Albanian national born in Albania. Thus, the Helsinki Accords do not at all state that he come from Athens in Albania. [as received]

Precisely for this reason, when His Holiness the Patriarch of Istanbul appointed without any warning four Greek priests as bishops and archbishops of Albania, and considering the Albanian Autocephalous Church's statute, now adapted to the Helsinki Charter, I categorically refused three of them and reached a compromise on behalf of the archbishop, His Holiness Janullatos. This compromise was that the archbishop could stay as a temporary archbishop of the Albanian Orthodox Church. First I want to say, and I have said it before, that he has greatly contributed to the reestablishment of the Albanian Orthodox Church. Second, His Holiness Janullatos himself said that as soon as the Albanian Autocephalous Church permits an Albanian cleric to take the throne of the archbishop, he would be immediately prepared to return to his academic obligations in Athens. Thus, I do not see any kind of violation, neither of Helsinki Accords nor of the Human Rights Charter. On the contrary, everything has been developed and is developing in full conformity with these principles. I discussed these problems with the highest-level Greek officials who, to tell the truth, showed a more special and unusual interest in this issues. I have made clear to them all the obligations and limitations deriving from the statute of the Albanian Autocephalous Church. Thus, everything developed in a clear and obvious manner, and there is no room for discussion in the context of human rights.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, yesterday you sent a letter to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali and other European and world personalities. In this letter you stated that Greek diplomats and politicians are involved in this activity. Whom do you specifically mean? Is it a question of the Greek Embassy personnel in Tirana?

[Berisha] Unfortunately, it is true that several Greek diplomats and politicians are very active in this respect. I have not intended and do not intend here to refer to the Greek Embassy in Albania, which has maintained a correct stance. This cannot be said for the powerful Greek consul in Gjirokaster. Of course, I want to say that the stance maintained by Greek foreign minister is unacceptable. He continues to make several statements, I would say offensive statements, such as the one that Albania lives on Greece's mercy, and the one of yesterday or the day before yesterday to our ambassador, speaking in a tone I would call inappropriate for a diplomat. I am addressing him as if he is responsible for everything that is happening against Albanians. I would also say that the calls for open revenge by Mrs. Tsouderou who, unfortunately, has a past burdened with ill-intentioned stances towards Albanians, cannot fail to make an impression and have their influence in these scenarios.

[Correspondent] In the letter you sent to Butrus-Ghali and other European personalities, you seemed to exclude present Premier Mitsotakis. Does that have any connection with your personal relations with him?

[Berisha] I can say that concerning the Greek Premier Mr. Mitsotakis, I have assessed and always assess his efforts to have good relations and develop all-round cooperation with Albania. On the other hand, I undoubtedly assess another important moment. In the frequent meetings we have had together, I can say that the talks were completely open. Despite the theme and complexity of what is being discussed, when the talks are open, there is undeniably a friendly component.

[Correspondent] Concerning the created situation, have you had any telephone conversations with Premier Mitsotakis?

[Berisha] I have not had a telephone conversation recently, because the temperatures have been high in Athens.

[Correspondent] Recently there were some Greek mass media that called you an enemy and a killer. On what do you think they base this logic?

[Berisha] I think that they have made a grave mistake, because it is completely wrong to seek enemies in friends or try to create enemies where there are none. As regards the other attribute you said, as killer, I can say that I have cured people all my life and now I am trying to cure the wounds of my country.

[Correspondent] There are rumors about the return of the Albanian ambassador from Athens. Is there any truth in this news, Mr. President?

[Berisha] The ambassador may come here for consultations, because the truth is that yesterday's incident in front of the Albanian Embassy was a grave incident. The Greek police did not protect the embassy and hysterical mobs threw various objects at the embassy building.

In the same way, I think that the stance upheld by the foreign minister was inhumane. In the meeting with the ambassador, he used unacceptable tones for the practice between two neighboring countries.

[Correspondent] Mr. President, will there be counter-reactive measures by the Albanian side considering these events and the stance maintained by the Greek side against the Albanian refugees in Greece?

[Berisha] I want to say that our policy is not a revengeful policy. On the other hand I want to stress, and every person, state, and political force must be clear, that Albania's sovereignty and integrity are indisputable and no one or nothing can infringe on them. What we can do in this direction is to secure a greater control over border movements and perhaps we will come back to the regime of visas. Here we do not intend to limit relations, but we mainly aim to regulate movements on both sides of border.

Anyway, I think that this inadequate climate created in Albanian-Greek relations cannot be solved through repressive and punitive measures towards each other. This is solved by putting an end to this campaign and continuing cooperation, which is undoubtedly in the interest of both peoples and countries.

It is true that the Albanian refugees are expelled, but it is an undeniable fact that these poor emigrants are working there not only for their families, but also for the prosperity and welfare of Greek families. What is to be stressed is their excellent behavior. All of us should be proud of this because, despite those who would like to criminalize the Albanian emigration, I can state that fact-based studies by distinguished Greek scientific authorities have proved that crime in the ranks of the Albanian emigration has not increased in Greece, and this phenomenon is many times rarer than in other groups of emigrants.

Thus, I think this emigration should be seen as something that brings both countries closer, that unites them more, and should not be used by the other party as a means of pressuring Albania, as a means of (?conquering) Albania, or accomplishing this or that goal. This is a short-sighted, unacceptable policy.

Macedonia Urged To Investigate Killing

AU2906112093 Tirana ATA in English 0824 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Criminal Deed of the Chauvinistic Macedonian Circles—Statement by the Foreign Ministry"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, June 29 (ATA)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania firmly condemns the criminal deed the Macedonian forces perpetrated at the Albanian territory on June 26, 1993. Consequently a senior Albanian military was murdered and an under officer was wounded.

This is a flagrant violation of the state and national sovereignty of Albania and constitutes an hostile act which impairs the relations between our two countries. This did not happen by chance. It is in the chain of the assassination, murder and plundering. As a result, 9 people were killed and 13 others wounded. We are right to think that it is about a hostile policy against Albania, pursued by certain political Macedonian circles.

Such events testify to a flagrant discordance between the commitment and promises of the political Macedonian circles and the concrete hostile and anti-Albanian course in practice. Such a short-sighted policy contributes neither to the strengthening of friendly relations of good neighbourliness nor the consolidation and international recognition of the new Macedonian state.

The provocations and tension are not the way to become member of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, but it is the peaceful policy, the implementation of international standards and norms both with the neighbouring countries and the peoples living in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.

The Albanian Government persists that the Macedonian Government should adopt a clear cut attitude in regard to this criminal act and bring the guilty to the court.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, forcefully confirms that the Republic of Albania, consistent in its peaceful democratic policy of good neighbourliness will never tolerate such pressure and criminal acts, which impair its nationals and the state sovereignty.

Ministry Reports on Wheat Harvest

AU2506195693 Tirana ATA in English 1010 GMT 25 Jun 93

[Text] Tirana, June 25 (ATA)—Wheat harvesting in Albania has entered now an important stage. Farmers in many districts of the country are being assisted with the necessary agricultural means.

According to information from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, in the districts of Lushnje, Durres, Elbasan, Librazhd, Korce there are 560 combines working. Over 30 thousand hectares have been harvested so far on national scale.

A considerable part of the combines has been sold to private farmers. Scores of combines have been sent from mountain zones to lowland zones to accelerate the wheat harvesting rates.

Through the Greek credit, private farmers have bought 230 tractors of "Belaur" type and 110 of "Ford" type. In the coming days, 250 cultivators will be sold to private farmers in the hilly and mountain zones. A German credit worth 9 million DM [German marks], given for Albanian private farmers, will be delivered soon.

Berov Appeals for Cancellation of Demonstrations

AU2906061593 Sofia Bulgarska Televiziya Bulgarian Television Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Statement by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov on 28 June—live or recorded]

[Text] Good evening dear compatriots: At the beginning of the harvest and at a moment in which, according to data provided by our Statistical Institute, the country's economic decline is finally showing a cautious trend toward a certain stabilization, Bulgaria needs civic peace and consolidation above all things.

The alliance of all Bulgarian citizens rallied in the name of democratic values, irrespective of all political passions—this is precisely what the Bulgarian people, tortured by conflicts, need more than anything else today.

This is the reason why, as prime minister of Bulgaria, I address all political forces, and most of all the organizers of tomorrow's national rally convened by the Alliance For Cooperation and scheduled to take place on Aleksandur Nevski square in Sofia, as well as the organizers of the Union of Democratic Forces rally, planned expected to take place on Wednesday [30 June].

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, for the sake of our national interests, for the sake of further developing the democratic processes in our country, for the sake of all those who are willing to help Bulgaria in overcoming the disastrous economic situation, I appeal to you to call off the mass demonstrations and rallies planned for Tuesday and Wednesday [29 and 30 June] which are likely to exacerbate the already tense situation in our country and are not likely to contribute to the solution of the difficult problems which our country is facing.

I hope that common sense and your sense of responsibility will prevail and peace will reign over the country.

SDS Council Insists on Early Elections

AU2906181393 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Today the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council held its weekly meeting. After analyzing the current political situation the SDS leadership decided that all available means, within the framework of the Constitution, should be applied to provoke early elections, which includes also the government's resignation and disbanding parliament.

Some deputies of the Fatherland Party of Labor, however, were ahead of the SDS and have already submitted a request for disbanding parliament.

This was pointed out at today's SDS briefing.

The SDS National Coordinating Council has adopted an appeal urging the SDS supporters to dissolve the protest camp, Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the SDS Coordinating Council, announced at the briefing.

It was, however, decided today that the SDS Parliamentary Group should continue to boycott the plenary sessions.

Tonight most of the tents in the camp of protest will remain on the square facing the president's office. Only a few have removed their tents.

Lively discussions are taking place in the camp about the meaning of pursuing the protest actions, as our reporter Lyubomir Rozenshtayn announced.

Radical Democrats Demand Elections

AU2906155393 Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian No 25, 23-29 Jun 93 p 1

[Declaration adopted at Radical Democratic Party Congress in Sofia on 20 June]

[Text] The 25th Congress of the RDP [Radical Democratic Party] was held at an exceptionally dramatic political juncture that poses a great risk to democracy and is characterized by a real process of recommunization in Bulgaria, blocking of the democratic reforms, and usurping the vote of the people with a restructuring of the political arena in parliament.

The RDP calls upon all Bulgarians to make their moral and political choice.

The RDP congress reconfirmed the party's principled liberal positions and values, as expressed in the adopted RDP Statute and Program.

The congress once again confirms the RDP's positions, positions that are reflected in Edvin Sugarev's letter to the president. The recent conduct and actions of the president of the Republic of Bulgaria run counter to liberal principles and his individual membership in the Liberal International.

The RDP calls for the resignation of the president and the government and for early parliamentary elections.

The RDP advocates preserving the unity of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces].

We appeal for a dialogue to set up a broad anticommunist movement uniting all noncommunist political forces and citizens, of which the SDS should form the basis.

In affirmation of the decisions that it adopted previously, the RDP demands total declassification of the archives of all the departments of the former State Security.

The RDP congress expresses confidence that a solution to the present political situation exists and that it is for the good of Bulgaria.

Tomov Explains Aims of Civil Alliance

AU2806160093 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 22 Jun 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Aleksandur Tomov, cochairman of Civil Alliance for the Republic, by Svetlana Krusteva; place and date not given: "Our Country Needs More Statesmen and Fewer Party Men"]

[Text] [Krusteva] Mr. Tomov, is the GOR [Civil Alliance for the Republic] an outstanding phenomenon?

[Tomov] In my view, as things are developing, it will become one. We sensed pronounced interest even at the beginning, and in 20 days everyone has found out what the GOR is. This is no mean achievement.

[Krusteva] Perhaps you deserve most of the credit for this.

[Tomov] I must thank all the journalists for this, but I do not think that it is an accident, for now nothing happens in Bulgaria without journalists. However, for the GOR to be a real phenomenon, we will have to work hard this summer, until September, which marks the end of the first stage, the stage of forming the alliance, when it will have to reveal its image.

[Krusteva] Why has the GOR appeared at this particular time?

[Tomov] The first reason, I believe, is that up until the end of 1992, the country was forced into a bipolar model. It is a fact that there was no strong dissident movement in Bulgaria before 1989, and the change occurred on 10 November 1989, not so much as a result of dissident activity as much as an internal party coup. This created many illusions that the perestroyka model would continue to make progress. At the same time, the existence of a strong communist, later socialist, party naturally led to a broad alliance of forces who wanted power. Accordingly, until 1992 the bipolar model could not be supplanted. In contrast to what happened in Czechoslovakia and Poland, it was a historical reality in Bulgaria.

[Krusteva] In your opinion, has the bipolar model now outlived its usefulness?

[Tomov] I think that in the last nine months, the new trend toward overcoming the bipolarism has become clear and irreversible. This process will certainly take a long time, but it was started by the people not the political forces in the superstructure. Now almost one-third of the electorate does not support either of the two main parties. We must find new solutions that are not based on confrontation. Furthermore, the disappearance of the bipolar model is also due to the fact that no one believes in the communism-anticommunism antithesis anymore. There is simply no chance that communism will be restored, while the present anticommunism may very easily end in the restoration of what existed 45 years ago, or at least attempts will be made to achieve this. Both the subcultures on which the parties are based in different ways remind people of the past, whereas our chance lies in looking to the future.

[Krusteva] You said that the trend to overcome bipolarism comes from below, from the people. Who in your opinion is spreading the theory that the GOR is Aleksandur Tomov's creation?

[Tomov] This is too ridiculous a proposition to merit discussion. I am sure that no one will believe it, although some circles want to show that the GOR is a secret structure of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. In actuality, the GOR is completely independent of all parties—the BSP, SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], or any other.

[Krusteva] Some GOR members belong to various political parties, including the BSP....

[Tomov] This is a tactical issue, but not just a tactical one, that we discussed when we formed the GOR. We decided that in the initial period, the GOR will develop as a movement to which we will seek to attract people who until now have been dispersed in different political formations. This is of immense value. For the first time since 1989, people who are clearly identified with different political parties can meet in one place. However, if the GOR wishes to achieve certain political goals, its leadership at least cannot sit on the fence. I consider that the leadership must clearly identify itself with the GOR and abandon its commitments to other leaderships and structures. In the lower-level structures, however, the alliance can be open to everyone. Anyone who likes the alliance can join it without exception. The most important thing is that they join the GOR because of their convictions. As far as I am concerned, I can say that it was a clear but difficult choice for me, because by this choice I had to admit many other things more openly. I think that the same goes for my colleagues, who are now quite numerous. You will probably receive information on the alliance's membership and its local structures very soon.

[Krusteva] Mr. Tomov, perhaps certain centrist organizations were not overjoyed when your movement appeared.

[Tomov] Of course, we are in competition with them, but some of them welcomed us. Nonetheless, I must admit that some people are insinuating that the GOR is a minor and temporary phenomenon. Dimitur Ludzhev, as usual, has accused us of having copied him. All this is petty. If anyone really wants stability in Bulgaria, he should be pleased with the general trend. A centripetal force is moving from the left to the center, since there is no other way of forming a centrist political bloc. It is ridiculous to imagine that it can be created only by a movement from the right to the center, yet some people in the NSD [New Alliance for Democracy] believe just this.

[Krusteva] Talking about members and structures, I do not beleive that the infant GOR is in a hurry to take part in elections. Nevertheless, do you think that there is any likelihood of early elections?

[Tomov] I do not think that Bulgaria has any need for elections at the moment, and I believe this for two reasons. First, some of the enterprises are now seeing a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel, and there are signs of a slight, early economic revival and an emergence from the economic crisis. In this situation, if the nation is clever, the politicians should lie low, bridle their ambitions, and delay their plans until this trend becomes a reality. Political wisdom requires this. If we follow the opposite course, it is very well known that elections always halt economic progress for six to seven months. Business is just getting moving again. Second, if elections are held tomorrow or the next day, I do not expect to see any major change in parliament. However, if the majority of parties decide that it is time to hold elections, then the earliest realistic time in the GOR's view is the spring of 1994. Yes, it is better to have more time. Every infant must have time to grow, but some babies put on weight quickly.

[Krusteva] What is your personal prediction of how the conflict between the SDS, parliament, and the Presidency will be resolved?

[Tomov] In my opinion, the attack on the president was not carefully thought out; in fact it was improvised. It is a hopeless campaign because there is nothing serious in it. Because of this, the SDS has retreated to the brink and is struggling to find a way out. The only way is for the SDS to declare—as they did recently—that the strikers have forced the postponement of the elections until the spring of 1994.

As for us, we must concentrate on our work during the next 10-12 months. We must adopt a package of taxation and other legislation, without which the nation cannot continue. The GOR will devote itself totally to this goal.

[Krusteva] Finally, what type of electoral system does the GOR prefer?

[Tomov] Look now, the GOR is still a movement. It is too early to think about the electoral system, but our constituent documents state that the next parliament should consist of responsible individuals. Now, if you put the name of a mule against the third number on the ballot paper, it will be elected. You could put down the name of your dog, for example, and he will be elected.

[Krusteva] Perhaps my dog would do no worse than some of your colleagues.

[Text] Yes, we do have trained dogs who press buttons. For this reason, the electoral system must seek a balance between fairness and personal responsibility. I think that some of the people in parliament whom people have gotten to know since the elections should not be elected because Bulgaria needs more statesmen and fewer party men.

Liberal Parties' Forum Ends in Sofia

AU2806142993 Sofia BTA in English 2053 GMT 27 Jun 93

["Today"—BTA lead]

[Excerpts] Sofia, June 27 (BTA) —[Passage omitted] A Bulgarian governmental delegation, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Neycho Neev, returned from a six-day visit to China today.

A two-day seminar on "Liberal Parties in a Postcommunist Situation," organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, ended in Sofia today. The liberal parties in Central and Eastern Europe see their role as champions of human rights on the principle of parliamentary democracy and as a political force capable of carrying out a radical economic reform in coalition with all democratic formations. This was the conclusion reached by the representatives of 112 countries attending the seminar. The liberal parties will oppose the special legislation on decommunization but they will not enter a coalition with ex-Communists.

The Romanian vessel Jariste 5 carrying over 860 tons of iron and detained at Vidin, sailed off today. Upon receipt of confirmation from the consignee, it was released by an inspecting team, the Shipping Inspectorate in Vidin (Northwestern Bulgaria) announced. Thirty-four vessels have been subjected to tight control over the last month. The Slovakian Tekov, carrying iron ore, has been awaiting clearance for 20 days now. [passage omitted]

The deliberately crippled budget of the creates enormous difficulties for the normal functioning of the capital, along with the other acts of the government, this has been mounting social tension, it is said in a declaration of the Sofia Deputy Mayor received at BTA and read on television. It is pointed out in the declaration that the government has not responded yet to the petiton it was handed by the Sofia Mayor and the chairman of the Sofia City Council.

Havel Says Bosnia Arms Embargo Must Not End

LD2806212693 Prague CTK in English 1831 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Lany, June 28 (CTK)—The current arms embargo on Bosnia must not be lifted, Czech President Vaclav Havel told journalists today.

Havel favoured finding a speedy resolution to the bloody Bosnian conflict but did not see the embargo's abolition as a good move, he said.

Whatever the decision adopted by the international community, Havel remarked, he thought that despite its limited resources, the Czech Republic would support the decision by taking part in eventual actions.

German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl advocated lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia in the speech he gave at a recent summit of the European Community.

Klaus Interviewed on Current Political Topics

LD3006093193 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1645 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Petr Stigler; place and date not given: "A Meeting With the Prime Minister of the Czech Government"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Stigler] Prime Minister, the number-one world event this weekend was undoubtedly the United States' attack on Baghdad as a revenge for the attempt on the life of the former U.S. President George Bush. Some even said that the Americans were employing double standards in their approach to Iraq and Serbia and that their action against Bosnian Serbs should be just as tough. Do you think that there is a rational basis for this kind of criticism?

[Klaus] At this moment I do not wish to either praise or criticize this action taken by the Americans. I feel it would be inappropriate for us to do so at this moment. But I cannot see a direct connection between the alleged action against former President Bush which took place somewhere in Kuwait in April and the night bombing of a city in June. I cannot see much of a connection here. I feel that if my considerations, for example in terms of relations between Czechs and Slovaks, were to proceed along the same lines it would be very unlikely that we would be able to live in peace with Slovakia.

[Stigler] There was no lack of developments on our domestic political scene either. The congress of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia took place. This strongest opposition party had split up at this congress. Do you think this can somehow affect the division of our political scene?

[Klaus] What happened at the Communist Party congress seems to me more or less irrelevant and quite marginal from the viewpoint of the present and future of the Czech Republic. I do not have the slightest need to comment on it.

[Stigler] It is, nevertheless, an important development, for the Communist Party used to be the strongest opposition party. The direction which its members are going to follow in the future is not clear at present time.

[Klaus] I think that it does not actually matter. After all, nobody has been, nobody is, and nobody will be likely to contemplate a coalition with the Communist Party. That's why I always kept maintaining that in my opinion it did not matter whether they have 8, 9, 11, or 12 percent of votes. I think that it does not matter at all. And so, if thanks to a number of pro-reform communists another left-wing party should come into being—and there is an abundance of such parties on our political scene—then it will not, in fact, make any difference.

[Stigler] Another, let us say scandalous event, was the resignation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] head Jacques Attali. His work had been criticized several times. The Czech Republic and you personally spoke critically of his person several times. Why, in your opinion, is this bank with pretentious objectives by far missing the goal for which it has been established?

[Klaus] I do not think that this is merely due to the personality of Mr Attali. [passage omitted]

First, Mr. Attali was never a banker in his life. Hence, to become a president of such a vast bank is rather extraordinary. Second, the bank was set up on a very vague concept of West versus East. Mr. Attali has today become a victim of the helplessness in present world which does not know how to cope with the legacy of communism. Should it be assisted? Should it be governed? Should this or that be done? [passage omitted]

[Stigler] Do you think that with the person of Mr. Attali the EBRD, or the concept for which the bank was set up, will meet its end? Or is there time now to improve, and enhance the efficiency of the bank's work?

[Klaus] Of course, the bank will not meet its end. [passage omitted]

[Stigler] Czech President Vaclav Havel is due to visit the Slovak President Michal Kovac on Thursday [1 July]. As he himself said, it should be one of the regular meetings if they actually decide to meet on a regular basis. You will undoubtedly discuss matters with the president on the eve of his departure for Slovakia. What I am interested to hear is how, in your view, could this visit help given the present state of Czech/Slovak relations?

[KLaus] In my opinion it is good that presidents should meet and give positive signals to both countries and to both peoples. But I do not think that these meetings will be able to yield tangible and specific results, because we have been engaged in continuing talks with Slovakia on the two issues which present the biggest problem to us—the property issues on the one hand and the border on the other hand. It is OK if the presidents favor a particular variant, but in our constitutional system it will constitute merely one important factor. It will not be a measure that could change matters. I am glad, however, that this meeting is taking place. [passage omitted]

Klaus Describes Crans Montana Economic Forum

AU2906080593 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 25 Jun 95 pp 1, 13

[Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus article: "The Meeting in Crans Montana"]

[Text] Several dozen politicians from the East and West, diplomats, businessmen, reporters, and scientists met for the fourth time in the splendid Crans Montana mountain center in western Switzerland to conduct a very open and necessary dialogue. I have been invited four times to this meeting, but it has never been convenient for us, until this year, when we sent a delegation that really represented the majority opinion of the citizens of this country. After Valter Komarek's participation in 1990, this delegation could clearly say, finally, that the Czech Republic is not attempting any perestroika, but a real market economy and a parliamentary democracy based on the competition of political parties, and that we had done a lot of work in this direction.

This year's conference was an exceptionally good opportunity for East-West dialogue: meetings between many presidents and prime ministers, including those of the former Soviet Union (also with former President Gorbachev, whose speech was politely applauded, and—to the embarrassment of all—no one asked a single question on behalf of the forum, since there really was nothing to ask), today's leaders of the former Yugoslavia, representatives of the Arab world and Israel, and, finally, Vladimir Meciar and I. Crans Montana is predestined to these events and I am convinced that the effect of such a meeting is not small.

It was very instructive for me to hear, see, and become personally acquainted with leading representatives of postcommunist countries. I can say that, in the eyes of the overwhelming majority, the Czech Republic plays an important role, and that it was precisely at that meeting that we were able to become a spokesman for all those countries. The clearness of our objectives, our ability to formulate a pragmatic strategy for achieving our goal, and our success in convincing our population of all this during free elections, is considered to be an example worth following.

Nevertheless, we must say that, at the Crans Montana Forum, there was also a clash of opinions regarding the future of Europe, voiced by representatives of the East and West. We felt uneasy about the mentor attitude toward the post-communist countries and held certain reservations about them—which proved to be strong even here—and which did not remain without reaction from Poland, Hungary, and particularly the Czech Republic. Those reactions were motivated by the fact that we belong (and we always have) to Europe as much as anybody else, and that we are not worse than those who live, by coincidence, geographically in the west.

I am very happy that my impassioned plea, provoked by a really unfortunate speech delivered by a French participant in the forum, was so positively accepted, and that particularly politicians from the East stressed that I had the courage to defend the "honor" of former post-communist countries (as the Byelorusian prime minister expressly said). B. Kadar, Hungarian minister of foreign relations, protested against their constantly recommending us to establish a new CEMA and Polish Minister Kropiwnicki mentioned that he did not found Solidarity in 1980 to defend Polish appurtenances to Europe in 1993. We must formulate our views on the future of Europe very clearly, and I would like to devote some time to these matters during my upcoming visit to Poland and Hungary.

The Forum in Crans Montana is some contribution to the dialogue, which is very necessary at this moment. The Alps' giant mountains added some special flavor to the whole meeting, and the majestic mountains reminded us of our nothingness and transiency. This certainly contributes to the fact that we are more willing to listen one to another, a Serb to a Croat, an Arab to a Jew, an Estonian to a Russian, a Hungarian to a Slovak, a Swiss to a Czech, and a Frenchman to a Pole, to name just some of the 36 countries present. Listening is an art, and the people of our times are, unfortunately, unable to fully master this art.

Dlouhy: Ready To Join EC Within Three Years

LD2806124693 Prague CTK in English 1206 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Paris, June 28 (CTK correspondent)—Czech Industry and Trade Minister Vladimir Dlouhy today said that the Czech Republic would be ready to join the European Community (EC) within two to three years.

The Czech party understands that the EC would not admit it by the time, said Dlouhy, who arrived for a two-day visit to France on Sunday.

But he said that West Europe would have to enhance its cooperation with the East and admit that, for instance, the Czech Republic can produce some goods more cheaply and more effectively than the countries of the European twelve. The idea of some that the West will export to the East, but not vice versa must disappear, Dlouhy said.

Western markets have been opened to the Czech Republic, but not so much as we had expected, he pointed out.

The most accommodating position has been taken by the EC Commission, while the EC member countries only differ in the rate of economic protectionism, Dlouhy said. He recalled the resistance of french farmers to imports of foreign products and German industrialists to steel imports.

Before his return to Prague today, Dlouhy will meet with Minister of Industry, Posts and Telecommunications and of Foreign Trade Gerard Longuet, and other representatives of the French Government and business circles.

Nuclear Technology Exchange With DPRK Unlikely

LD2906125393 Prague CTK in English 1242 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 29 (CTK)—If the former Czechoslovak Communist regime exchanged military nuclear technologies with North Korea [DPRK], it was done by no means through the Federal Foreign Trade Ministry, Karel Mrocek is quoted as saying by today's Czech independent daily "LIDOVE NOVINY".

He is reacting to reports by South Korean papers which were published in reaction to a statement made by Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec in Seoul on Saturday. Zieleniec said that Czechoslovakia and North Korea did cooperate in the nuclear area before 1988.

Though Martin Povejsil, head of the Czech Foreign Ministry Asian, African and Latin American Department, said that the cooperation involved only visits by experts, the South Korean press mentioned possible exchange of nuclear technologies for military purposes, the paper writes.

Mrocek, a worker of the former Federal Interior Ministry, says that Czechoslovakia and North Korea only exchanged knowledge within scientific-technological cooperation of the countries of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). But it is possible that some important information was also supplied through other channels, he adds.

Karel Vykypel, former Czechoslovak counter-intelligence chief, told the paper that he had never heard about any supply of nuclear technologies. Nothing like this went via the counter-intelligence or the Interior Ministry. Relevant ministries arranged sales by themselves, he points out.

Deputy Director of the Nuclear Research Institution O. Hrazdil is quoted as saying that the institute has never cooperated directly with North Korea. Our institute deals with the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, he points out. Meetings of experts always took place within the Moscow-based Interatomenergo Society and the Nuclear Research Institute in Dubno, also in the former Soviet Union, Hrazdil is quoted as saying.

The paper also quotes director of the Nuclear Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences as saying that the exchange of technologies is most unlikely. It would be impossible to keep secret anything like this, he says.

Government To Have More Say in Privatization

AU2906120693 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jun 93 p 2

[Interview with Jiri Skalicky, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, by an unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "The Government Wants To Implement Its Own Ideas on Privatization"]

[Text] The amendment to the set of laws on large privatization, which was recommended by the Economic Committee of Parliament for approval in the Chamber of Deputies, should somewhat strengthen the state's position when transferring property into private hands.

We asked Jiri Skalicky, minister for the administration and privatization of national property, to explain the specific reasons for and the character of changes proposed by the government.

[Correspondent] What is the reason for the demand that the government—or the Ministry of Privatization, as the case may be—should be allowed to intervene more in privatization projects and change the conditions and ways of privatization?

[Skalicky] Originally, we expected that the best solution would always be found in one of the presented projects. In many cases, this has proved unrealistic. Ministries acquire data on enterprises and the amount of interest in them. From this information, they can find out what kind of privatization would be best for them. To adhere to the rigid wording of the law—either to approve the project or reject it—is not feasible in real economic life. The purpose of the proposed changes is to find some leeway for reaching an agreement that is advantageous for both the state and the new owner. The state has, so far, been in a disadvantageous position.

[Correspondent] Specifically, how will the state organs proceed according to the amendment?

[Skalicky] If—based on the individual projects—we arrive at our own idea as to what the best manner of privatization would be, unfortunately, we quite often face the problem that not one of the projects contains it. This is why we have to seek a new presenter for the project who would be willing to meet our demands, deal with the founder, etc. The amendment will allow us to draft our own proposal and realistically offer it. We believe that the procedure may speed privatization up.

[Correspondent] In what way does the amendment define the position of the National Property Fund?

[Skalicky] The real dispute concerns the fact whether the fund is a sovereign owner who can freely dispose of the property that has been transferred to it or whether the fund is only a depository, while the decision is up to the state. The amendment solves this by compromise—certain rights necessary for operative decisions are left to the National Property Fund, but key decisions regarding really large volumes of property and its privatization must be taken up by state organs.

HSD-SMS Chairman on Transformation of KSCM

LD2806135493 Prague CTK in English 1320 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Brno, South Moravia, June 28 (CTK)—The fact that not the whole of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) was reformed at its 3rd congress on Saturday was regretted by Jan Krycer, chairman of the Self-Governing Democracy Movement for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS), today.

If a new subject called the Democratic Left Party is created, we cannot but welcome it. It is an expression of effort to transform (the party), Krycer told journalists.

The fact that not the whole KSCM was transformed at the congress heralds the party's end, Krycer believes.

Speaking about the concept for the Czech Army's restructuring, Krycer challenged the total of 65,000 soldiers to which the current strength (about 100,000) is to be reduced by the mid-1990s. If the Czech Republic were to have an army comparable with the German Bundeswehr, its number should not exceed 48,000, he pointed out. He also said that the Czech Army had twice as many tanks, almost twice as many planes and 30 per cent more helicopters per one million of the population than the Bundeswehr.

The opposition HSD-SMS has 14 seats in the 200-seat Czech Parliament.

National Social Party Congress Elects Chairman

AU2906133393 Prague CTK in English 1821 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 26 (CTK)—61-year-old Pavel Podsednik from Brno, South Moravia, was elected chairman of the National Social Party (NSS) at the NSS 3rd congress here today. In 1990, Podsednik was mayor of Brno for some months.

The congress, attended by 119 delegates, elected a 35-member Central Executive Committee. The party currently associates some 1,400 registered members.

[Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 28 June on page 3 carries a 150-word CTK report on the NSS congress, which adds that "J. Petrtyl became NSS deputy chairman and P. Votava NSS general secretary." Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech on 28 June on page 2 carries a 200-word CTK report on the congress, which quotes NSS Chairman Pavel Podsednik as saying that "about 60 percent of NSS members advocated the party's integration into the Liberal National Social Party."]

New KSCM Chairman Interviewed

AU2906131293 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 28 Jun 93 p 8

[Interview with Miroslav Grebenicek, newly elected chairman of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, by a "(woll)"-signed correspondent; place and date not given: "Grebenicek: We Do Not Want To Return To Before November"]

[Text] Prague—Newly elected Communist Party Chairman Miroslav Grebenicek does not intend to revoke the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] membership of those who expressed support for the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. He said in an interview for LIDOVE NOVINY that only those who disagree with the party's program and infringe on its articles by presenting views in public that are at variance with the KSCM's orientation in a pluralist democracy would forfeit their membership in the KSCM. According to Grebenicek, the SDL's orientation "is hovering clearly in the left-wing spectrum."

[Correspondent] Do you think that the preservation of the party's name and the departure of the reform forces will place the KSCM in even greater isolation?

[Grebenicek] The course of the congress sent a clear signal that we are definitely not one of the political entities that would like to return to before November. The decision to preserve the name was made by party members at a party discussion, which it is necessary to respect. However, I do not think that today's congress has definitively resolved this issue.

[Correspondent] Do you anticipate tension between the party leadership and deputies?

[Grebenicek] We are not the only party that has such problems. I want to meet with the deputies on Tuesday [29 June] and agree on the rules of the game. I am convinced that they will also take these steps. If we do not reach an agreement, it will be to the detriment of both sides.

Banking Council Reports Economic Recovery

AU2806143993 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 25 Jun 93 p 2

["(MS)"-signed report: "The National Bank Reports Economic Recovery"]

[Text] At its session yesterday the Czech National Bank (CNB) Banking Council discussed monetary development in the Republic from the beginning of the year to the end of May. It reported that the decline in economic output at the beginning of the year associated with the division of the state and the currency was—according to the information available—temporary. There have been obvious signs of economic recovery since April, especially in construction, in households' demand, and also partially in increased exports to regions with freely convertible currencies.

At the end of April, the balance of payments current account in convertible currencies recorded a surplus of $316 million. The balance of trade also shows a surplus. The CNB's foreign currency reserves currently amount to $2.3 billion, while foreign currency reserves in the banking system as a whole amount to $4.8 billion.

During the first five months of the year, bank credits for businesses and households have increased by 47 billion korunas, that is, by 8.2 percent. The government's indebtedness fell during this period. The Banking Council considers the development in consumer prices to be significant. The inflation rate in May (0.4 percent) confirms the stability of prices development. However, the Banking Council is still concerned about the consequences of further wage increases. Based on an analysis of the monetary situation, it decided to revise the CNB's monetary program. The revision proceeds from the hypothesis that the real increase in the gross domestic product this year will be around 1.0 percent given a balanced state budget, a slight balance of payments surplus, and an annual inflation rate of 14-16 percent. Bank credits—which should increase by roughly 9.0 percent before the end of the year given the overall substantial decline in interest rates—will be the principle source of the increase in the money supply.

The Banking Council also discussed applications for permission to operate as a bank. It decided to grant such permission to the Foresbank based in Zlin, to the Raiffeisenbank based in Prague, and to a branch of the Waldviertler Sparkasse von 1847 based in Jindrichuv Hradec.

Railway Reorganization Will Cut 1,100 Jobs

LD2906091193 Prague CTK in English 0853 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Prague, June 29 (CTK)—One third of the employees of the present top and middle management of Ceske Drahy (Czech Railways—CD)—therefore 1,100 people—will lose their jobs as a result of basic changes made by Transport Minister Jan Strasky after six months of deliberation.

Strasky explained these changes and introduced new Director Emanuel Sip at a press conference last night. Besides Sip, Strasky also appointed 25 leading employees at CD's head office and the nine directors of the newly formed regional commercial operations administrations. These directors should choose their subordinates by mid-July. The remaining employees will be laid off by the end of July.

The new conception of the enterprise is reflected in its completely different organisational structure. Middle management—the district administrations—have been practically eliminated. The general administration will be restructured, and three new divisions will be created: commercial operations, transport lines, and asset management and privatisation. Sip called this structure a compromise between the supporters of complete separation of operations from the lines and those who wanted freight and personal transportation separated.

Immediately after forming all managing organs, their directors will devote their attention to changes in operational elements. According to Strasky, they should make efforts first of all to preserve their employees.

The commercial operations division (roughly 1,900 employees) will lay great emphasis on commercial activities. The nine commercial operations administrations, which will be closer to the customer, will answer to it.

The transport lines division can be the germ for a future state enterprise for the care of transport lines, which Strasky said would remain in the hands of the state for a long time to come. The first task of this division will be to quantify the prices of transport lines.

The asset management and privatisation department will ensure the commercial use of all unnecessary railroad property. It will also have the main say in questions of the gradual privatisation of the railroads.

The whole intervention into the organisation of the state enterprise should be quick, effective, but human, Sip said. Employees will be released according to legal regulations. For all those who want to return to the railways, it will be made possible, Sip said. Possibilities for bringing these employees back might be found among the organisation's developing commercial activities.

Meciar Rejects Possibility of Starvation

AU2906113193 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Jun 93 p 2

["(ak)"-signed report: "Apparently, There Is No Threat of Any Vales of Starvation"]

[Text] Bratislava—Representatives from the KOVO Trade Union met with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar yesterday in the Office of the Slovak Government. They discussed, among other things, regional issues, privatization, the social sphere, and conversion. The prime minister promised the unionists that they will meet again within two weeks at talks involving the economic ministers and representatives from the engineering enterprises. The talks will focus on preparing starting points for resolving the complicated economic situation.

Following the meeting, the prime minister said apropos conversion that the Slovak Republic arms industry has not been converted, but has been destroyed, since its capacity has been reduced by 91 percent during the past three years. The engineering industry can only recover if it devises a completely new concept for engineering production. At the moment, however, there are no alternative programs, although the government is able to guarantee the financial resources for their implementation.

A Slovak Government Transformation Council, to be responsible for transforming the economy—and especially engineering—will be set up to deal with the current problems. Trade unionists will also participate in it. Its task will be to put forward a concept for at least two decades. Restoring output to its former level is, however, no longer possible. Meciar rejected the trade unionists' criticism that because of the number of people being made unemployed, there is a danger of so-called vales of starvation in some regions. According to the prime minister, the social safety net is prepared—in the worst possible situation—to cope with up to 20 percent unemployment. However, there are already signs of economic recovery; the 2.5 percent increase in daily output and the state budget's monthly revenue—which has risen from 8.4 billion korunas to 12.4 billion korunas compared to January and February—bear witness to this.

Meciar on Current Political Issues

LD2706201993 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1710 GMT 27 Jun 93

[Regular weekly address to nation by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Developments today are faster than anyone would envisage. Therefore, we have already responded to the development that is to take place in future times. Our constitutional system is an open one. In the event that new international agreements are adopted, which are more favorable to the citizen than our own documents, our system allows for incorporating them into our legal system. It also gives the citizen, besides guarantees within the state, a possibility to seek guarantees outside the state. This is an exceptionally important feature adopted by the state for the benefit of a citizen. It means that the state pledges to bow to a different decision in the event that the right of a human being is violated. [passage omitted]

By doubting our membership in the Council of Europe, doubts are being cast on the extension of guarantees and protection of citizens' rights.

When looking back at the development of the last week and recent days, as well as the status quo, we have to say that it is controversial. However, it is not something that would not have been expected.

We were aware that not all in our country agreed with the contents of our constitution. We knew that a number of politicians from Hungarian political parties were writing their complaints to various European bodies. We witnessed investigations into these complaints. The result was: Slovakia meets the conditions of the Council of Europe, and the necessary small adjustments can be made on the basis of the council's recommendation. That is why rapporteurs' reports are favorable for us.

Of course, it is the Hungarian minority and its politicians who attract greatest interest. No guesses needed, I can tell you that Minister Moravcik really met [Hungarian] Minister Jeszenszky yesterday, both of them being foreign ministers. [passage omitted] Several questions emerge in this connection.

The first question is: How does the Hungarian Republic see its relations with the Slovak Republic, since at one time there is misunderstanding related to Gabcikovo, next time it is related to the Council of Europe, and prior to that there were doubts concerning our policy on minorities.

We also have to ask who slips in pseudo-arguments to the Hungarian side—arguments that are untrue and are not in line either with the legal system of the Slovak Republic or with the developmentsin our country.

We have to ask, what is our citizens' relation to the Slovak Republic? We have to ask both the Slovak citizens and, especially, the Hungarians. What is their relation to what is being done in their name? Do they identify themselves with what is going on, and do they support it? We have to say quite openly that events go beyond the issue of the protection of rights.

There is one more chance for the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia to play a constructive role. They could issue their stance tomorrow to the effect that they support Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe. This might even unblock the disapproval by the Hungarian side. So, for the first time since long ago, these parties in Slovakia have a chance to do something and to express their relation to their homeland and their state. [passage omitted]

Of course, when we return to the issue of minority rights, we can understand them differently. They can be understood on the basis of the standard norm created by Europe. We have already gone beyond that norm, and however malicious some people may be, they cannot deny this fact. One can on the other hand proceed along a contractual basis and then this is a matter of reciprocity. The Slovak Republic is against such rights being applied in regard to our Hungarian fellow citizens only to the extent that they are applied to Slovaks in Hungary. We would rather proceed in the opposite direction, that is, that the rights of Slovaks in the Hungarian Republic be made equal with those enjoyed by citizens of Hungarian nationality. This is why I have already agreed, and this has already been confirmed by the government, that the position of Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary will be monitored for a period of two years and that a report about the results of this will be submitted to the CSCE.

Therefore, however much our admission into the Council of Europe is under a cloud at present, there is nonetheless one light. All the states of the European Twelve have told us that they did not agree with the course taken with the Hungarian government.

We have, however, one more problem, and that is the issue of our border with the Czech Republic. This border presents a problem because it has not been marked. There is, therefore, a need to discuss it. At the same time, a border control system and a border are not the same thing. We understand that at the time of a greater migration, each state wants to protect itself. We are in the process of concluding on Monday a readmission agreement with the Polish Republic. We held discussions about the issue in Romania. Talks are also in progress with the Hungarian side.

We are willing to conclude a readmission agreement with the Czech Republic as well. We give guarantees to the Czech Republic that we will create such protective measures on our borders that it will be an exception if someone crosses the border illegally. We propose to the Czech Republic that we should prevent illegal emigration by changing visa requirements. We draw attention to the expenditure involved. We draw attention to the trends of developments and to what we promised each other when dividing the state. We are in favor of holding discussions, indeed, holding them immediately. We are not, however, in favor of continuing the process of creating further artificial obstacles between the citizens of the Czech and Slovak republics through a border control system, even if this is done under the pretext of a protection against illegal emigration. In the end the Slovak Republic itself would be subjected to it.

I have received another letter from the Czech prime minister. I will answer it and react in a way that corresponds to our tradition of civilized relations, mutual respect, and understanding. [passage omitted]

Kovac Speaks to Trade Unionists on Reform

AU2906161693 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 25 Jun 93 p 2

["Excerpts" from speech by President Michal Kovac at the second All-Union Congress of the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions in Bratislava on 24 June 1993: "Trade Unionists Want To Enter Politics"]

[Text]

Misuse of Trade Unions

The idea of trade union unity was ruthlessly abused by the Communist Party, which loudly proclaimed the building of a free, democratic, and socially just society, while, in fact, it established a totalitarian regime in which all segments of the society—including the trade unions—were subordinated to its party-power interests. For decades the united trade unions were just so-alled cogs, tools for the implementation of the policies of the totalitarian state-party. The rank-and-file trade unionists expressed their disapproval of this role during the revolutionary November days in 1989, and significantly contributed to the velvet course of the antitotalitarian revolution.

Long before November 1989, we economists, but also a steadily growing body of the public, knew that our economy was not developing in the right direction, that the so-called real socialism operated with losses and without prospects. The make-up of the relative social stability was maintained for many years at the cost of the future, and a not at all distant future at that. The truth about the state of the economy and other spheres of social life was exposed only after the fall of the totalitarian regime. The competitiveness of our enterprises is insufficient, and the state of the infrastructure in the area of transport and communications, as well as our banking and finance industry, are at least unsatisfactory, one could even say terrible.

Consequences of the Federation

It is necessary to state, however, that the uneasy situation of the Slovak economy was further harmed by some unilateral decisions by the federal government after November 1989. I am thinking, above all, of the manner and speed of the conversion of our arms industry. This process has only reached the half-way point—a radical decline in the arms industry occurred (practically to one-tenth of its maximum in 1987) but to date the non-military production in the affected enterprises has not been completely established, and serious economic and social problems have resulted in several Slovak regions.

Today, all of us, the entire Slovak nation, must succeed in demanding two processes: First, we must fulfill the Slovak statehood by establishing all the institutions necessary for the smooth operation of a modern state. Despite some difficulties, particularly in the personnel sphere, in principle we are leading this process to a successful conclusion. Second, we must very decisively, and at the same time tenaciously and in a well thought-out manner, continue the social-economic transformation of our society that started in November 1989. I have spoken several times in favor of a definite transformation of our economy into a market one, based on private ownership and protected by the legislation of the state bound by law.

I am well aware of the demanding and, particularly for the socially weak strata of the society, traumatic nature of the process. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the initiated transformation must be continued, and conclusively, and that under no circumstances should it be slowed down.

We Do Not Want Hyperinflation

At the same time, I am also aware of an entire spectrum of justified demands regarding the growth of wages and social benefits. Again, however, as a politician and as an economist, I must emphasize with all responsibility that the state may circulate only such an amount of money as is covered by the produced values. There is nothing easier, or more dangerous for our economic and social life, than to print and issue uncovered money. We would not have to wait long for the destructive consequences of such a financial policy. We see this in the form of the hyperinflation in some of the postcommunist countries. Therefore, it is in the best interest of all of us to do the utmost to implement a reasonable financial policy because the extent and quality of cooperation with foreign financial institutions and foreign governments depends on this policy.

Here, I would like praise the prudent policy of the Confederation of Trade Unions, and the individual trade unions, that avoids any extreme steps and seeks the road to a consensus with the employers and the government. The road of social partnership, which finds its concrete form in the tripartite agreements, appears to be in the present difficult times to be the most viable one, as it provides for all the participating parties the most acceptable platform for a long-term peaceful and constructive cooperation. It certainly is a matter of course that the concluded agreements must be abided by all the parties involved. Otherwise, the very purpose of signing these treaties would be jeopardized.

To Maintain Direction

As you certainly know, after talks with the IMF representatives, the government adopted a memorandum on cooperation. It promises therein an entire sequence of economic and financial measures that will affect the social sphere. These measures certainly are not easy, but they are inevitable for securing a stable cooperation not only with the IMF but also with other world and European financial institutions and banks. In this situation, I myself attach great importance to social negotiations and the search for the optimum solution in the distribution of the social impact of these measures, and that also in the interest of maintaining the social intent. That is one of the conditions for the successful cooperation with abroad and a significant prerequisite for our economic consolidation and future growth. We do not just expect unilateral understanding from the trade unions. At the same time, as you are certainly aware, a reconstruction of the government—for which the trade unions called—is under way, and it will probably bring new impulses for the government policy, particularly in the economic sphere.

I am convinced that the Slovak Republic, which has demonstrated its viability in the first months of its existence, and despite all the doomsayers, will continue even more vigorously on the path of stabilization, and eventually the new dynamics of its economic and social life. Its success is unthinkable without the participation of independent trade unions aware of their responsibility to their membership and to the entire society and the state.

Toth Assures Economic Tasks Being Fulfilled

LD2906091993 Prague CTK in English 0858 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bratislava, June 29 (CTK)—Slovakia was fulfilling all the three major economic tasks—internal convertibility of the crown, a reasonable state deficit, and stability of currency, Finance Minister Julius Toth said last night.

He was speaking after a session of the Government's Economic Council which discussed a report on fulfilling measures in the currency, financial and budgetary policies this year.

Additional measures for the second half of the year would be discussed in September, Toth said.

MKDH Says Minority Policy Inconsistent

AU2906133293 Prague CTK in English 1515 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] Bratislava, June 26 (CTK)—Statements made by Slovak Government officials to foreign representatives markedly differ from the government's style of politics at home, said Hungarian Christian Democratic Party (MKDH) Chairman Vojtech Bugar on Slovak Radio's Hungarian-language broadcast today.

This was clearly demonstrated, he said, by the Slovak parliament's resolution on Slovakia's acceptance into the Council of Europe. Concrete conditions set down by the Council, which the government is obligated to fulfill, were not included in the resolution.

Edita Bauerova, parliamentary deputy of the Coexistence movement, said that although these conditions had been omitted from the parliament's resolution, the parliamentary chairman had proposed the immediate discussion of a draft law on names and surnames. Bauerova pointed out several insufficiencies in the proposed law and noted that a year ago, all her attempts at resolving this problem had been rejected by the interior minister.

The law on names and surnames would allow for non-Slavic names and surnames, used by citizens belonging to minority ethnic groups and by foreigners living on Slovak territory, to be entered into the official register of names. The resolution of this problem is one of the two concrete conditions set down by the Council of Europe for Slovakia's acceptance.

A part of the resolution which was passed by the Slovak parliament at its 20th session on Wednesday [23 June], which would have obligated parliament to resolve the possibility of using non-Slavic names and surnames, was rejected by deputies. Another part, which concerned the legal resolution of the use of bilingual names of towns and regions in territories inhabited by ethnic minorities, was also voted down.

The Council of Europe's Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly will decide on Slovakia's acceptance next week.

Government To Operate Nuclear Plants Past 1995

LD2906124593 Prague CTK in English 1028 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bratislava, June 29 CTK—Plans for the restructuring and privatisation of the energy sector and supply and demand proposals until 2005 were passed by the Slovak Government's Economic Council, said Economy Minister Jaroslav Kubecka Monday.

An integral part is the intention to keep block V-1 of the nuclear power plant in Jaslovske Buhunice, western Slovakia, operating past 1995, said the minister, explaining that it was impossible to obtain sufficient alternate sources of energy by 1995. The plans also count on the use of all four blocks of another nuclear plant in Mochovce, western Slovakia, now under construction.

The plans call for greater use of non-traditional energy sources, and importing 10 to 20 per cent of requirements, said the minister. Following the trend to restructuring in the economy may also mean reductions or possible cutting off of some large users.

Diversification of resources is planned, with privatisation of the power system and the Slovak energy utility, into at least two separate corporations. The Mochovce nuclear plant would also be privatised, according to a proposal.

Government Backs U.S. Action Against Iraq

LD2806154593 Budapest MTI in English 1522 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Budapest, June 29 (MTI)—From the start, Hungary has supported international efforts to make the Iraqi Government take positive steps in the interest of the world's peace and security, foreign affairs spokesman Janos herman said on Tuesday.

Explaining Hungary's reaction to U.S. action against Baghdad, Herman said since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, world organizations have done everything to influence Iraq positively.

Evidence publicized by the U.S. government shows terrorism and aggression continue in the region. The United States' resolute and unambiguous response deters terrorism and aggressive acts and revives civilized norms. At the same time, Hungary regrets that U.S. action killed innocent civilians, Herman said.

Several questioners doubted the U.S. air raid's ethics: Herman said, "military action, if justified, is always ethically right."

Herman then answered further questions about how the Hungarian Government took the Russian Parliament's move removing ratifying the bilateral basic treaty off the agenda, and proposed to cut out a clause on the 1956 Hungarian revolution from the treaty's preamble. Herman said Budapest had learnt of what happened only through the media, without no official news from Moscow.

"We see the ratification debate as Russia's internal affair, and not affecting our stand: Hungarian Parliament has ratified the basic treaty and we see no way to revise it," Herman said.

Ministry Spokesman on Slovak CE Admission

LD2906121093 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Gyoergy Onody sums up what was said at the foreign spokesman's regular Tuesday news briefing:

[Onody] Janos Herman began his Foreign Ministry news briefing today by outlining Hungary's position regarding Slovakia's admission to the Council of Europe [CE].

He said: I consider it important to point out that Hungary supports the Czech Republic's soonest possible admission. This country developed its democratic legal system after the split. At the same time, there is a debate among the members of the Council of Europe concerning Slovakia's institutional system. None of the members have agreed that the council's requirements concerning the Hungarian minorities living on Slovakia have been fully satisfied, something that would be desirable. For us, as well, it is regrettable, he added, that the Hungarian minority, in the past half a year, also had to complain by means of a series of memoranda about their lack of rights.

Janos Herman continued: We looked forward with great expectation to the talks with Slovak Foreign Minister Moravcik. It emerged there, however, that Slovakia did not show a readiness to adopt the decisions of the Council of Europe.

No one calls into doubt, Janos Herman said, that Slovakia should be a member of the Council of Europe. There can be differences of opinion in certain organizations, but these are temporary, only, if the sides show a readiness to eliminate the problems, he concluded.

Antall Views Hungary's Development

AU2806120193 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Jun 93 p 5

[Georg Paul Hefty report: "We Are Destroying the Rich Experience of the 20th Century"]

[Text] Bonn, 25 July—The optimism of Hungarian Prime Minister Antall is strongest when he presents a pessimistic view of the future. In Bonn, he expounded his foreign-policy goals, surprising neither the chancellor nor the foreign minister: Hungary wants to join the EC and NATO. The EC will open accession talks with Hungary in the second half of this decade, but NATO membership seems to lie in the distant future, as one can gather from a statement by Kohl. In an interview, Antall showed understanding for the time being: "Our task is to explain our security needs. Our friends accommodate us as much as they can. We are willing to accept that." Does that means that Hungary's alliance situation will not change any more in this millennium? Antall did not rule out anything. One cannot make any definite statements in 1993, he stressed. Four years ago, nobody foresaw the current situation. "It requires a special intellectual courage to predict what will happen at the end of the decade." There is a good and a bad scenario. According to the good one, Hungary will be a full EC member, together with the other states of the Visegrad Group [Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland], and NATO will have assumed a new role by then. His government and all responsible parties in the Hungarian parliament are oriented toward Europe and the Atlantic, and are seeking organic links with NATO, which has become the absolute stability factor in this region.

According to the bad scenario, reforms in the former Soviet Union and in eastern Central Europe, "from the Baltic states to the Black Sea," would collapse. "This would also be dangerous for Western Europe," Antall stressed. Without the iron curtain, it is much more difficult for the West to defend itself than in the era of military confrontation. The West might be destabilized economically and militarily by migration movements. The Hungarian head of government believes that this pessimism is justified: "If the democratic governments of the world accept the actions of an aggressor, if they accept accomplished facts resulting from aggression, and if they forgive the aggressor, this will be the end. We are destroying the rich experience of the 20th century—from Bolshevism to Hitlerism—if we again pursue a defeatist policy that adapts itself to the realities in foreign policy, in issues concerning democracy, in domestic policy, and in the economic sphere where protectionism is beginning to reemerge."

If Hungary should not be incorporated in NATO, what material support does it need in its exposed position? Antall cannot avoid using the word "immense." Hungary needs money to rebuild its economy and to enter the world market. "Yet we also need technical assistance and military equipment—naturally within the framework of the existing agreements." If Hungary is to curb the migration movements and drug trafficking, it needs help. "In my view, this is in the interests of Germany and the whole West." The Budapest government expressed specific wishes in this respect in the past few days, paying tribute to the comprehensive support for the Hungarian police by the German federal and provincial authorities.

To ensure the West's readiness for help, it is important how Hungary presents itself. How can the impact of the recent controversy over Antall's former deputy, Csurka, be limited? Csurka caused quite a stir with anti-Semitic statements and embarrassed the governing party and its Chairman Antall to such an extent that he was finally expelled. The head of government and party chairman denies that this has caused a decline in Hungary's reputation. "It is really absurd to mention the pamphleteer and would-be popular tribune in connection with events in the world—including Western states—in which xenophobia and violence by and against minorities are involved. Nothing of that kind has happened in our country. If such things have occurred at all, it was to an extent that is being neglected in other countries." In Hungary, noisy statements are rarely followed by deeds. Csurka was overestimated by the West, which again boosted his image at home. He has withdrawn numerous things, particularly his anti-Semitic statements. Yet he caused considerable damage by demagogically exploiting the difficulties of the transition. "He suggested state socialist measures instead of the market economy. One the one hand, he is a politician who holds right-wing extremist views, but on the other he submitted proposals to his party, the government, and the coalition that are based on communist ideas."

The minister president stressed that the government is aware of the problems resulting from the changes that are similar in Hungary to those of eastern Germany. In the same way as unity alone no longer impresses millions of Germans, numerous Hungarians are no longer satisfied with the removal of the Soviet troops alone. Social dissatisfaction is increasing. The opposition is trying to exploit this situation, even if it has to admit that it does not know how to improve things. This also applies to Csurka and others who are criticizing the government within the coalition, coating their phrases with an icing consisting of national and social ingredients. Thus, is no improvement possible? "I did not say that," Antall replied. More determination is required in certain areas, including privatization, and corruption that is linked with it must be fought more vigorously.

Just like other states, Hungary is affected by the worldwide recession, and, like the governments in Paris and London, the government in Budapest also expected a more favorable development when it promised better living conditions in 1990. Still, his government is the only in the region that has been in office for three years and that is not willing nine months before the next elections to pursue an economic policy designed to please everybody, but which would end in a disaster after a short improvement. Instead, Hungary wants an agreement with the IMF and harmony with the international financial organizations.

Has Hungary overcome the sufferings of the dictatorship, or will the guilt of the past play a role again in the election campaign? Antall stressed that the idea of seeking justice for the victims has not been removed from the agenda. He is not interested in a "witch hunt, but in finding ways of punishing, or at least naming, those who are guilty. Yet we do not want any kind of policy in Hungary that would lead to a psychological destabilization." The chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum is confident that his party will "emerge stronger from elections and find a suitable coalition partner" in a much clearer situation than in 1990, because the "fringes are now clearly defined." In case Antall had hoped, after the formation of his first government, that he would able to govern without a coalition next time, the past three years have convinced him of the opposite.

Jeszenszky on Liberty Day, Slovakia

LD2806101093 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0445 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Csaba Belenessy in Mohacs on 27 June—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Belenessy] Mr. Minister, as was written in the invitation, you were invited to a meeting of the diplomats of the countries which in the course of history stayed here in Hungary as occupiers.

[Jeszenszky] First, I have to say that it was not me but the Liberty Day Foundation who invited the diplomats. Second, it has to be seen that the countries present do not associate themselves with the great empires that came here as occupiers and indeed caused enormous damages. At the same time these current successor states are of course connected to the previous empires. Such dialogues by all means serve the purpose to find the way of present and future cooperation. [passage omitted]

[Belenessy] Mr. Minister, on Saturday [26 June] you met Slovak Foreign Minister Moravcik. Did you advance in the issue of the conflict which had evolved, namely that Hungary would only support Slovakia's membership in the Council of Europe subject to conditions?

[Jeszenszky] I again expounded on the viewpoints that have been guiding Hungarian diplomacy in this issue, and not just for two weeks but practically since admissions to the Council of Europe have been on the agenda. [passage omitted]

It is a key issue of the new Europe, or the new central Europe, that the national minorities, ethnic groups living in the various countries become full-right citizens of their country and their survival through generations be guaranteed. This is what the Hungarian parties in Slovakia had also worded and I think this is not just a rightful claim, but if we solve it together then the tension in Slovak-Hungarian relations will cease and we can be very good partners in bilateral relations as well as in the central European cooperation, the Visegrad Cooperation, and the common Europe.

[Belenessy] Has the tension eased since Saturday?

[Jeszenszky] It is up to Slovakia whether it will take the steps regarding the situation of the Hungarian minority, which the Hungarian minority there has been urging for years and the investigating committees of the Council of Europe and the members of the Parliamentary Assembly have also been expecting and voicing. [passage omitted]

[Belenessy] Mr. Minister, the news was heard a few days ago that the foreign affairs committee of the Russian parliament does not support a clause of the Hungarian-Russian basic treaty in which the Russian side apologizes to Hungary for the 1956 intervention. What will be the consequences?

[Jeszenszky] There are various pieces of news. I reckon that it is not by any means the opinion of the Russian Government, nor is it the view of the foreign affairs committee of the Russian parliament. It was almost adopted by the Russian parliament on two occasions, last time only the quorum was missing. It is another thing that certain deputies have objections to the wording, and I think that we will solve this question.

[Belenessy] After all, Russian President Yeltsin already made this gesture in his memorable parliamentary speech.

[Jeszenszky] That is right, and I think that we not only have to remember that, but it also gives the tone that will characterize Russian-Hungarian ties in the year, years to come.

Walesa Denies Criticizing U.S. Baghdad Strike

LD2906221393 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2100 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Reuters has said that President Lech Walesa, who was in Belarus, criticized the United States for its missile attack on the headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service in Bagdad. Walesa was reported to have said it would be bad if someone wanted to be world policeman. President Lech Walesa said this at Okecie airport:

[Begin recording] [Walesa] I did not say anything like that. Someone is lying about things. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified reporter] You did not use the phrase "world policeman"?

[Walesa] No, well, I was saying that it would be bad if someone were to be a world policeman. If certain relations would not be sorted out, such as the use of force, then one could associate it this way. This is not true because the United States gave its reasons for the attack. [Reporter] Reuters implies that you suggested that the United States was taking upon itself the role of a world policeman.

[Walesa] So Reuters should be more serious. [end recording]

Press Office Releases Comment

LD3006002393 Warsaw PAP in English 2240 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 29—The Presidential Press Office released on Tuesday night the full text of Lech Walesa's answer to the question asked at a press conference in Minsk earlier on Tuesday about his opinion on the U.S. missile strike in Baghdad.

"(...) we have so many internal problems to discuss that we are short of time to tackle those great developments that take place in the world (...) Such issues must be subject to international decisions. Such organizations like the U.N., apart from adopting interesting resolutions, must guarantee the implementation of those resolutions. There must be clear statutes and clear interpretation, and then determined implementation (...) Today, we have no comprehensive regulations and their clear execution. I have listened to world leaders and everybody agrees that this should be done. So, it is all right, but I would prefer it to be clear, from an international angle. I would prefer that everybody knew in advance that if such a situation occurs, there must be a certain reaction. So, there is a problem: We must quickly put our (Polish) internal affairs in order and at the same time settle affairs in the international scene."

Belarusian Parliamentary Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich added: "In our talks we did not touch upon that question or any other international issues. We just discussed bilateral relations and, according to information we have, we know too little to make statements on the question. The information I have is the one published by the media."

BBWR Electoral Status Uncertain

LD2906131093 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 1200 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] It is still unknown whether the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] will be treated as a political party or an election coalition. The State Electoral Commission [PKW] will make a decision on this matter. This decision decides what the election threshold will be which the BBWR will have to reach in order to be able to take part in the elections at all. PKW Chairman Andrzej Zoll:

[Begin Zoll recording] I am not able to answer this question today, as I do not really know, and the PKW does not know either, what this creation really is. We have no documents concerning the setting up of the BBWR. As soon as these documents are available to us, we will be able to answer unequivocally whether it is a coalition or a citizens' election committee. [end recording]

Suchocka Speaks at Democratic Union Convention

LD2606162993 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1200 GMT 26 Jun 93

[Text] [Announcer] The regional convention of the Democratic Union is holding debates in Poznan.

[Correspondent H. Sochacka] The first to speak was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, its chairman and former Poznan deputy. He said that it was essential to make the electorate more disciplined. This would decide the outcome of these elections, especially now when the people were put off by the parliamentary and the democratic system—and in consequence by parties which were so little differentiated.

He also gave his opinion on the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, which he described as not altogether non-party and which introduced chaos into the democratic system. He believed that economic matters ought to come to the forefront and not those matters which divide parties.

The next to speak was Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka, who stated that there was a need for stability now that there was no parliament and also later, after the elections, when it would be necessary to form a new government. She also said that there would probably be fewer parties in the new parliament but that it was doubtful that any one of them would be able to form a government on its own.

In conclusion, she recalled the importance of the achievements of the present government—stressing that it was, of course, the work of the whole of the coalition, but first and foremost that of the Democratic Union. She then went on to stress her very close links with the Wielkopolska region. The convention's debates were closed to journalists at 1200.

Foreign Minister Views Career, Policies

AU2806094693 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Jun 93 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Foreign Minister Skubiszewski by Katarzyna Nazarewicz; place and date not given: "Politics Do Not Have To Clash With Morality"]

[Text] [Nazarewicz] Your decision to withdraw as a candidate for the lucrative post of a judge at The Hague International Court of Justice surprised many politicians. I heard one member of parliament call you a "surprisingly moral minister," as if he wanted to stress the combination of morality and politics was something exceptional.

[Skubiszewski] I would like thank that member of parliament for holding me in such high regard. However, in this case, it was not a straightforward question of morality, but a question of making a choice in favor of a certain duty dictated by the position of the government and the state, and a question of loyalty toward the prime minister. I would add that, during my short professional career, I have received several generous offers of posts in the West.

Regarding the basic issues that you touched upon, politics does not have to clash with morality. I do not consider myself to be a professional politician. In fact, I took on the job of directing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the belief that I would return to being a professor of law and to the legal profession. In this respect, withdrawing as a candidate for The Hague was difficult.

[Nazarewicz] A week after your decision to remain in the government, the Suchocka cabinet became dangerously weak, it was hit by a wave of strikes, and then there was the no confidence vote.

[Skubiszewski] Are you suggesting that I should have gone to The Hague nevertheless? I will not raise the issue. At a difficult time one does not leave the helm. It is another matter if a given government begins to behave in an unacceptable manner. Then one does go. That was not the case with the Suchocka government, which is proceeding in the right direction.

[Nazarewicz] Let us return to your experiences as a minister in several cabinets. Does the fact that you have never left any of them mean that you have never had any doubts about any government decisions? Was there no cabinet that began to run aground in moral terms?

[Skubiszewski] There can be various situations and doubts. There were also issues that fell into the category of morality.

[Nazarewicz] When did you have such doubts?

[Skubiszewski] Prime Minister Olszewski and his colleagues embarked on such a course during the last week of that government's existence regarding the so-called files issue. They went so far that the primate, Cardinal Glemp, found it necessary to say about those who had been slandered: "Many of them, people who are upright and noble, have suffered injustices, slander, and false suspicions in this confusion. I offer my sincere apologies to all these people." However, Olszewski's government was dismissed immediately and I did not have to leave it, because there was nothing left to leave. I was abroad when that event took place. When I returned, the government was no more.

[Nazarewicz] From what you have said, I would, however, conclude that, in taking up the post of foreign minister in successive governments, you did not always have the same attitude toward them.

[Skubiszewski] The decision to enter the Jan Olszewski government was a difficult one. I had many, serious misgivings, and they were all proven right. The prime minister himself urged me very strongly to join the government. I had two very long conversations with him at his request. I hesitated, and declined the first time. When the Sejm approved his mission, Prime Minister Olszewski immediately turned to me and stressed that the situation was different. It was not. He tried to reach me by telephone, but I was neither at the Ministry or at home, because I was attending two meetings. It was the president who put an end to my vacillation when he specially returned from Gdansk the following day regarding the formation of the government. However, I was left with the feeling that the decision was not a good one.

[Nazarewicz] Do you regret it?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, I do not think that I should have entered the government in view of what I encountered. My main reason for entering the government was that certain very difficult issues regarding Russia, especially the withdrawal of Russian forces from Poland, had not been completely resolved. It was possible to complete these issues thanks to President Lech Walesa's support for the arduous and consistent work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

His role in Moscow on 22 June 1992 was decisive. Lech Walesa was involved with the withdrawal of the forces from the beginning of his presidency. I would also single out the lengthy and effective work performed by Professor Jerzy Makarczyk, the secretary of state, who is now a judge at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. There were great moments when progress was made on these matters. It was to due to the actions of the Belvedere and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Had it not been for our strenuous work on various levels, there would have been a danger that, in the spring of 1992, the issue of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Poland would have remained at the same stage as it is in the Baltic states. President Walesa removed a significant burden from Poland.

However, let us remember the broader context. In 1989, I had decided to accept the offer of joining the government and conducting foreign policy, irrespective of what upheavals may have been in store. Without going back to earlier conflicts, I would say that, during all the upheavals during Prime Minister Olszewski's government, it was possible to protect foreign policy. Besides, to this day I do not understand why Olszewski and his government did not make foreign policy one of its successes, but, on the contrary, there were a great many difficulties. But is is history already. Another difficult time in my work as minister occurred recently, and it was the necessity of having to choose between The Hague and Warsaw.

[Nazarewicz] Your decision was received with great relief. Today, few politicians can sacrifice such really large sums of money. This prompts one to ask about what public service really means to a politician and what the limits to making sacrifices are?

[Skubiszewski] The Hague is—thinking in terms of money—over $12,000 a month tax free! Those are enormous sums, not only for Poland. On top of that, there is a pension amounting to $6,000 a month. Let us assume that I had been chosen for a full term of office in the fall. I decided to stand as a candidate for The Hague court. That would have been a good moment to go. In June 1992, when I accepted Prime Minister Suchocka's proposal to join her government, I said that it would not be for long. I do not know when my colleagues in the government were born, but I am certainly the oldest. To return to The Hague—it was the most difficult thing for me—from the outset, I was not sure what to do. It was a decision that was the subject of a whole series of conversations with both the president and the prime minister, as well as many other people, including people abroad. Very important foreign circles wanted me to join the International Court of Justice. The talks and reflection on the issue took up a great deal of time. One could say that it was a kind of extended agony and the patient was suffering. It is said that it was my decision. However, one's own decisions are made under various circumstances and are dictated by various priorities. Can one say that it was a completely free decision? Essentially, I made the decision a day or a day and half before the vote in The Hague.

[Nazarewicz] We were wondering whether something had not suddenly happened....

[Skubiszewski] No, nothing happened. As I said, it was under consideration since March. The people that I spoke to also underwent a certain evolution.

[Nazarewicz] What argument prevailed?

[Skubiszewski] I decided that, at the moment, stability has to be maintained in the Ministry. I had to consider the view that my departure from the government would be the cause of a certain amount of disquiet among political parties and that it would weaken the cabinet. I was even told that the government would collapse (I personally did not think so). However, it is a fact that there were three ministers that the government did not have at the time, and now a key post would have been vacated. I would have gone at the beginning of June, but it was known that there would have been certain problems with finding a candidate for the post of minister of foreign affairs. I was not convinced of all those things, but did take that view into consideration. And I would also recall the question of loyalty. I also took account of the advantages of continuity in the concept underlying the conduct of foreign policy. I do not wish to say that there must be a personal dimension to this, but something of the kind is present. Maybe we find ourselves looking at a moral issue once again: If the government is dismissed and I am dismissed along with it, and then another government is formed that I am not asked to join it, the situation is a different one. However, I could have been a factor that would have set in motion a great deal of confusion. That is how I saw it at the time, with the layout of forces in the state being such as it is.

[Nazarewicz] What do you mean by a great deal of confusion?

[Skubiszewski] You should go and ask for an interview somewhere else.

[Nazarewicz] The confusion was not avoided. However, not you, but the public sector strikes and what they entailed were the cause.

[Skubiszewski] Of course, all those events had more of an impact on the government than anyone's departure could have had. The situation has changed, and the question regarding me has lost importance. However, when the question was pertinent, things were different. There were other problems in addition to the strikes and the vote of no confidence. Besides, following the confidence vote in the Sejm, my position looked different once again. The president talked to me, and he accurately foresaw the way things would go. The president has a good insight into our kaleidoscope.

[Nazarewicz] Can you see yourself participating in a Belvedere government? That is something of a hypothetical question today.

[Skubiszewski] I am not a professional politician, I am not a candidate for political office. I came to the Ministry on 12 September 1989, because the situation was such that I thought I could be useful. It was necessary to achieve a breakthrough, to show the world that there are changes in such an important area as foreign policy, although we are moving gradually. In 1989, there was a struggle between the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and Prime Minister Mazowiecki over the Ministry. Mazowiecki won, promoting someone who had no connections with the previous regime. From the beginning (1944/45), I opposed Soviet domination and its local offshoots. Please go to Poznan and ask about that.

[Nazarewicz] You said: I could have been useful. How do you see that today? Were you useful?

[Skubiszewski] I hope so. Today, Poland has its own original foreign policy, which was formulated with great difficulty. It is outstanding in many respects. It is a policy that is realizing the Polish raison d'etat, a policy that is developing lasting relations with the West and combining them with good relations with the East.

[Nazarewicz] You said that you are consistently developing an original foreign policy, but I did not get the impression that parliament understands that. During your Sejm speech of 29 April, you referred to certain items of legislation that parliament was dealing with sluggishly. There is, for example, the copyright question, which is making it difficult for us to achieve international agreements.

[Skubiszewski] In the very general picture of important issues that you are drawing, the copyright issue is a detail, although a very important one. I have never been involved in a significant conflict with parliament. The fact that parliament did not accept my report on the Euroregions does not change my assessment. During the later general debate on foreign policy, no one criticized the Euroregions any more.

[Nazarewicz] However, you showed the members of parliament quite clearly that they were sluggish and were dealing with issues of little importance for the country....

[Skubiszewski] No, you are distorting things. I am describing our country's foreign policy. Even if it is not understood by everyone, the majority have responded positively to me.

[Nazarewicz] What did you consider to be the most pressing and vital matter that the Sejm and the Senate should have considered before the president's decision to dissolve parliament?

[Skubiszewski] Undoubtedly the copyright question that you have mentioned. Parliament was not behind schedule on ratification issues. However, the question of ratifying the concordat will arise shortly.

[Nazarewicz] During the budget debate, you said that it would be unacceptable for Poland not to pay its contributions to international organizations.

[Skubiszewski] Parliament really could increase those sums allocated out of the state budget, especially as the sums involved are not very large. This is an area where it could really have acted, by making savings elsewhere. It is a question of the state's prestige. The matter is shameful, because, so far, I have been unable to pay Poland's contributions to the UN, and we already know that we will be in arrears with our payments to the Council of Europe and the CSCE. It may cause international organizations to become concerned, but it does not settle anything yet. States that are financially sound pay their contributions in January, in advance.

[Nazarewicz] Is the paying of contributions not a gauge of political standards of conduct?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, it is also a question of a state's integrity. If one is a member of a certain organization, one has to pay one's dues.

[Nazarewicz] We are entering another difficult period in Poland's relations with its neighbors on the other side of the eastern border. What is your assessment of the results of President Walesa's visit to Ukraine, which is experiencing a serious governmental crisis?

[Skubiszewski] It was very successful visit. The president conducted talks well on difficult subjects in Kiev. Ukraine is a partner with whom we have good relations, and we will systematically develop and enhance them. There is a large bilateral sphere, but we also want to cooperate with Ukraine in a Europe that is in the process of uniting. Having achieved more progress in this area, we are prepared to assist Ukraine in its ties with European organizations.

[Nazarewicz] Many opinion polls show that there is considerable concern among Poles regarding their neighbors—Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

[Skubiszewski] Yes, the political and economic situation in those countries is in a state of flux, and it is difficult to make any forecasts. They are embarking on the road to appropriate development with difficulty—only the beginnings of a democratic transformation are starting up there. As an immediate neighbor, we could become the first victims of more serious conflicts there. That is why the bridge that we are building to the East must be supported by very strong Western pillars. We will not interfere in conflicts between the states that have emerged from the former USSR. We will participate in multilateral diplomatic prevention and peace operations.

[Nazarewicz] Are your Western partners in the WEU, NATO, and the EC aware of that.

[Skubiszewski] I recently initiated a debate on that subject at a closed session of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on the initiative of the British chairman, Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd.

[Nazarewicz] NATO and the WEU still do not see any practical possibility of Poland becoming a member, and the same is true of the EC. Our presence at the WEU Consultative Forum alongside other postcommunist bloc states is a kind of polite, but consistent way of keeping Poland in Europe's anteroom.

[Skubiszewski] That cannot be described with the one word anteroom, and one does not have to place NATO and the WEU on one level. The latter will, in my estimation, undergo a renaissance. During my recent speech at the WEU Consultative Forum with the participation of states from Central and Eastern Europe, I stressed the necessity of integrating all of Europe and extending the sphere of European security above all. I think that lies in the interest of the entire continent, and that is how the issue is viewed by the members of the WEU. Nevertheless, today it is difficult to determine when the integration of Central and Western Europe will take place, and that also applies to security.

[Nazarewicz] In their numerous speeches, representatives of the so-called national faction in the Polish parliament have called for the closure of our borders, mainly in the east and the south. ZChN [Christian-National Union] deputies have called for the fastest possible introduction of visas, and if that were to happen, then it be the most certain way of closing the door on European integration. What is your view?

[Skubiszewski] Borders have to be controlled, but not closed. I think that it will be possible to avoid visas, if we ensure that our country has good border controls. Of course, that is easier said than done, especially with the limited resources at our disposal. The eastern border was a wall until recently, suddenly it was opened, and on that border we have to regulate the movement of great masses of people coming to our country from the east. If we introduce visas for the east, then in practice we too will stop travelling to the east, and Poles in the east will stop coming to Poland, because great bureaucratic problems will arise there.

[Nazarewicz] Recently, I read a letter from a reader following the signing of the Polish-German law on asylum-seekers. He suggested that the Germans had bought themselves peace from a wave of Romanian immigrants from us for an inconsiderable amount of money. Do you agree with that?

[Skubiszewski] The agreement had to be signed, because the issue is a European one, and the Germans would have closed their borders anyhow, and then we would have been left with the entire problem. We will accept our citizens from Germany—there is no doubt about that—and citizens of other states who got to Germany from Poland illegally. In view of that, we are guarding our borders better, so that Romanian citizens and others do not come to us to try to move further afield.

[Nazarewicz] It is said that you are very protective of your private life. Your colleagues are exceptionally discreet, and sometimes they even admit that they themselves do not know much about you. So, I will try to do something to satisfy public curiosity. What kind of soup do you like?

[Skubiszewski] I like everything that is prepared well.

[Nazarewicz] Is there a good cook in the ministry, where you usually eat?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, I like the food in the canteen. It is, above all, healthy. You can try it out. It is the first time in my life that I have eaten in a canteen in Poland—well, you see what has come of me in my old age. As far as soups are concerned, I like tomato, cucumber, and crayfish soups, but crayfish soup is not eaten nowadays. I remember crayfish soup from my parents' home. There are no crayfish today. Have you ever seen a basket full of crayfish resting on nettles?

[Nazarewicz] Unfortunately not. Is there anything that you dream of?

[Skubiszewski] I would like to have permanent access to a good international law library (there is one in The Hague). I would also like to take a rest, in the Wielkopolska countryside, because I am very much attached to it, or perhaps somewhere in the Lublin area, which is where my father's family came from. I also like the Baltic, I do not need any other sea.

[Nazarewicz] People say you are a charming man, you spend your vacations with nuns.

[Skubiszewski] You can see for yourself that I have got nothing to hide.

[Nazarewicz] What do you really regret?

[Skubiszewski] Most of all? I now regret that I never married. I did not regret that when I was young. A Pole is wise after the event. Nowadays, I would not have the time to have lunch with my wife. Sometimes, when my sister comes to visit me and cooks something first-rate, I manage to find some time. Since I joined the ministry, my private life ceased to exist. That's too bad, maybe the point about my private life is that there isn't one? But that will no doubt end shortly—there will be elections first, and then a new government and a new foreign minister.

Non-Party Bloc Preparing To Present Program

LD2806222593 Warsaw PAP in English 2200 GMT 28 Jun 93

[Text] Warsaw, June 28—The second session of the Programmatic Council of the Non-Party Reform Bloc (BBWR) has begun discussion of over 60 manifesto proposals put forward by its supporters, Andrzej Olechowski, economic adviser to President Lech Walesa, announced on Monday.

Olechowski announced that the electoral programme of the BBWR would contain 21 points, covering agriculture, central and local government, employment relations, education, culture, and ecology. He added that the main aim of the Programmatic Council was to ensure that the BBWR programme was internally consistent.

The programme is to be ready by next week at the latest.

In Zielona Gora on Monday, Solidarity Leader Marian Krzaklewski announced that he would not be standing for election to parliament in the September elections. Krzaklewski, whose Solidarity Union decided at the weekend not to join President Walesa's BBWR, said that he believed it would be impossible for him to fulfil simultaneously the function of union leader and parliamentary representative.

Krzaklewski added that the Union was not seeking to assume power, but rather to ensure a solidarity presence in parliament at a time when the rights of employees and unions are under threat, "and when democratic reforms are not being continued in the direction we fought for in the 1980's." He said that the Union would be pleased to achieve the 5 percent threshhold necessary for representation in the next Sejm, and would reckon 7 percent support as a great achievement.

In other election news, the Supreme Council of the Christian National Union (ZCHN) announced on Monday that the party's recently-declared electoral alliance with the Peasant Agreement (PL) could form the basis for a wider election pact. Marek Jurek, said that the coalition should act as a Catholic and national counterweight to government coalitions influenced by leftist-liberal and neo-communist forces.

Jurek, a ZCHN deputy in the outgoing parliament, added that while the party would honour all agreements with the European Communities signed by previous Polish governments, it was important to defend Polish interests and Polish sovereignty. Also, the ZCHN Supreme Council demanded that the government immediately introduce visa requirements for those seeking to use Poland simply as a route for illegal immigration.

Leader of the Peasant Agreement (PL) Gabriel Janowski reiterated the ZCHN stance on the possibility of creating a wider coalition, although he admitted that talks with the leading centre-right parties, and with the Polish Peasants Party (PSL) had not yielded the expected results.

Speaking in the southern Polish city of Krakcow, Janowski added that he believed President Walesa's BBWR could form the basis of a presidential element in the forthcoming parliament, but was not a body which existing political parties, "the basis of parliamentary democracy," could join.

In Koszalin (north-west Poland), leader of the populist "Samoobrona" Farmers Self-Defence Union Andrzej Lepper announced that his Union would present candidates in every electoral district, and that it would put forward policies designed to defend the interests of the rural population. He added that, in accordance with the requirements of the electoral ordinance, he would shortly issue a sworn affidavit to the effect that he was never an agent of the American CIA, the Soviet KGB, or of the Israeli intelligence service Mosad.

Solidarity Holds Congress; Walesa Quits

AU3006112193 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28 Jun 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by GAZETA staffers Marek Bialowas, Robert Gromadzki, and Jaroslaw Kurski: "Farewell to Walesa"]

[Text] Solidarity's last historic leaders walked out of the union's congress. "This is not my Solidarity," said Walesa.

The fifth Solidarity congress, meeting on its second day in Zielona Gora on Saturday [26 June], decided to run independently in the elections. Two hundred and fifty one delegates were in favor of this decision, with only 16 against, and 22 abstentions. The congress did not discuss the union's possibility of joining the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR].

In the corridors of the congress hall, the surprisingly quick decision concerning the elections was attributed to rumors that Lech Walesa was on his way to Zielona Gora. Delegates were reluctant to discuss the BBWR in his presence.

Several hours later, it was unofficially announced that the president was not on his way after all.

On the "Panorama" television news program on Sunday evening, Lech Walesa commented on congress events thus: "My path and that of Solidarity are diverging from each other. I do not want to belong to such a union. One cannot suppress arguments. The Solidarity that I built never did so. I do not know what has happened, but this is not my Solidarity." When these words of Walesa's were read out in the hall, there was a round of applause.

Yesterday [27 June] afternoon the congress adopted a resolution condemning former Solidarity parliamentary club deputies for "pursuing their own policies, ignoring the opinion of the National Commission." The congress warned that "these persons have already broken their pledges once, and there is no guarantee that they will not do so in future." Voting in favor of this resolution were 134 delegates, with 85 against and 53 abstentions.

"People here are being tried without the possibility of defending themselves. People with names like Rulewski might have given the union more votes. Now these votes may be absent," said former Solidarity senator Alina Pienkowska. She then lay down her Solidarity delegate's mandate. Two other delegates followed her example.

Speaking to the press, Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the deputies addressed in the resolution, said: "That resolution is a personal defeat for me. I wanted to work in the union. I believed the union and I were indispensable to each other. I acted in Poland's interests, not my own. Everything I did was in good faith."

Jan Rulewski, also criticized in the resolution, said he felt like a fish that has been cast out of the water, but added that he has no intention of leaving the union.

Stanislaw Weglarz, former Solidarity deputy, described the resolution as a "tragedy for the union." He said: "At the previous congress, Walesa said Borusewicz was his teacher. And yet at this congress, the Solidarity foundations personified by Borusewicz have been crushed."

In the evening, the union, by a majority of votes, altered the resolution wording by deleting the word "condemns" and replacing it with "negatively assesses." The sentence about persons who have broken their pledges was deleted.

Despite the fact that the decision on Solidarity's participation in the elections had already been made, a debate on this subject took place all the same.

"The union should either refrain from participating in the elections altogether, or it should form its own political party," said former Solidarity deputy Wojciech Arkuszewski. In his opinion, the concept of a Solidarity deputies club inside parliament is incorrect, and could lead to the union's disintegration.

Arkuszewski's remarks were greeted by laughter, and some delegates ostentatiously walked out of the hall. "I am quitting the union. I cannot continue to work this way," said an upset Arkuszewski. "There is nothing more I can do. I wish everyone else here success, maybe they will succeed where I cannot."

Bogdan Borusewicz supported the idea of forming a political party. "Only a trade union that jointly runs the country can have its own parliamentary representation," he said. "For a union, whose purpose is to protect workers' interests, such a representation is wrong."

Borusewicz also criticized the present Solidarity leadership. "The union cannot behave like a beleaguered fortress and surround itself with a wall of ever-increasing height. The National Commission cannot behave like a communist party central committee for which the concepts of constitution, rights, and parliamentary status have no meaning."

Marek Markiewicz, former Solidarity deputy and currently chairman of the Radio and Television Committee, said that "the decisions that have been made today could lead to an election defeat."

Solidarity leader Marian Krzaklewski criticized the idea of forming a political party. "It would have to be approved by the majority of Solidarity members, and people have generally had bad experiences with political parties." He said that he would demand that the future parliamentary club be subordinated to the National Commission.

The congress failed to decide how to finance the election campaign. A draft resolution proposing that each Solidarity member contribute 10,000 zlotys was rejected. Union treasurer Leszek Jankowski was dismayed. "Solidarity has no money for the campaign. This is absurd. I do not know what will happen."

On Sunday, the delegates also addressed an appeal to society as follows: "Our fatherland is in danger. The elections are going to be a decisive battle for Poland. We have had enough of the state's paralysis, the authorities' incompetence, and society's isolation from decision-making processes."

Although the congress voted in favor of a resolution recognizing as harmful the activity of the "network" of Solidarity factory committees and other informal structures, the vote was later considered invalid.

In its programmatic resolution, Solidarity said that the most important tasks of the future Solidarity parliamentary club are to bring about the adoption of the new Polish constitution, accelerate work on a decommunization law, bring those guilty of economic scheming to justice, and protect trade union rights. The union also called on the president and government to stop the planned increases in energy prices and housing rents.

Foreign Ministry Condemns U.S. Strike on Baghdad

AU3006111893 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Our correspondent accredited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has briefed us on the news conference held by its spokesman, Mr. Mircea Geoana.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledges the statement made by the U.S. Administration in connection with the military action undertaken by the United States against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, a statement according to which this action was based on the independent and exhaustive examination of indications that Iraq had prepared, equipped, and tried to carry out a terrorist operation that threatened the life of former President George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in April.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterates Romania's position of condemning, repudiating, and completely eradicating any kind of terrorist forms and practices.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expresses regrets about the fact that this military action claimed human lives among the Iraqi civilian population, something that cannot be justified by any means.

At the same time, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses the hope that the Iraqi Government will act toward peacefully and definitively solving problems by strictly abiding by the pertinent UN Security Council resolutions.

The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that efforts have to be made by both sides so that the situation that has been created will not intensify the conflict and lead to new forms of military actions.

Our correspondent, Doina Saiciuc, has informed us that the official visit that the minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Teodor Melescanu, will pay on 5-6 July to Tirana was also announced.

Serbs Demand $50,000 To Release 30 Blocked Ships

AU3006114193 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1112 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 30/6/1993—Thirty Romanian ships are blocked upstream Mohacs, in the international sector of the Danube. Serbians demand an over 50,000 dollar fee to let them return to the country, announces Gheorghe Antitescu, commercial manager of the Navrom River Shipping Company.

Iliescu Reviews Recent Visits, Talks Abroad

AU2906155193 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 24 Jun 93 pp 1, 3

[Part two of interview with President Ion Iliescu by Rodica Avram; place and date not given: "There Is No Democracy When There Is Misery and Starvation"]

[Text] [Avram] Mr. President Ion Iliescu, after the "tour de force" you made to participate in important meetings in Vienna, Geneva, and Crans Montana, would you please review the main points of these meetings and what their effects will be on our country's life?

[Iliescu] I would divide last week's tour—so to say—into three major components. First there was my participation in each of the three important international meetings. As far as the Vienna conference that was dedicated to human rights is concerned, it was the first forum of such scope and at that level since the "Iron Curtain" disappeared. Therefore it was of particular significance. Our presence was marked by the two well-known positions of ours: Our position on human rights as a decisive philosophy for the development of international relations today and for social development on the whole aimed at consolidating the democratic framework of the development of social and political activity in all countries and in relations between states. This position was joined by the strong position of the poorly developed states in connection with the process that is known to the world, namely the widening gap between rich and poor and the difficulties faced by the developing countries. They came to this meeting with the slogan "the right to development" as a fundamental right of these peoples. One cannot talk of democracy and individual freedom when there is misery and starvation. Consequently, the problem of overcoming the underdevelopment stage is an essential and fundamental condition even for the stability of the international political activity.

Then there were the two conferences in Geneva: the conference on disarmament, which already has continuity in the international political activity and within UN functions. The problem of disarmament gained a new connotation after the disappearance of the two blocs that were confronting each other. Our address at this meeting is known; it discussed, on the one hand, recent developments, the danger of a nuclear war, and, on the other hand, it drew attention to the conflicts that have emerged in various points on the globe and the threat that can by posed by proliferation of conventional weapons which continue to wipe out human lives. In my speech, I also drew attention to the deterioration of regional and local balances.

This is why I launched the idea of transparency in connection with conventional weapons and the transfer of such weapons between states.

Finally, I participated in the ILO conference which this year discussed the problem of social protection—a subject that was greeted by us, because it suits our interests.

We stressed Romania's concern with effective communication between partners and with social dialogue linked to strengthening a system based—along with the development of our economic activity—on the principles of the market economy, that is on a partnership between employers, wage-earners (trade unions), and government as a mediator. In conclusion, these three international meetings were an opportunity for us to contact representative forums and to present our concerns and the problem confronting us, and they were an opportunity to conduct dialogues on major prevalent issues of the international activity.

This would be the first component of my visits last week. The second was my participation in the Crans Montana Forum.

The third component of the visit was the meetings with multiple representatives of the countries which hosted the meetings in which I participated. In Austria I met with President Thomas Klestil, with Federal Chancellor Vranitzky, and with Foreign Minister Alois Mock. Our talks focused on bilateral questions. I think that there is a positive atmosphere for developing our future relations; as Danube countries with longstanding traditions we have common interests. The desire was expressed to develop these relations and we established a few tangible things with Chancellor Vranitzky at the government level. It is very interesting to study the Austrian experience because it has been particularly successful in a balanced economic development and in the development of a social market economy—a term used by the Crans Montana Forum. This idea is also included in the platform of the Social-Democratic Party, but I have also come across this term in the discussion entitled "Where Is Europe Heading?" at which a Swiss researcher—but also businessman—expressed surprise at the enthusiasm with which some people in the East speak about the irreversible progress toward capitalism when they themselves are ashamed of pronouncing the word "capitalism," although they are in the middle of the developed capitalist world, when the whole of Europe is speaking of "social market economy." What does this mean? A formula that tries to combine the virtues of the market economy, with all the incentives it represents for record economic development, with ensuring better social protection and diminishing social discrepancies. Thus, the term "social market economy" has become a political platform for numerous political forces, not only for the social-democrats. I have held talks on this subject with Chancellor Vranitzky in connection with an exchange of experience in this respect and with intensifying our economic and political thinking regarding the future of our society's development.

[Avram] In Switzerland you also had numerous meetings: with the president of the Confederation, with members of the Federal Council (government), with local leadership representatives, and with businessmen. Can one talk of a tangible effect of those talks?

[Iliescu] All these talks underscored our mutual interest in closer cooperation. I can say that I have noted increased interest by politicians and financial-economic circles in opening toward Romania. As a matter of fact, lately I have noted the presence of representatives of Swiss companies in Romania. This time around I met again with the director general of Brown-Bovery company; a team has been in our country to examine opportunities for cooperation with some five Romanian units. I also held talks with the Suchard company representatives; negotiations on a joint venture with a Brasov unit have already begun. I met with the leader of Nestle company, the biggest complex in the food industry, which is interested in developing cooperation with Romania, especially in the area of baby food. Numerous other companies and banking institutions were interested in initiating relations of cooperation. We discussed the possibility of using a framework of cooperation for training banking cadres.

On the whole, we may speak of a busy week with numerous opportunities for contacts and dialogues. I have not mentioned a number of other meetings with the chiefs of European and non-European states. This is the advantage of multilateral meetings, because, in a short time, they offer opportunities for contacts which otherwise could take place only over a long period of time.

[Avram] Considering the realistic and much more favorable perception of Romanian realities during the international meetings you attended, the slow-motion process of our country's admittance to the Council of Europe is hard to understand.

[Iliescu] There are two elements to this problem. I conducted several dialogues in connection with Romania's image. Many of the people I talked to noted, on the one hand, insufficient information about Romania's situation and real developments and, on the other hand, even a sort of disinformation and distorted presentation of what is happening in our country. At this level, we have to accept that each one has his own concerns: We are living in a tense time when economic activity is encountering difficulties at the world, continental, and national level. It is normal for everyone to be concerned with his own problems and this is why there is a certain reticence in connection with expanding the circle of partners within the European Community. Similarly, there are factors that somehow hamper the dissemination of information and there are political obstacles—the effects of what I termed "vestiges of ideological intoxication." My partners in the dialogue told me that the sometimes false perception of Romanian realities is also because of the negative influence of certain circles and politicians in our country; in this respect, such people do our country a disfavor. Maybe not always because of ill-will, but their actions are antinational, no matter what their intention. By expressing their grudge, such people transfer their political struggle abroad, thus undermining Romania's national interests. I think that we have to have the necessary moral strength and power to rise above group and party interests, and to rally our efforts to contribute to the correct understanding of realities the way they are. This is an essential civic duty which many people do not understand, being simply blinded by political obsessions. This exacerbation of political discords, especially when they reflect abroad, is very bad for us. During the talks I held last week I was cautioned against this weakness of the Romanians compared with others who know how to plead for their national interests, regardless of whether they belong to the government or opposition.

[Avram] Mr. President, I suggest that we conclude this interview on an optimistic note, that is by bearing in mind what you said before about the fact that Romanian realities are perceived much more favorably lately. Proof in this respect is the attention paid to Romania at the important international meetings you attended. Thank you.

Defense Ministry Denies Training Terrorists

AU3006114393 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1058 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 30/6/1993—"No foreign persons are trained for terrorist purposes in any military unit in Romania, either belonging to the Armed Forces or to the other militarized institutions of the state," shows the Armed Forces Press Office.

Allegations in a publication that there is a centre training terrorists in Fagaras, central Romania, and that Romania helps Irak to hide its chemical weapon, are thus denied.

Melescanu on Ties With Moldova; Announces Snegur Visit

AU3006110793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0921 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 30/6/1993—"Ties between Romania and the Republic of Moldova have entered now a different stage," stated Teodor Melescanu, Romania's foreign minister, in an interview granted to the CURIERUL NATIONAL daily.

"It had been a first stage with prevailing interests for the promotion of major and generous ideas, of some ideals. Now we are passing to a new stage and we must find out that concrete ways for giving substance to these generous ideas... We have already passed the stage of talks over the need of economic integration, for example, but we are now concerned with concrete ways of translating it into fact.... We have already passed the stage when we were referring to the need for the people to circulate. However, about 3.5 million Romanians crossed the border last year (to the Republic of Moldova) in both ways. So, now we have reached the stage when we are concerned with a decent circulation of these people...," the Romanian diplomat said.

The Romanian foreign minister also pointed out "the important role of the decision of Romania's Parliament regarding the establishment of a special fund to ensure financing of several cooperation projects with the Republic of Moldova. We have tried together to establish the priority of projects needing financial assistance. And the result was that a most important field is that of infrastructure of power systems, the building of a railroad with European rail gauge that would allow a decent circulation, the linkage of Moldova to one of the fibre optics networks for telecommunication that is due to start operation in Romania. Not the least important is the project for complex adjustment works of the Prut River..."

Teodor Melescanu also showed that a second priority as regards assistance projects goes to culture, education, science and education.

During the interview, Mr. Melescanu also informed that the president of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, is expected to arrive to Bucharest in July and that Romania hopes to resume a quadripartite mechanism, that is collaboration among Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania to contribute to the political settlement of the existing issues in the eastern part of Moldova.

Moldova's Lucinschi Meets Parliamentary Leaders

AU2906181693 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1608 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 29/6/1993—Senate's President Oliviu Gherman and Chamber of Deputies's Speaker Adrian Nastase met on June 29 at noon with Petru Lucinschi, the president of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, who is making an official visit in Romania.

During the interview, the Romanian Parliament's representatives remarked "the stagnation in the bilateral relations," underscoring the desire to revigorate them in multiple fields. They also underlined the necessity of a new impetus to be given to the parliamentary relations between the two Romanian states, noticing that the relations at government level were much more advanced. A peculiar stress was set on the relations between the communities of the two states within the general framework of the relations between their central administrations.

The heads of the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament clearly expressed "their belief that demarches are necessary to be made over concrete matters of mutual interest." They also emphasized the necessity of a closer coordination of the two countries' diplomatic and parliamentary demarches within the European institutions' framework.

The lack of dynamism is a fact, the Romanian parliamentarians stated and further termed the cultural exchanges as "of low quality and level."

In his turn, Petru Lucinschi, president of the Republic of Moldova's Parliament, presented to his collocutors proofs of a likely clarification process occurring in the Republic of Moldova which would further outline a more favorable attitude toward intensified relations with Romania. He admitted the necessity of talks over concrete issues of mutual interest. "We need time to consolidate our achievements so far," Petru Lucinschi concluded.

Addresses Deputies

AU2906163493 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1317 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Speech by Petru Lucinschi, chairman of the Moldovan Parliament, to a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies in Bucharest on 29 June—live]

[Text] Parliamentarians, honored audience, ladies and gentlemen: The very fact that the chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova is standing in front of you now and is conveying warm greetings on behalf of our parliamentarians is a sign that essential changes have occurred in the world, in Europe, and on the two banks of the Prut River, changes which we have witnessed and have participated in.

Messrs. Deputies, the proclamation launched before the people of Bessarabia on 19 October 1859 by Alexandru Ioan Cuza and Vasile Alecsandri read as follows: We want you to view our arrival amongst you as a sign of peace and gratification. We want you to forget the past, to close your ears to the voice of bad sentiments, and to be firm in your faith and love for the Moldovan country. Our homeland has embarked upon a road of improvements that will benefit all its sons, without any discrimination. What we should, however, never forget is the fact that one has to work hard to accumulate wealth. Only through wisdom and patience will we be able to fulfill our desires.

I hope you agree with the topicality of these words. It is our firm conviction to see to it that relations between the Republic of Moldova in all areas will reach the European development level. Our common integration into Europe would be a precious inheritance, which we could leave to our successors. Then we could say—in a dignified way—that we have fulfilled our mission as politicians.

The events of the past years in the life of our young state prove that we have achieved certain successes. There have been emotional events, flower bridges, and numerous cultural events, but there has also been a sort of euphoria that has hampered the development of things in their depth. Let us bear in mind that we are evolving from totalitarianism toward democracy and, at the same time, toward a state governed by law. This is quite a difficult task.

Messrs. Deputies, we have been asking ourselves of late what was the aim of the platform of the movement for the people's strengthening and for awakening their national awareness in 1989-90? We have examined what we achieved during these years in order to realize what we have accomplished and where we went wrong. The conclusion is as follows: The movement pleaded for the democratization of society. We wanted greater publicity, we wanted national and cultural freedom.

Then, events took a different turn. The initial platform was almost completely forgotten. At the end of the second millennium, the world has entered a new stage of integration. By virtue of inertia, we are making too much policy, but we do not ask ourselves what is of primary importance in all this: Sovereignty and independence, which permit us to have different relations with the world; we should enjoy this fact.

Now it lies in our power to create favorable conditions for economic, cultural, and scientific integration and so forth. It has been repeatedly said that Romania respects the will of the Moldovan people—the only ones entitled to decide on their future. Romania supports, by all means, the strengthening of our sovereignty and our affirmation at the European and international level, and shares the conviction that our future cannot be viewed except within the context of Europe. Please believe me, this is a wise policy and we want to express our thanks.

Now I would like to talk about certain problems we are facing. The fact is known that the Republic of Moldova was created in 1940 from part of Bessarabia, which was part of Romania, and from another part of the former autonomous Moldovan Republic, which was part of Ukraine. The borders of this republic were recognized by more than 120 states. We joined the international community, the United Nations, and we hold the status of special guest within the Council of Europe.

As for the situation created on the left bank of the Prut, let us not examine it only as historians, let us deal with it primarily as realistic politicians. I want to draw attention to the following event: During the disintegration of the Soviet Union, numerous forces were involved, which by all means wanted to stop this inevitable process. An opposition movement against the democratic forces was created in most of the former republics. This is a specific reality both in the Baltic countries, the Caucasian countries, and in Moldova. It is obvious that the armed forces of the former USSR did all they could to see to the emergence and consolidation of their military structures—the two pseudo-republics: Tiraspol and Gagauz region.

They have set up a joint bloc and, under these conditions, it is not always easy for us to stabilize the social-political situation. We are between Scylla and Charybdis, some are pulling us to one side and other to another side. You know both of them, I do not have to call them by their name to stir emotions again.

An essential change that we have to take into consideration occurred in the postwar period when a new demographic and national situation was created. We have 64.5

percent Moldovans in the Republic of Moldova, 13.8 percent Ukrainians, 13.0 percent Russians, 3.5 percent Gagauzians, 2 percent Bulgarians, 1.5 percent Jews, and 1.7 percent of other nationalities.

The native population forms the minority in our big cities. The same thing can be said about many rayon centers. About 25 percent of the total number of families are mixed families. As the poet Ion Vatamanu—who is here in the audience—says, the mother tongue of 4.6 percent of Moldovans does not appear as Romanian in their passport.

Gentlemen, this is a reality that we have to take into account. If we do not, we are going to live in an atmosphere of permanent interethnic confrontations, especially now, when following the military conflict in the Dniester region, all kind of weaponry has spread uncontrollably. Anyway, how can we find solutions to these difficult problems? Would it be by creating an appropriate climate, true friendship with all our neighbors, and close relations with Romania, Ukraine, and Russia? With Ukraine we have common borders. Many of our people are currently in the composition of the Ukrainian state. Evidently in our relations with Ukraine and Russia, there is also an aspect that is called the interethnic aspect. In general, in the current legislation, but especially in the draft of the new constitution, human rights and the rights of ethnic groups are stipulated in detail. By the way, the constitution puts the foundation for a state of law, the separation of power in the state, and self-administration at local level, which will open up new prospects for the individual to develop in the plenitude of his capability.

Gentlemen, we have a common millennium-old history, the same language, and culture; however, we should not stop at this assessment. If we enumerate the laws that would give even more impetus to our relations, then we realize that still we have much work to do in our parliaments. However, we should not busy ourselves with unimportant things of a general nature because we, as current parliamentarians, are elected for a certain period.

In connection with this, I wish to tell you about an event: Once, Germany's former chancellor Helmut Schmidt arrived in Moscow. A correspondent asked him: In what way are you guiding yourselves by Karl Marx's theory? His answer was: in no way do we guide ourselves according to Marx's theory. We respect him as a scientist, but we guide ourselves by the opinion of the electorate. The main thing for us is also the opinion of the electorate. However, I am thinking about why transformations are advancing so slowly. Could the reason be that today there are very many of those who think only of Karl Marx? Gentlemen, let us adopt laws that would stop the Prut River from being an obstacle in our relations. Consultations on harmonizing laws regarding the freedom of the individual with international rules on human rights should come as natural for our parliamentarians. Mr. Adrian Nastase in his speech today also stressed this fact. There are possibilities to sign several special accords that are included in the draft of the basic treaty. On the eve of our departure, Messrs. Andronati and Melescanu signed a number of important documents and the implementation of those documents will elevate our cooperation to a new level.

Several limited companies have been established and we hope that joint enterprises, joint banks, and others will also follow. Romania's support has taken concrete shape in the assistance granted by the national bank for the printing of banknotes and coupons and 7,000 scholarships were granted to us. All these are noteworthy acts and we express our most profound gratitude for them. The channels of our fraternal relations are ensured through several crossing points over the Prut River. Symposiums, concerts, theater tours, book publications, simultaneous television broadcasts, religious services, and unveiling of monuments, have become ordinary events on both banks of the river.

We are trying to get rid of the nefarious heritage of the totalitarian regime and we are trying to stifle all kind of phobias that belong to relations among cavemen but not among civilized people. History has left its marks in people's psychology. The consequences can be seen in the mentality of people and in their behavior. I remember an instance during the first flower bridge built over the Prut River. A lot of people gathered on the bank of the river, just like for any festive occasion. Two citizens, after raising toasts, asked each other: where are you from? One of them said from Nisporeni, and you? The other one said: I am from Straseni. Well, I thought I came to meet a brother from Romania, my family, my village sent me here, but you are from a neighboring rayon. They started to fight.

Gentlemen, deputies, we would like you to accept us the way we are. History has not just taken a stroll through our destinies, it had ploughed and sown things that had not grown in our area before. To eliminate with one single stroke of a pen everything that puts obstacles in the path of the development of our relations, today, under the new conditions would mean to create new tension and new human tragedies. Let us move toward each other animated sacred feelings. The political wisdom should include the options of the broad masses of voters, who entrusted us with the destiny of the country.

Gentlemen, parliamentarians, I am extending to you my most sincere thanks for the honor you granted us by inviting us here as response to your visit. Please accept our friendly wishes for well-being, success, and prosperity.

Thank you. [applause]

Government 'Operative Command' To Deal With Harvest

AU2906122793 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0734 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 29/6/1993—A governmental operative command has been established in Romania for providing support to companies, associations, and private producers in grains harvesting and storage.

The command includes Viorel Hrebenciuc, general secretary of the government and head of the command; Ioan Oancea, minister of agriculture and food; state secretaries in the ministries of the interior, national defense, industries, finance, and transports; and other officials.

The recently set body aims to support the supply of material and financial resources for harvesting, transport, and storage of grains, to adopt special measures for ensuring the necessary funds for purchase at stimulative prices of previously contracted wheat harvests, providing also other facilities for farm producers.

The governmental operative command will make daily analysis on the harvesting, promptly providing support for the settlement of issues that may appear at territorial level.

Operative commands are to be established also at county level that will be headed by prefects.

Foreign Media Bulletin: Balkan Crisis 30 June

WA3006160093

The following is an overview of current FBIS reporting on events in the Balkans. It supplements other FBIS reporting and consists primarily of selected summaries of longer reports. For reference purposes, serial numbers of the longer reports are provided.

SUMMARY

Bosnian Croats call for full mobilization, curfew in Croatian-held areas, say UNPROFOR not welcome ... Fighting continues throughout Bosnia ... Bosnian Presidency agrees body should work "collectively" ... Bosnian Army chief expresses support for President Izetbegovic ... Humanitarian-aid convoys facing problems with financing, blockades.

MILITARY

MOBILIZATION ORDERED IN CROATIAN-HELD AREAS (Mostar Radio): Bosnian Croat forces issue order calling for full mobilization of all conscripts within 24 hours, the imposition of an evening curfew, a ban on the sale of alcohol, and the closing of all shops that do not sell food. Commander says UNPROFOR and EC monitors "no longer welcome" in Mostar because they have "caused nothing but harm" to the Croats while the Muslims have "used them for their own purposes." (LD3006130393, LD3006125193)

FIGHTING CONTINUES THROUGHOUT BOSNIA (Mostar Radio, Sarajevo Radio, TANJUG): Sarajevo Radio reports Croatian attacks on a column of refugees fleeing fighting in Novi Seher, "fierce battles" between Muslims and Croats being waged in Mostar. Zagreb Radio denies Muslim forces have broken Croatian hold on Zepce, says "Muslim media" are trying to "boost the morale" of the "battered" Muslim army by alleging that they have penetrated the town. TANJUG accuses Muslim forces of using "poison gas" in an attack on Bosnian Serb troops in a village near Sarajevo. (LD2906174593, AU3006095693, LD2906233893)

POLITICAL

BOSNIAN PRESIDENCY TO 'WORK COLLECTIVELY' (Sarajevo Radio): During a meeting in Sarajevo, the Bosnian Presidency decides that the body, which has been split into two factions over whether or not to negotiate a partition of the country with the Croats and Serbs, should "work collectively" and that initiatives by "individual Presidency members" should first be discussed at Presidency sessions. Members Ganic, Lasic, and Lazovic were requisitioned to draft an outline of the Presidency's stand on the country's future constitutional makeup. (LD2906172093)

BOSNIAN ARMY CHIEF SUPPORTS IZETBEGOVIC (Paris LE FIGARO): Commenting on rumors that Bosnian President Izetbegovic has been replaced, Bosnian Army Commander in Chief Delic says that the Army is "loyal to the legal Bosnian authorities, represented by" Izetbegovic and that if the country wishes to change its head of state it must do so through a "vote in parliament and probably a referendum." (PM2906143693)

HUMANITARIAN AID

CONVOYS FACING FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BLOCKADES (AFP, Sarajevo Radio): UNHCR spokesman says food convoys for Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia will cease in July due to a "lack of financial aid" and that existing food stocks will "completely run out" by the middle of the month. In addition, the Bosnian Ministry of Transportation has sent a letter to Bosnian Croat leader Boban saying that residents of besieged areas of Bosnia are "on the verge of famine" and "mass starvation" because of Croatian blockades of humanitarian aid convoys. (AU2906191093, LD2906224693)

Serbs, Croats Produce Plan for Bosnia

AU2906151193 Paris AFP in English 1452 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Geneva, June 29 (AFP)—The Serbo-Croat peace proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina are contained in a six-page document of three annexes.

The first part in nine points sets out constitutional principles for a confederal Bosnia-Herzegovina comprising three highly autonomous republics.

The second part, an agreement for peace, says that arrangements for a cessation of hostilities already discussed under the Vance-Owen peace plan will be retained in a form adapted to the needs of the way the splitting of the territories has been agreed.

The third section sets out interim arrangements for administration ahead of free elections under international supervision.

A provisional government is envisaged, to be known as a co-ordinating committee, with nine members, three from each community.

There would be a rotating presidency each month, with the foreign ministers changing every four months.

A frontier commission is proposed to deal with any border changes.

There would be one member from each community plus one each from the United Nations and the European Community. Crossing-points between the constituent republics would temporarily be under international supervision.

Each republic would have a police force reflecting the composition of the respective populations, with international supervision of the forces.

To protect human rights, there would be a human rights court, four ombudsmen and a special mission named by the United Nations and headed by a human rights commissioner based in Sarajevo, with deputies in the regions.

Details of Plan

LD3006235993 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2258 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Geneva, June 29 (TANJUG)—Top representatives of Bosnian Serbs and Croats agreed on Tuesday about a document on so-called transitional arrangements for the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The document specifies the role and organization of a coordinating body, a borders commission, future international borders, the police force, an international access authority for regulating full freedom of movement, and the final defining of mechanisms for the protection of human rights and restoring the status quo that had existed in certain areas before ethnic cleansing operations had been carried out.

The essential difference with respect to the original version of the Vance-Owen peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb-Croat initiative—according to the assessment of legal experts at the local U.N. headquarters—is that the Vance-Owen plan had envisaged a president and a government during the period of transition in agreement with the situation which proceeded from the assumption that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a state.

Since Bosnia-Herzegovina will now not be a state but a confederation of three ethnic states (of Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Moslems), the transitional arrangements define Bosnia-Herzegovina as a confederation headed by a coordinating body, the legal experts said. The coordinating body—which will have nine members, three each from the Serb Republic, the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Moslem republic—would be organized on a parity principle and adopt major decisions by consensus.

Three members of the coordinating body, one from each republic, will be monthly appointed to chair the coordinating body and act as head of state. During the period of transition, the coordinating body will appoint a person who will act as foreign minister for the joint interests of the member-states of the confederation. A different minister will be appointed every four months so that all three republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina have a representative in this office in the course of one year.

The three sides and the two co-chairmen of the international conference on former Yugoslavia will have a representative each on the borders commission, which should carry out demarcation on the basis of given maps and resolve marginal territorial disputes. Under the Vance-Owen plan, borders were to have been under the jurisdiction of the central authorities of the state of Bosnia- Herzegovina. The commission will adopt decisions by consensus, and if unanimous agreement cannot be reached, the problem will be transferred to the coordinating body.

The international borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina with other former Yugoslav republics will be within the jurisdiction of the individual confederal units for their parts of the border. In the beginning, the borders will be controlled by foreign observers (until the republican constitutions are adopted), but TANJUG learns that Bosnian Serb representatives expressed their reservations about this.

Customs and border taxes will be within the jurisdiction of the republics and the confederal budget will be financed from given quotas.

A uniformed police force will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics, and only the chapter on human rights, with minor corrections, was taken from the Vance-Owen plan.

Republican courts will be authorized to deal with human rights, and there will be a temporary joint court for human rights, responsible to all three republics, during a certain period.

The coordinating body will create an international access authority whose task will be to secure freedom of movement along roads and railway lines which pass through the territory of more than one republic and to secure free access to the Sava and ports on the Adriatic coast. The authorities of this organ will briefly coincide with the role of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) until a traffic police is established who will take over the role of securing freedom of movement.

Diplomatic circles at the U.N. headquarters in Geneva assess that there are real chances for the principles contained in the Serb- Croat initiative to be applied in practice since they are a reflection of the actual situation.

Owen on Izetbegovic's Importance in Settlement

AU2906145293 Paris AFP in English 1417 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Geneva, June 29 (AFP)—Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, who has boycotted talks on plans to divide the country along ethnic lines, is still a "crucial element" in any settlement, mediator Lord Owen said Tuesday.

"You cannot ignore his undoubted input on the Bosnia-Herzegovina army," the European Community envoy said in an interview with AFP. "A settlement has got to be one which they will accept, otherwise the fighting continues."

Owen spoke as the 10-member Bosnian presidency was set to meet at Sarajevo airport Tuesday to thrash out differences over a Serbo-Croat plan to make Bosnia a confederation of Serb, Croat and Moslem republics.

Seven presidency members attended talks here Monday on the scheme. Izetbegovic, chief of the Moslem-led government, has rejected the idea and stayed away from the negotiations along with his vice president Ejup Ganic and Army chief Rasim Delic.

The delegation that traveled to Geneva, including three Serbs, three Croats and Izetbegovic's rival Fikret Abdic as the only Moslem, says it has the authority to reach a settlement that would end the 15 months of fighting.

But Owen, who two weeks ago scolded the president for dismissing the proposal out of hand, said, "I am keen to see Izetbegovic fully involved in the whole thing. I think he is seen by most people as a crucial element."

He said it was important to keep the Bosnian presidency intact and was critical of the fact that the full body had not held a meeting throughout the war until Tuesday's scheduled session.

"The trouble is the Bosnian Government was not functioning democratically and properly now for 14 months," Owen said.

The mediator was interviewed as he flew to Brussels for discussions with Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, whose country will assume the rotating E.C. presidency on Thursday.

At the same time his Geneva conference co-chairman Thorvald Stoltenberg, the U.N. envoy, flew to Zagreb where he was expected to meet with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

Their consultations came a day after the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders announced progress in their talks on confederation, notably on arrangements for military disengagement and an interim administration.

But Owen said "considerable problems" remained on the map of a future confederation, a concept which replaced the mediators' failed efforts to keep Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state divided into 10 semi-autonomous provinces.

Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has said the Moslems, who currently control only 10 percent of the former Yugoslav republic, would get 25-30 percent, concentrated in central Bosnia and a northwestern pocket.

Owen said the main concerns were now ensuring access for Moslems to the Sava River, a key supply route on Bosnia's northern border with Croatia, and to the Adriatic Sea via the southern Croatian port of Ploce.

The other key point, he said, was the Serbs insistence on keeping some of the territory around Sarajevo which the mediators fear could cut off the Moslems in the capital from the rest of central Bosnia.

Owen acknowledged arguments against the confederation plan such as that it could allow the Bosnian Serbs and Croats to join up later with Serbia and Croatia, or could encourage new population shifts.

Owen blamed the two-month-old rupture between the Bosnian Moslems and Croats, supposed allies against the Serbs, for the death of the peace plan he co-authored with former U.N. mediator Cyris Vance.

"Basically Bosnia-Herzegovina had been held together by one thing, the Croat-Moslem coalition," he said. "Once that was smashed it became ever harder to see the 10-province structure because the 10-province structure reflected the pluralistic Bosnia."

Izetbegovic Says Presidency Agrees on Next Session

LD2906215893 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Interview with President Alija Izetbegovic by unidentified reporter after meeting of the Presidency—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] You have reached agreement on some matters?

[Izetbegovic] Yes, we have agreed on almost everything, on our methods of work in the Presidency. We have agreed on minor alterations to the effect that the Presidency's works should ensure everyone's participation. If possible, every member of the Presidency should participate, either directly or indirectly—preferably directly. We demand their presence at our sessions. If that proves impossible, then we should make sure that our documents are distributed in time.

Secondly, we have established... [pauses] I mean, a considerable part of the meeting dealt with preparations for the next session, which will take place somewhere in Bosnia-Herzegovina, perhaps not in Sarajevo, probably in Zenica or Tuzla. These two towns have been given priority. We have decided to prepare the Presidency's stands.

Presidency To Present Counter-Proposals

AU2906182193 Paris AFP in English 1753 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, June 29 (AFP)—The Bosnian collective presidency said here Tuesday [29 June] it would present its own proposal on the future shape of the republic, in defiance of a Serb-Croat plan to carve it into three ethnic mini-states.

After a meeting at Sarajevo airport, the 10-member presidency released a statement saying three of its members would prepare the proposals for the next meeting, to be held in about one week's time.

Vice-President Ejup Ganic, a Moslem, said the presidency had to "take more initiatives" and not wait for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who drew up the plan to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnic states.

The statement said the next meeting would be held on territory still held by the Moslem-led Bosnian government, in either Zenica in central Bosnia or Tuzla in the northeast, "or any other place with the help of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR)."

The meeting marked the first time the full presidency has convened in Sarajevo since the war began about 15 months ago.

Seven members of the presidency arrived from the southern Croatian port city of Split on a U.N. Protection Force plane following peace talks in Geneva Monday boycotted by President Alija Izetbegovic and two other presidency members—Ganic and army chief Rasim Delic, who support Izetbegovic.

In addition to Izetbegovic, Ganic and Delic, the presidency is made up of three Serbs, three Croats and one Moslem, Fikret Abdic.

The new proposals will be drawn up by Ganic, Croat member Miro Lasic and Serb member Miro Lasovic, who is Bosnian parliament speaker.

Ganic said Bosnia-Herzegovina's fate should be decided in the war-torn republic, and it was not normal that "the doctors are in Geneva and the patient is here."

The Serb-Croat plan to divide Bosnia into three ethnic states loosely linked in a confederation was discussed at the Geneva talks brokered by international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg.

Ganic said the new proposals would "reflect the majority of members" of the presidency, and "one or a few members do not have the capacity to divide Bosnia." [passage omitted]

Conclusions of Presidency Session

LD2906172093 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] At its session today, presided over by President Alija Izetbegovic and attended by all its members, the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina discussed the current political situation and a peace initiative for resolving war [words indistinct] in our country.

The Presidency adopted the following conclusions:

First: It was decided that the next session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be also attended by the cochairmen of the peace conference on former Yugoslavia, Messrs. Owen and Stoltenberg, will be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or more specifically in Zenica, Tuzla, or any other location to be chosen with the help of the UN Protection Force.

Second: The Presidency has decided that its members Ejup Ganic, Miro Lasic, and Miro Lazovic should draw up draft proposals outlining the Presidency's stands on the constitutional system in Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with [words indistinct]. During preparations for the next session, consultations will be conducted with relevant political forces in the country.

Third: In reference to its method of work, the Presidency came to the conclusion that all initiatives by individual Presidency members should first be discussed and stands should be taken on them at the Presidency sessions.

Also among the topics discussed today was the presence of the members [words indistinct]. A decision was made that in future the Presidency should work collectively and in its full composition.

New Bosnian Army Chief Supports Izetbegovic

PM2906143693 Paris LE FIGARO in French 29 Jun 93 p 5

[Xavier Gautier report: "Bosnian Army Behind Izetbegovic"]

[Text] Sarajevo—"We will resist, as the French did against the Nazis. But our situation is much worse." General Rasim Delic, commander in chief of the Bosnian Army, gazed at his interlocutor with his blue eyes: At a time when Bosnia-Herzegovina seems doomed, it is General de Gaulle's example which is providing inspiration.

Gen. Delic, who has just replaced Sefer Halilovic, has the job of cleansing the army of its uncontrolled elements, without weakening the lines of defense. It is a delicate mission: The fighters defending Sarajevo and the Muslim enclaves for 14 months have become susceptible. Whatever the political arrangements, they will defend themselves "to the death," the officer said.

Rasim Delic is only answerable to the Bosnian Presidency. His duty as a soldier, he said, is to save the lives of his compatriots: "My country is being subjected to the most sordid war in history."

His country? Until 15 April 1992—the war had been going for a week—the former artillery colonel in the federal Yugoslav People's Army [JNA], who trained at the Belgrade Academy, was based at the JNA's Zlatiste communications center: After seven days on Trebevic mountain, overlooking a bombarded Sarajevo, he joined the newly formed Bosnian Army. For more than a year, Delic has commanded the defense of Brcko, one of the toughest fronts in northern Bosnia. He then benefitted from exceptional cooperation with the Croatian forces.

Today, in his headquarters situated a few meters from the Bosnian Presidency, the general has no time to chat. Wearing a combat uniform with a badge saying: "Armija Bosnia-Herzegovina," without any other symbol of rank, surrounded by broad-shouldered young soldiers, he said: "The Serbs are attacking the Gorazde enclave, using tanks. The Croatians are provoking us throughout central Bosnia. Mostar has been reduced to a ghetto. If we abandon our lines of defense, our enemies will pursue their advance and their massacres. This is the situation."

For him, the lifting of the arms embargo is "necessary and urgent": "Weapons would help to defend the last pockets of resistance," he stressed. "Otherwise, we will see the Lebanization of Bosnia."

The commander in chief was direct and did not avoid "sensitive" subjects: neither the internal problems of his army, nor rumors of a coup against President Izetbegovic. He knows perfectly well that on the front—on Mount Igman, in the old district of Sarajevo, or around Novi Travnik—the militia are sometimes controlled by the mafia. These armed gangs infiltrated by some "mojahedin" are perpetrating senseless massacres, like their enemies. "They are kamikaze, desperate people," he said.

The general rules out the hypothesis of a putsch against Alija Izetbegovic: "I am talking as a soldier. The army is loyal to the legal Bosnian authorities, represented by their president." Is Fikret Abdic, the strong man of Bihac, trying to oust the president with the approval of the United Nations? Rasim Delic, a smile on his lips, replied: "If the country wishes to change its head of state, it is very simple: A decision must be made by the collegial PresiDency, then there has to be a vote in parliament, and, probably, a people's referendum."

The general follows the positions upheld by Izetbegovic and Ejup Ganic, his vice president: "The partition of Bosnia would lead to a disaster." He paid tribute in one sentence to the "difficult" action of the UN Protection Force and General Morillon: "They are doing what they can...."

Rasim Delic emphasized: "We absolutely must restore the balance of forces. It is urgent. The Europeans know perfectly well that the Serbs will not negotiate without being forced to do so.... That would restore courage to the desperate population."

But the general lost credibility last week when he refused to replace the command of the 2d Corps which has threatened to blow up the chlorine factory at the entrance to Tuzla in northern Bosnia.

He replied curtly:

"We have lost more than 100,000 people in a few months. Some 1.5 million Bosnians are refugees. The survivors are living like dogs," Gen. Delic admitted, "if we had to cause a disaster to prevent the Serbs from invading Tuzla... we would do so."

Muslim Party Terms Izetbegovic Policy 'Catastrophic'

LD2906220493 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Mirsad Baksic, president of the Croatian Muslim Democratic Party [Hrvatska Muslimanska Demokratska Stranka], has said that Fikret Abdic, Ismet Hadziosmanovic, Armin Pohara, and Senad Beslagic [prominent Bosnian Muslim personalities and officials in various parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina] are people with determination and capacity to guarantee the survival of the Muslim nation, unlike its current leaders, Izetbegovic and Ganic, whose policy has been catastrophic. Baksic protested sharply against ethnic cleansing regardless of who is behind it. He sees a lasting solution to the Muslim-Croat relationship in their joint anti-Serb bloc.

Krajisnik Assesses Progress of Geneva Talks

AU2906175793 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Statement by Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Serbian republic assembly, for the Belgrade Radio's Argument More program in Belgrade on 29 June—recorded]

[Text] The joint action, based on the interests of, not on a false coalition between, the Serbs and the Croats gives a new quality to the approach that the international community has accepted, that the Serbs and Croats do not wish to live in a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is where the chance lies for this new concept, because force cannot join and preserve a state that has never been created. That is Bosnia-Herzegovina. If force is to be used, an artificial situation has to be created, and the artificial situation would be if the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims lived in a unitary state after this war. Force would create a situation that would always be uneasy and likely to induce more conflicts.

We have overcome that problem now and the joint approach reached, with the great assistance of the cochairmen, is that Bosnia-Herzegovina has to be transformed into a complex state community, that is, into a confederation. Three peoples, three states would be united based on the will of the people and according to their interests, and based on the number of functions that suit each nation. We have agreed that a coordinating body be formed according to the parity principle. There would be three representatives of each of the three nations, and the decisionmaking would be done through the full agreement of views. It would mostly be done through consensus, while some issues would probably be solved by a majority vote. However, all the issues, the mode of decisionmaking, would be incorporated in a rule book, which would be based on [word indistinct] grounds. We have agreed on that.

As for the military paper, how to reestablish peace, there have been no important changes, and this is where [words indistinct] because we all want to have peace, to have the forces disengage [word indistinct], to have everyone withdrawing his forces back to his newly formed republic, and then to solve all the disputed issues through [word indistinct].

Ministry Warns Boban of Impending 'Mass Starvation'

LD2906224693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] The population of northeast and east Bosnia, as well as the population of Sarajevo and part of Herzegovina, is on the verge of famine and on the way to mass starvation, says an open letter to Mate Boban sent by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Transport and Communication.

This situation has deteriorated considerably over the past two and a half months due to the ban on passage for all convoys carrying food through territories controlled by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO].

We are convinced that you are aware of the fact that HVO members under your command have over the past three months confiscated more than 600 trucks with food intended for starving children and elderly people, many of whom, unfortunately, are no longer among the living.

Mr. Boban, it is quite certain that you will have to explain to the suffering Croat people who are feeling the consequences of such conduct, together with other peoples on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, why 945 metric tons of potatoes and 1,340 tons of seed potatoes went to waste in the port of Ploce, and why it took 60 days to transport potatoes through territories controlled by the HVO.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Transport and Communication demands an explanation of why more than 20,000 tons of food in Metkovic still await transport, when this food is necessary for the bare survival of the population. Therefore, it is up to you, Mr. Boban, to help with your authority and influence, and we hope that, while reaching decisions, you will not miss the opportunity to show in practice just how much you care about the Croat population as well as about others who have been living in these regions for centuries, the open letter to Mate Boban concludes.

UNHCR: Lack of Money To Halt All Food Aid in July

AU2906191093 Paris AFP in English 1844 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Geneva, June 29 (AFP)—Food convoys for the Moslem enclaves in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina and the capital Sarajevo will cease in July due to lack of financial aid, U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) representatives said Tuesday.

Food stocks will have completely run out by mid-July in Belgrade, where the convoys leave for Zepa, Gorazde, Srebrenica and Sarajevo, towns all under siege by the Bosnian Serbs.

1.1 million refugees in Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are benefiting from the food convoys.

The UNHCR, which is responsible for the distribution of international aid, needs 411 million dollars to continue but only has 130 million dollars in cash, according to Ron Redmond of the UNHCR.

15,000 more people will soon be displaced in central Bosnia because of fighting between Croats and Moslems, said Redmond.

The situation is "so tragic" that it will not be possible to transfer the rations from the warehouses in Metkovic, near the Croatian port of Split, to those in Belgrade, he added.

A convoy which left Belgrade on Friday [25 June] for Gorazde is being denied access to the town because it is carrying an escort from the U.N. Protection Force, said the UNHCR representative in Geneva Sylvana Foa.

65,000 people are sheltering in cramped conditions in Gorazde. The UNHCR is unable to proceed with its planned evacuation of 11 seriously injured people from the town to Split, and then on to the German city of Cologne.

ICRC Gives Statistics on Prisoners

LD2906203293 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1857 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Belgrade, June 19 (TANJUG)—Officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) are regularly visiting 3,533 prisoners in Bosnia-Herzegovina, says a statement submitted by the I.C.R.C. to TANJUG on Tuesday.

Of this number, 2,450 have been in captivity for some time, and 1,100 have been captured since fighting escalated between Moslems and Croats in central Bosnia two months ago, the statement says.

I.C.R.C. figures show that the Croat side is holding 1,008 prisoners, the Moslem—1,327 and the Serb—1,059 prisoners.

Since January, the I.C.R.C. officials in former Yugoslavia have collected and delivered 520 thousand messages.

The I.C.R.C. has 212 delegates in former Yugoslavia and employs 632 local associates.

In the six months of 1993, the I.C.R.C. has distributed 250 thousand food parcels, half a million family parcels and nine thousand tons of cereal.

The programme of assistance costs 12 million swiss francs a month to operate, the statement says.

Muslims Target Serb Positions in Doboj Region

LD2906123093 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0925 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpt] Doboj, 29 Jun (TANJUG)—Muslim formations are continuing their assaults on Serb-held positions and settlements on the front in the wider Doboj region, Serb military sources announced today. Muslim forces are also active on the Maglaj section of the front, threatening Serb positions and populated areas with constant provocations. Their strongest attack was launched against the Serb-populated settlement of Blizna, targeted by 128-mm rocket launchers and 120-mm mortars. [passage omitted]

Serbs Renew Shelling of Gorazde; One Killed

LD2906150293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Report by Hajrudin Becic from Gorazde]

[Text] Following a five-day lull, the parachute operation was resumed last night above Gorazde with only partial success. Only pallets containing medicines have been found. The pallets containing food probably missed the target due to poor weather conditions.

However, howitzer shells fired from chetnik strongholds hit Gorazde again. The town was hit by five shells this morning, and another four shells fell on the town center at 1122 hours. One child was killed and one was seriously wounded. All this happened very close to UN observers. Material damage is not extensive.

Last night and this morning, chetniks launched attacks on [Muslim] defense lines as well, especially from the direction of Foca. Artillery was active with sporadic fire from antiaircraft machine guns and shooting from infantry arms. There were no attempts to break through defense lines, while the aggressor's forces regrouped in certain sections of the battlefield.

Muslims Use Poison Gases in Attack on Serbs

LD2906233893 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2317 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—Moslems on Tuesday used poison gases in an attack on Vogosca, a Serb village near Sarajevo, the capital of the war-torn former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb News Agency SRNA reported.

Despite the ceasefire which all three warring sides (Moslems, Serbs and Croats) signed in mid-June, Moslem units on Tuesday afternoon attacked defence positions of Bosnian Serbs near Sarajevo's Grbavica district with grenade launchers, SRNA said quoting a Bosnian Serb military statement. One woman was wounded in the attack.

Moslem units opened fire from anti-aircraft machine-guns also on Serb positions in Ilijas, a village northwest of Sarajevo.

A civil war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina between local Moslems, Croats and Serbs when the republic seceded from the former Yugoslav Federation.

HVO, Army Continue Fighting Around Maglaj, Zepce

AU3006095693

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian, at 0800 GMT on 30 June, carries the following reports on fighting in the republic:

The correspondent from Maglaj, Hajrudin Sermic, reports that Novi Seher, which remains in encirclement, "is being shelled with unabated ferocity," while the villages around it are being looted and burnt down. "There are wounded civilians and the situation in the town is extremely bleak," Sermic says, calling upon the international humanitarian organizations to help.

"Fierce fighting around Zepce and in Zepce itself, the suffering of innocent civilians, and a stormy night after a relatively peaceful day in Zavidovici are the main characteristics of the last 24 hours on the territory that is under the responsibility of the Bosnia Operative Group," correspondent Adnan Djonlic says at the beginning of his dispatch. He says that the troops of the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army are closing in on Zepce "and other towns that have been encircled." "A long column of refugees, who were moving from Novi Seher toward (?Zepce), was intercepted by Croatian Defense Council [HVO] fighters, who opened fire at them," Djonlic says and adds that numerous civilians were killed and injured in this attack. He says that "the chetniks' activities" in Zavidovici intensified during the night. As he reports, Hajdarovici, Smajlbasici, (?Brasevine), and Mahovo were attacked by Boors guns and 82-mm mortars. He also reports a "fresh concentration of military hardware in Mount Ozren," which to Djonlic indicates that more attacks are about to take place. "Actually, at this very moment, the attacks have just started," he says, adding that "fierce artillery fire is shaking up the entire territory of the free territory of Zavidovici commune."

"The provocative aggressor's fire, yesterday afternoon, gained in intensity and, in the course of the night, transformed into a real mortar attack," Hamiz Deronjic reports from Brcko. He reports that attacks at Licki Most and Rijeke with 82-mm mortars, late yesterday afternoon, were an overture to "intense aggressor's attacks in this part of the battlefield." Dizdaruse and Rijeke were pounded by Bofors gun, antiaircraft machine guns, tanks, and 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm caliber mortars, Deronjic says. He says that Brod, Brodusa, and Bukovac were exposed to attacks from the above weapons from 2100 GMT onwards. Despite intensified attacks, "all the lines of defense of the free Brcko territory are under the complete control of the fighters of the 108th Motorized Brigade, the 108 HVO Brigade Brcko, and the affiliated units of the Second Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army."

A report by Mostar Press Center claims that "fierce battles were fought in Mostar in the course of the night and particularly early this morning." Quoting the command of the Fourth Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the reports claims that (?the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army captured the northern camp) and "a great number of HVO fighters were captured" in the process. The report says that "there are no other details of last night's and this morning's battles for the time being." It is reported that the HVO is currently shelling the town sporadically.

Muslims Appeal for Help

LD2906145593 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Report by Hajrudin Cermic from the Maglaj municipality's press center]

[Text] The situation in Maglaj is still critical: Chetnik and Croatian Defense Council [HVO] attacks on the defense lines and the civilian population are continuing. Hundreds of tank, howitzer, and mortar grenades are mercilessly destroying and killing from all directions. The noose is tightening around Novi Seher, where 10,000 people are offering desperate resistance. These people are facing a large-scale massacre. The wounded cannot receive any medical assistance. The body of another drowned person from Bradic who tried to escape slaughter by diving into the Bosna River was found today. The emergency ward service is appealing to the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] to send helicopters for the evacuation of the wounded and sick to Zenica. The doctors in Maglaj are helpless. We are inviting foreign journalists to come to this town and tell the world about the horrendous suffering of the population of this region and help stop the killing of civilians in this way. The war presidency of the Maglaj municipality, which is in constant session, also called on the UNPROFOR to immediately send its representatives to Maglaj and do all it can to help lift the blockade of Maglaj and put an end to the attacks on the population.

HVO Commander: Mostar Battle 'Decisive'

LD3006125193 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Excerpts] This morning our studio was visited by Stanko Puljic, chief of staff of the south-eastern Herzegovina operational zone of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO].

[Puljic] [passage omitted] Muslims opted for this war and this will perhaps be the decisive battle for Mostar between Muslim forces and HVO units. They wanted the war and they will get it. We have decided to close all bars and restaurants in the city. We will close all borders [of Herceg-Bosna]. Nobody will be permitted to leave and no movement will be allowed. UNPROFOR [UN Protection force] and EC monitors are no longer welcome because lately they have caused nothing but harm to us. It is clear that the Muslim army has used them for their own purposes. Every individual in this city has to understand that this is a battle for survival. [passage omitted]

UNPROFOR Unwelcome

LD3006132493 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Excerpts] In connection with this morning's perfidious attack by the Muslim army on units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] [in Mostar], Miljenko Lasic, commander of the eastern Herzegovina operational zone, sent the following warning to the Spanish Battalion and military observers in Medjugorje:

We have for a long time been issuing warnings to the effect that the Muslim army in Mostar is planning to take control of the entire town, that they are not interested in peace and that they want to realize their dark intentions. [passage omitted]

Since we warned you daily and notified you about the intentions of the Muslim and mojahedin forces, we are now warning you not to come to Mostar in view of your personal safety and because of your complete ineffectiveness.

Mobilization, Curfew Ordered

LD3006130393 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Excerpts] In connection with the latest attack by Muslim forces on positions of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] and the Croat nation in this region, whereby the imperialistic war that began in central Bosnia has continued, HVO President Jadranko Prlic and Bruno Stojic, head of the HVO's defense department, sent the following message to the Croat people of Herceg-Bosna:

The Croat people of the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna, Croats, our brothers from the Republic of Croatia and in the diaspora:

Covert, and recently overt, intentions of the Muslim leadership and their army to make up for their losses in the struggle against the Serb aggressor and for their historical frustration by conquering areas historically belonging to the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina are being confirmed in Mostar. [passage omitted]

In accordance with his authority, and due to the newly arisen situation, Bruno Stojic, head of the defense department of the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna HVO, has issued the following order:

First, all military conscripts from the area of Herceg-Bosna, regardless of where they are at the moment, must report to defense offices in their home municipalities—i.e., to their units—within the next 24 hours.

Second, all bars and restaurants are strictly forbidden to open, and a total ban on selling alcohol in public has been introduced.

Third, a curfew has been imposed in all municipalities in the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna between 2100 and 0600 [1900 and 0400 GMT], and in the town of Mostar between 2000 and 0600. Residents must strictly observe the curfew, and relevant bodies of the military and civilian police must, in accordance with their authority, take action against people not observing it.

Fourth, only shops selling food can open, while all other shops and departments in department stores must remain closed until this order is annulled.

Fifth, all persons and legal entities that have not reported to defense offices in their home municipalities are forbidden to engage in any kind of work.

All persons and legal entities coming under the scope of this order are responsible for its implementation, while the civilian and military police will supervise the implementation.

[Signed] Bruno Stojic, head of the defense department of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna

Croatian Counteroffensive

LD3006113893 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Report by Zdenko Vranjes from Mostar]

[Text] Mostar has been rocked by explosions of shells from all types of heavy weapons and by constant ear-splitting fire from infantry arms since 0345 last night. The fighting is in progress in the area of Zalik, around the Tihomir Misic barracks, and in Bijelo Polje.

All hell broke loose this morning when Muslim forces launched a sudden all-out artillery and infantry attack on the headquarters of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] in Bijelo Polje, positions of the HVO 2d Batallion in Vrapcici, and the Tihomir Misic barracks. HVO forces responded fiercely. Defense lines have not moved, and huge losses have been inflicted upon the Muslim army in the strong conteroffensive using all available weapons, HVO military sources in Mostar report.

In connection with this morning's attack by the Muslim army on HVO units, Miljenko Lasic, commander of the southeastern Herzegovina operational zone, has warned military observers and peace forces that it was confirmed this morning that the Muslim army does not want peace in Mostar, but is trying to take control of the entire town. A news release from the eastern Herzegovina operational zone headquarters says this perfidious attack best shows the extent of hypocrisy of the Muslim political and military top brass, which yesterday held a news conference in order to accuse once again the HVO and the Croat people for attacks in Mostar, while at the same time they were preparing this morning's aggression.

Croatian Forces Claim Capture of Zepce

LD3006114393 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 30 Jun 93

[Text] Ozren, 30 Jun (TANJUG)—The entire town of Zepce and its suburbs are in the hands of Croatian Defense Council forces, claims Serb Radio Ozren this morning, citing Croatian military sources.

Muslim forces have been driven out of the town to a distance of two to seven kilometers, the same source says, specifying that the nearest Muslim units are two kilometers away toward Zeljezno Polje along the Zepce-Zenica road, while other Muslim positions on other sections of the Zepce front are six to seven kilometers away.

Novi Seher surrendered to Croat forces on 28 June at 2000.

Units of the Serb republic [of Bosnia-Herzegovina] army from Mt. Ozren and Teslic have linked up along the Krsno Polje-Bradici-Lijesnica-Osve-Crni Vrh line, so Maglaj and Tesanj are now completely surrounded.

Huge Muslim Losses

LD2906174593 Mostar Croatian Radio Herceg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Report by Antun Mrkonjic from Zepce]

[Text] In their insane plan to link Islam from Zenica to Tesanj, the Muslim and mojahedin (?forces) have all day been launching strong attacks on Zepce and surrounding villages from the directions of Zenica and Kakanj. Fanatics of the 105th Jajce Brigade, Seventh Muslim Brigade, and special units of the Muslim Ministry of Internal Affairs from Zenica are the fiercest in the attacks. However, fighters of the the HVO's [Croatian Defense Council's] 111th [word indistinct] Brigade have not only repelled all attacks, but have also taken control of Novi Seher and surrounding villages, and of some crucial hills in the vicinity of Zepce. Muslim forces have been pushed back to the stronghold of Orlovik in the town, which they cannot leave now.

All members of the military police of the so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina army who were [word indistinct] opposite the building of the Zepce Ministry of Internal Affairs surrendered last night to the HVO military police.

A counteroffensive by fighters of the [HVO] 111th Brigade is in progress in Zavidovici. Defense lines are stable. Two fighters have been killed and five wounded in the fighting today.

The commander of the local [Muslim] 319th [word indistinct] Brigade from Zepce, Galif Dervisic, has admitted that among his ranks there are more than 100 dead soldiers, and that he wants to surrender, but criminals Enver Hadzihasanovic and Vehbija Karic will not let him. Muslim forces have abandoned positions facing the army of the Serb republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] in Tesanj, Maglaj, and Zeljezno Polje [a village near Zepce] thus (?enabling) Serbs to attack these towns unhindered, whereby Zenica will be put under direct threat.

Muslim media are trying to boost the morale of the battered Muslim army in Zepce by spreading lies about the alleged penetration of the Muslim army into the town. This is not true. Zepce in under the control of HVO fighters, and it is only a question as to when they will take full control of the town [sentence as heard].

Muslim Counterattack

AU2906205693 Paris AFP in English 2018 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpts] Zagreb, June 29 (AFP)—Bosnian Moslem forces launched a counter-attack Tuesday on the mostly Croat-controlled town of Zepce in northern Bosnia, the Croat news agency HINA reported.

Most of Zepce, 70 kilometres (45 miles) north of Sarajevo, fell to Croat forces Monday, as clashes continued around the nearby town of Maglaj, bitterly contested by the two former allies against Serb forces.

HINA said the Moslems, attacking from Zenica and Tesnja, about 20 kilometres (12 miles) north of Zepce, were backed by tanks and multiple rocket launchers. [passage omitted]

Leaders in the breakaway Bosnian Croat region of Herceg-Bosna in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina denied Tuesday that there was a Serb-Croat military alliance against the Moslems.

A statement by the Herceg-Bosna presidency sent to AFP in Zagreb said the Serb-Croat collaboration, alleged by Radio Sarajevo, was "false, as is the assessment that this assumed alliance is part of the Serb-Croat proposals on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders have agreed on a plan to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic states loosely linked in a confederation.

HVO Continues Shelling

LD2906211993 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpt] An ever-increasing number of troops [of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] are linking up with the forces in Zepce and the other places that have been under total siege for a long period of time. The extremist formations of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] are still sporadically shelling the town. The situation in Novi Seher is extremely grave. A large column of refugees from this town is moving towards Zepce. They have been intercepted by fighters of the Croatian Defense Council. They opened heavy fire on the unarmed column. It is feared that there is a large number of casualties. The aggressor's activities in the battlefields of the Zavidovici municipality have subsided. Only three tank shells have been fired on the town by the chetniks. [passage omitted]

Croat Forces Reportedly Take Over Novi Seher

AU2906112293 Paris AFP in English 1106 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Zagreb, June 29 (AFP)—Bosnia's Croat forces took control overnight of the strategically located northwestern town of Novi Seher and a cluster of villages nearby, Zagreb Television reported Tuesday [29 June].

Fighting between Moslems and Croats in that region was continuing Tuesday morning with Moslem soldiers surrendering in droves to the Croats, according to the television report.

Novi Seher is located near Maglaj and Zepce in a predominantly Moslem region about 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Sarajevo.

Croat forces have since Monday [28 June] gained control of most of Zepce where more than 1,000 Moslem soldiers have surrendered, Zagreb Television said.

Members of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) stationed in Kiseljak, near Sarajevo, were not able to confirm Tuesday the fall of Novi Seher. They said UNPROFOR observers have not been able to venture out of Kiseljak since Monday as Croat forces have placed land mines around their compound.

Zagreb Television reported meanwhile that Moslem forces in the region of Novi Travnik, located about 60 kilometers (37 miles) northwest of Sarajevo, were bringing in backup troops Tuesday "which may signal they are preparing a new offensive."

Also Tuesday a prisoner exchange was to take place between the Serbs and Croats in the southwestern Bosnian town of Celebici. It was unclear how many prisoners would be involved in the exchange.

Fighting Among Muslims in Zenica, 15 Dead; Bihac Tense

LD2906133893 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1226 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Excerpt] Banja Luka, 29 Jun (TANJUG)—A showdown among Muslims took place in front of the "Beograd" department store in the very center of Zenica, in which 15 persons lost their lives while more than 30 were wounded, Serb intelligence sources report. It is assumed that the cause for the incident was the distribution of food, whose reserves have been reduced to a minimum a long time ago.

Following Muslim-Croat clashes in central Bosnia, relations between these two peoples' civilian and military authorities have reached boiling point in Bihac as well. All parts of the municipality controlled by the Croatian Defense Council, Serb sources claim, have been sealed off by barricades and nobody can enter these settlements without special authorizations. Certain sections of the city, also encircled by barricades, are completely off limits to the members of the army loyal to Alija Izetbegovic. [passage omitted]

HSS Supports Democratic, Decentralized State

93BA1107F Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 93 pp 9-11

[Interview with Ivo Komsic, president of the Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Ivan Sabic in Zagreb; date not given: "Bosnia and Herzegovina Cannot Fall Apart Without a World War"]

[Text] The news about the founding (renewal) of the HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] in Sarajevo surprised the entire Croatian public, even the leadership of the HSS in Zagreb, as was evidenced by Stipac's disavowal of the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina [Bosnia-Herzegovina], although, to be sure, it was rather mild. Many were also surprised by the election of Dr. Ivo Komsic, former vice president of the SDP [Socialist Democratic Party], to be president of the newest Croatian party in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Today, there is no longer any surprise, Eng. Drago Stipac said in a recent press conference: "The HSS has been revived in Sarajevo, and we must accept that as a fact." Another fact is that Dr. Ivo Komsic consented to an interview with our newspaper.

[Sabic] Mr. Komsic, you had a rich political career behind you even before you came to head the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Could you give us a cross section of it in a few sentences?

[Komsic] I began to take an active part in political events only when disintegration of the League of Communists was on the horizon. Up until that time, I mainly studied political theory as a sociology professor in the School of Philosophy at Sarajevo University. I directed my activity toward democratization of the party and society. That process met with hard going, there were strong resistances to change, and because of my obstinacy I suffered a great deal of criticism, and sometimes I even received threats. Nevertheless, we managed to transform the old communist organization into the SDP, to change the Republic Constitution, to introduce a multiparty system and carry out democratic elections. From this vantage point, this does not seem particularly impressive, but that was not the case at the time when all that occurred. Many people were against changes, especially the party organization within the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], which always functioned as a party within the party.

[Sabic] Why, then, did you leave the SDP?

[Komsic] When Bosnia-Herzegovina gained the status of an internationally recognized state, it seemed to me I had done my job. However, even before my disagreement with the party comrades in assessment of the character of the war in Croatia was evident, and this became even more prominent in assessment of the intentions of the JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I demanded that we prepare for war, because Bosnia-Herzegovina was already occupied, I called for an army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be formed, that there be no negotiations with the JNA.... I did not get any support, not only from my own party, but not from the incumbent parties either, which could have done much more in this area. That is why I resigned from office in the party and withdrew completely from politics.

[Sabic] What motivated you to come back again?

[Komsic] Even before the war, the unity of the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] was a formality, it was based more on opposition to the wrecking policy of the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] than on any joint political platform. I expected that such a political platform would be formed when the aggression began against Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially because one and the same aggressor attacked both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, as the war progressed, those two political partners did not come closer, but there were more and more indicators that suggested they were moving apart. Even then there were those who thought that we should form new Croatian political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I personally was against that, calculating that a state of war was not suitable for that and afraid that this would cause confusion and weaken the resistance to the aggressor. By sacrificing Stjepan Kljuic in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, the Muslim side instilled additional vagueness in the attitude toward Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state to which the Croats and Muslims had committed themselves. That move could be interpreted in two ways: as a compromise and as a concession to the so-called hard Croatian line, but also as a change in the strategy for preserving Bosnia-Herzegovina within internationally recognized borders. The ambiguity in the interpretation of the Vance-Owen plan on the Croatian side and procrastination about signing it on the Muslim side and indecisiveness in its application by both sides created space for staging conflicts between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], which grew into authentic open war. Who were all the participants in that, who started it first, these are not the most important things now. The conflicts should be stopped, because they threaten to destroy both of those peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina by putting Croatia in a difficult international position and relativizing the Chetnik crimes. Those conflicts put Croats outside the HZ [Croatian Community] of Herceg-Bosnia in a particularly difficult position, because they are left without any political protection at all. Those were the motives for forming a new Croatian party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] Why did you decide that that would be the HSS?

[Komsic] We decided on the HSS, because this is the party with the greatest and most glorious tradition in Bosnia-Herzegovina and because its program as a whole offers the greatest opportunities for the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to live together. That party is deeply ingrained in the consciousness of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even after the war it opens up a future for the economic and cultural-spiritual development of our people.

[Sabic] The party is now here. What comes next?

[Komsic] If we carefully analyze the consequences of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, aside from the genocide against Muslims and Croats, aside from the destruction of everything we have painstakingly created over decades, aside from the destruction of cultural and religious monuments of those two nationalities, complete destruction of the government structure and social structure is also evident. In Bosnia-Herzegovina today, nothing is left of this; we have been completely reduced to nationalities and their armies. We have to face that truth, however disastrous it is. Our task is renewal, above all, of the elements of the social structure, and only afterward of the government institutions, if we have any desire to create the prerequisites for democracy in this region. That construction should begin with democratization of the ethnic entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have begun this by forming a new Croatian party. This has already given an impetus to both the Muslims and Serbs, and we should expect similar parties from them as well.

[Sabic] Awhile ago you mentioned the sacrifice of Stjepan Kljuic and a concession to the so-called hard line in the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would there have been an HSS in Sarajevo if Kljuic's faction had been victorious in the HDZ?

[Komsic] I do not want to talk about the HDZ. The HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina does not want to condemn anyone. Within the limits of our capabilities, we want to save what is still left. We also do not want to be some reserve of the HDZ in a partnership with the SDA and SDS. Those three parties are one another's partners, and both the HDZ and SDS carry the burden of that partnership. We want a new political climate, and that means that we need to have parties with a new profile. Of course, we do not mean by that that we will not cooperate with those parties.

[Sabic] The headquarters of the HSS in Zagreb was not at first enthusiastic about the revival of the HSS in Bosnia-Herzegovina. What was the reason for that?

[Komsic] It is not a question of either resistance or of bad feeling. It was a question of cooperation made difficult because we were out of touch. Certain moves simply were not sufficiently coordinated. That is why I came to Zagreb and now all the things that were unclear have been corrected. I have informed Mr. Stipac and the other members of the leadership of the HSS about our activities and intentions, in particular about the motives for reviving the HSS in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The key issue at the moment is the desire for the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina to strengthen Croatian unity, to create a favorable political climate for restoring mutual confidence between the nationalities living in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is a great responsibility on us, because we inherit the tradition of a party which had an immense moral capital and influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and not only among Croats. None of us has the right to expend that cheaply. That is why the leadership of the HSS in Zagreb was understandably cautious.

[Sabic] What are your relations now?

[Komsic] Organizationally, we are two separate parties, but we are united in our program. The political thought of the Radic brothers is indivisible, we inherit it equally, and we are trying to take it further. It is important to emphasize that we are striving to assist a continuity of that thought. Opponents of the HSS in history, and there have been many of them, have always aimed at interrupting that continuity. In no party have the leadership and followers suffered so much as in the HSS. You know yourself that they have spared no means to do this. In future, the activity of the HSS and of the HSS of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be coordinated on all strategic issues. We are particularly gratified by the fact that both parties have the same view of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] Can you say something more detailed about your views of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Komsic] Our party favors a democratic society of Bosnia-Herzegovina and a decentralized state. The first is a condition for us to be a part of Europe and to live according to the principles of freedom and equal rights of individuals and peoples. Those are the foundations of European civilization. And the second is a condition for democratization of the state and a pledge to the equality of the nationalities in society.

[Sabic] In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the forces defending it are divided over whether it will be "civil" or "cantonized." Can it be said that you have inclined toward either of these options?

[Komsic] Misconceptions have been created on this issue, and political laymen have furthered them. Politics is a practical activity, but dialogue is its instrument. It is thus not permitted in that dialogue to change the meanings of terms which have become conventional. In our country, those meanings change frequently as they are ideologized. That is the case with these terms. Who can prove that they are mutually exclusive? The term "civil" does not apply to the state, but to society, pupils learn that even in secondary school. This is a term which has marked the modern epoch, which is based on mutual recognition of people as such, on their rights and freedoms. "Cantonization," on the other hand, pertains to the arrangement of the state, to its decentralization on the geographic principle. A civil society offers only the prerequisites for democracy, which does not mean that states of that type must be democratic. There have been and there are civil societies with an undemocratic government (the power of military juntas, political oligarchies in one-party systems, etc.). The state may also be decentralized into cantons, but this does not necessarily mean that it will also be democratic. Bosnia-Herzegovina has historical experience with decentralization of its state. During the longest period of its history, the state was decentralized, this was the medieval state. It was decentralized, that is, even when there was neither democracy nor awareness of it.

[Sabic] Does the Vance-Owen plan fit into the views of your party concerning the future arrangement of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Komsic] The situation is that the Vance-Owen plan offers Bosnia-Herzegovina a framework for a cease-fire and normalization of the situation. It offers a possibility of beginning to rebuild the social system and institutions of government. Whether that is the best plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is another question. However, it must be borne in mind that the world is behind it and that that plan has the support which could bring it about. Its great weakness is that it opens up the possibility for Croats and Muslims to disagree. It should nevertheless be accepted, in spite of those who have left the seeds of discord in it, and it should be taken up as a way of overcoming Croatian-Muslim conflicts and as an opportunity for defeating the aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sabic] People in the Muslim leadership were at one time saying that the Croatian-Muslim conflicts were caused precisely by the Vance-Owen plan, that is, by the attempt of the Croats to implement it.

[Komsic] I have already said that there is a trap set in that plan. Two armies backed up by differing policies are left on the same space. When we add to that that the ratio in the population between the Croatian and Muslim nationalities in that space is almost in balance, the possibility of conflict remained open. Those who shaped the plan knew that, and they also certainly knew that the people responsible for carrying out the plan are not sufficiently wise and would take the bait. That is why they were in a hurry to realize their political aims by carrying out the plan. The first step, of course, was to remove the "other army," which inevitably resulted in a conflict.

[Sabic] How in your opinion should the plan be realized?

[Komsic] It would be normal for the plan to be carried out by whoever adopted it. The plan has been imposed upon all parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they are its object, so they cannot be the subject in carrying it out. The plan must be carried out by the international community, and this must be under pressure, including even the use of force.

[Sabic] Recently, Mr. Stipac, president of the HSS, said that the HZ Herceg-Bosnia is a bone in the throat of Croatian policy which should be surgically removed. Do you share his opinion?

[Komsic] The operation of which Mr. Stipac speaks is a very simple one: The creation and functioning of provinces (Mostar and Travnik) eliminates all the functions of the HZ Herceg-Bosnia. This is very important both to the position of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to the international position of Croatia. That is why the Vance-Owen plan should be carried out without hesitation—immediately and determinedly. Political power and the power of government, and this applies to the individual for that matter, are not what they think themselves to be, but what they do and what others think of them. Thus, in the case of Herceg-Bosnia we should speak about what it has done and the impression it has left. It was first formed as a political community, but later it took over the functions of defense and government, because war broke out. When those functions are unified, the result is a state. If we add to this the constant political aspiration of its leaders that Bosnia-Herzegovina be confederalized, it all becomes clear.

[Sabic] Do you agree with the opinion that Herceg-Bosnia in the time of the confusion of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina functioned rather well and that it was precisely thanks to its existence that most of what is free territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina was defended?

[Komsic] When it comes to defense, I must acknowledge that resistance to the aggressor was offered in good time and was well-organized. If that had been done over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the aggressor would not occupy almost 70 percent of the territory today. As for the political function of Herceg-Bosnia, it must be said that it mobilized Croats both politically and morally to fight over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The function of government, however, was reduced only to a certain territory. So, those three functions could not be solidly coordinated without a conflict with the Muslims. They consented to participate in defense within Herceg-Bosnia and to join units of the HVO. The government function bothered them, because it was parallel to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leaders of Herceg-Bosnia provided occasion for that by withdrawing from the government bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the same time that was a sign to the world of its division. So Croatia came under attack. All of this can also be viewed from the standpoint of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats who remained outside Herceg-Bosnia felt abandoned, deceived, and betrayed, because both in the elections and the referendum they opted for a sovereign and territorially intact Bosnia-Herzegovina. Suddenly they were left without the political support of those for whom they voted and the policy to which they committed themselves. The leaders of Herceg-Bosnia knew of that problem. There was only one way of preserving and unifying all its functions, to unify all Croats in one space. That is the point at which the agony of the Croats began. How to achieve that otherwise than by resettlement, and that means consenting to a policy of ethnic cleansing. This is at the same time the main motive behind the resistance of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Herceg-Bosnia. People are not ready to leave their homes. This is a tragic policy for our people. That was the first time in its history that it abandoned Bosnia-Herzegovina as its own state. Not to mention how that act would bring Serbia across the Drina and provide a permanent threat to Croatia. The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina must not do that.

[Sabic] Today, in the world there is frequent mention of disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In whose interest is it for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina to end that way?

[Komsic] It is no accident that the plan for that kind of outcome of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina arose as a formula of The Five, and that following the agreement in Medjugorje. It is obvious that that agreement dashed the hopes of those who expected further warfare between Muslims and Croats as the Vance-Owen plan was implemented. That is why they came out with a new proposal which encloses the Muslims in reservations, recognizes the territory conquered by the Serbian Nazis, and leaves the Croats the attractive bait of Herceg-Bosnia. This creates the possibility of unifying the temporarily occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia into a unified Serbian region (or state). The Muslims are being pushed into a conflict with the Croats in a fight for living space, and Croatia is brought to the dangerous verge of having sanctions introduced. The objective is to destroy or integrate the Muslims over time, to destabilize Croatia permanently and break up its territory, and to extend Serbia to the limits of an expanded Serbia. Destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a condition for that.

[Sabic] Are there prospects of that happening?

[Komsic] In spite of everything, I think that is not possible. Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot break up without a world war. If that occurs, it will not be important who is responsible, but the fact that the entire world has finally come to share the tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Stoltenberg's Meeting With Presidency Members Uncertain

LD2906135993 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Thorvald Stoltenberg, cochairman of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, arrived in Zagreb this afternoon. He said that the reason for his visit is primarily to say goodbye to Swedish General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the former UN Protection Force commander. Asked how he views the continuation of the Geneva negotiations on the constitutional and territorial set-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stoltenberg said that yesterday he and Lord Owen received useful explanations on the basis of which a document was drawn up which is almost identical to the Vance-Owen plan. He said that issues of the protection of human rights, demarcation, and certain elements of a military agreement were discussed. This is the basis for further talks on maps, Stoltenberg added.

He could not confirm whether he would meet with members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency in Zagreb today, on their way back from the meeting in Sarajevo, because he had not been in touch with them since yesterday.

Krajina's Jarcevic Warns of Hostilities

AU2506121993 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jun 93 p 12

[Interview with Slobodan Jarcevic, foreign affairs spokesman for the Krajina Serbs, by Zeljko Garmaz in Belgrade; date not given: "The Serbs Will Go To the Woods Again and Seize Weapons From the Croatian Army"]

[Text] Two weeks before the decision about the extension of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate in Croatia is taken, the Krajina Serbs are showing increasingly openly that they will not allow Croatian sovereignty in the "Krajina."

Slobodan Jarcevic, the so-called foreign minister of the "Krajina," with whom we spoke in Belgrade, puts impossible political requests to Croatia and openly says that the Serbs want the war in Croatia to continue.

[Garmaz] In a session of the "republic of Serbian Krajina Parliament" 10 days ago, it was decided to carry out the "referendum on the unification of the republic of Serbian Krajina with the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the possibility of uniting with other Serbian countries." What does it mean?

[Jarcevic] The Serbs are entitled to their own state and every statement coming from Croatia which challenges this right is futile.

What happened in Petrinja is only a continuation of the Serbian idea of creating a state of its own.

[Garmaz] Why do you want to hold this announced "referendum," even though nobody in the world will recognize it?

[Jarcevic] The Serbian peoples in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are one people. They are artificially divided by the former borders of Turkey, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and Venice. Both of these two peoples have the same enemy—the Republic of Croatia, which committed aggression in Herzegovina, against "my" Kupres, Bosanski Brod....

We know that the Republic of Croatia has a stronger army than the "republic of Serbian Krajina," and we can oppose the enemy only if we get united with the "Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," because the aggressor is the same. It would be completely insane to allow the stronger Croatia to destroy the "Krajina" first and then the "Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina." If the Croatian aggression continues, our two states will defend themselves together. Over the last few days we have received enough information on the amassing of Croatian troops along the borders with the "Krajina".... Tell them that a new war will not bring anything good to Croatia, and it can only cause the loss of Croatian sovereignty over territories that it holds today. Look here (he shows Zadar, Biograd, the Zadar hinterland, the Gospic region, and Western Slavonia on a map), here we have Serbian enclaves. We were told by Butrus-Ghali that considerably more Serbs were expelled from Croatia than Croats from the "Serbian Krajina"—this entitles us to retain the whole "republic of Serbian Krajina," but also to consider the occupied Serbian territories in Croatia.

[Garmaz] It seems that you are warning the Republic of Croatia of the forthcoming "unification." This "unification" might cause a war!

[Jarcevic] I do not know how many young people Croatia lost in this war, but it cannot allow itself to force its army to fight against two Serbian countries. If it does so, everything will end in catastrophe. It is not only my interpretation; you cannot find a single Serb in the "Krajina" who has a different opinion. The Serbs want to defend their country, and the Croatian Government, unlike the propaganda of its media, does not want to accept negotiations and blames the Serbs for refusing them. I participated in the negotiations in New York and Geneva, where we tried to reach an agreement by accepting the territories Croatia occupied in its attacks against the "republic of Serbian Krajina" on 2 January 1992. We cannot accept such negotiations any longer, and we shall negotiate as soon as Croatia withdraws from the occupied territory. We want to negotiate on equal basis—as two states.

[Garmaz] Resolution 815 confirmed the right of the Republic of Croatia to establish its sovereignty over its whole territory.

[Jarcevic] The drafts of these resolutions are written in arrangement with the UNPROFOR situated in Zagreb.

If it were not like that, it would not be possible that there is a completely illogical Croatian wish in every resolution, which does not correspond to the actual situation between Croatia and the Krajina.

If Resolution 762, for example, says that the Krajina leadership should enable the Croats who lived in the Krajina to return there and at the same time does not mention the much larger number of Serbs expelled from Croatia, it is certain that this resolution does not correspond to the real situation and that only Croatian wishes are expressed in it.

Resolution 815 was passed only with the aim that "the Krajina is a part of Croatia." After this resolution had been passed, we wrote a letter to Mr. Vance and asked to annul and formulate this resolution. Vance and Owen were in a very unpleasant situation when we reminded them of this problem; they could not utter a word, they stared at the floor, but in the end they said: "Yes, but the UN Security Council does not allow Croatia to apply this resolution by force. All the resolutions will be applied by mutual agreement." The Croatian people must know that the UN Security Council thinks that neither of these resolutions is ready to be carried out. It is only a basis for talks between the two sides!

[Garmaz] How could an arrangement between the Republic of Croatia and Knin be reached?

[Jarcevic] There is no other solution but to establish a Serbian state. Everybody in Knin thinks that the separation is the only solution. There is nobody in the "Krajina" who would not confirm what I am telling you. Croatia will not be able to break the Serbian resistance alone, although it would like to do so. It will need and receive military help from the international community, which will help it to occupy the "Krajina."

[Garmaz] If you are so certain that Croatia will start an operation with international support against the "Krajina," how can you be sure that the "Krajina" will survive?

[Jarcevic] The Serbs will defend themselves, they will go to the woods and grab weapons from Croatian soldiers if they do not get help from anybody and if they are not allowed to buy weapons.

[Garmaz] The Serbian side did not go to the negotiations in Topusko. Why?

[Jarcevic] We did not go to Topusko because Croatian soldiers had killed 12 of our soldiers several days before. We decided to participate in spite of that, but then four Serbian civilians were killed in Glina....

[Garmaz] You did not come to negotiations in Zagreb, either. Why?

[Jarcevic] We could not have signed the agreement to allow UNPROFOR to take over a part of the occupied territory and have the Croatian Army and police withdrawn. This was only a trick, because UNPROFOR would have been forced by the resolutions passed by the UN Security Council to give this territory back to Croatia. This means that the aggression committed by Croatia would have been rewarded.

[Garmaz] In the case that the Republic of Croatia starts implementing Resolution 802, by which the Croatian Army should withdraw from the liberated area in the Maslenica operation—which can hardly be expected because of permanent military conflicts there—how would you react?

[Jarcevic] In this case we would demobilize our army immediately and send police into the disputed area. Even if this happened, if the Croatian Army withdrew and UNPROFOR stayed on the demarcation line, I think that Croatia would attack again.

[Garmaz] What should Croatia do in your opinion?

[Jarcevic] We want to talk, but not only about electricity, but also about trade and free harbors in the Adriatic, which we would use in return for something else. Croatia has to understand, though, that we cannot give up our state. The Serbian state is here forever, and Croatia should not hope to establish its sovereignty in the "Krajina." We are ready to discuss the highway between Zagreb and Belgrade, the railway connections through Knin and Slavonja, the broken telegraph and telephone lines, the transmission line for electricity from Serbia....

[Garmaz] I am trying to find a slight indication in your arguments for a peaceful solution to the problem of the "Krajina." You are completely uncooperative, though. Is war the only possibility?

[Jarcevic] Croatia is not being very clever if it starts another war for the "Krajina." The question is whether it is able to survive it. There is not a single man in the "republic of Serbian Krajina" who would give up his state and allow the Croatian authorities to enter his house again. Count on that!

[Garmaz] What do you think about the Serbian National Party?

[Jarcevic] The Serbian National Party does not have anybody to represent any longer. Less than a hundred thousand Serbs remain in Croatia.

Croatia wanted the division between the Croatian and the Serbian community in Croatia. If Croatia can explain why it expelled 300,000 Serbs, it should do so. Why should it have a different attitude toward the "Krajina" Serbs?!

[Garmaz] These figures are incorrect and there is no logic in them. How can you prove them?

[Jarcevic] I have documents which we sent to the genocide commission in New York. Even the newspaper GLAS SLAVONIJE published the names of those expelled together with a commentary by a priest and an official of the Commune of Slavonska Pozega.

SNS Leader Offers Solution for Krajina

AU2506185993 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 11 Jun 93 p 5

[Interview with Milan Djukic, president of the Serbian National Party and vice president of the Croatian Parliament, by GLOBUS; place and date not given: "'Forget the Referendum, the Majority of Us, the Serbs, are on This Side of the Front Line!'"]

[Text] At the session of the "Assembly of the republic of Serbian Krajina," held last Saturday in Petrinja, a decision was brought to hold a referendum on the union of two self-styled "Krajinas," in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We asked Milan Djukic, president of the Serbian National Party [SNS] and vice president of the Croatian Parliament, to elaborate on the views of his party regarding this issue.

[Djukic] The SNS has been warning of the consequences of unsolved political questions regarding the relations of official Croatian authorities with the local authorities in the area of the so-called Krajina. We suggested an operative program, in order to thwart the moves of self-styled authorities in that area, like the one you just mentioned. Already in April 1992, during SNS conferences and in international contacts, we warned of the possibility of such Krajina referendums...

Six months ago, we warned President Tudjman about some occurrences that were not beneficial for the global Croatian politics of solving the crisis on the territory of our state, especially not in a peaceful, political manner. We said that there was a particularly negative attitude toward presenting the solution of the Serbian question in Croatia to international political subjects. We allowed that the "Krajina" be accepted for a fact, and the international community approaches it as such. Everyone equates the "Krajina" with the Serbs in Croatia, which is very dangerous. Moreover, everybody thinks that the solution for the relations between the Serbs and the Croats lies in solving the "Krajina" problem, which is not correct. And finally, the solution of "Krajina" problem is conditioned by the implementation of the Constitutional Law, and not by the realization of the Constitutional Law wherever that is possible in order to show Europe and the world that we have one of the most democratic political means for the solution of the crisis.

[GLOBUS] There have been many manipulations with the number of Serbs in Croatia, and many refer to the census of 1991...

[Djukic] We have quite accurate figures, because we follow the migrations of the population. The statistics of war-time, but also of post-war reality, come to the seat of the SNS every day. There are about 200,000 Serbs in "Krajinas" today. We think that, among them, there are about 50,000 people who came from other Croatian areas; the largest number went from western Slavonia to Baranja. The population structure of the "Krajinas" has changed, because many Serbs who did not live there before the war, and who, at that time, did not live in Croatia at all, are there now.

Those people are now serving the military junta that rules the "Krajina." They are destroying Croatia in order to realize the plan and program of Slobodan Milosevic.

[GLOBUS] The census of 1991 is not at all a relevant indicator of the number of Serbs in Croatia today.

[Djukic] That is correct. Approximately 180,000 Serbs left the free areas of Croatia, therefore, the parts outside the "Krajina." Some of them went to Serbia, most of the others went to Bosnia-Herzegovina or western Europe. There are some 290,000 to 300,000 of us in the part of Croatia where the juridical system still functions...

Consequently, it is obvious that any kind of referendum in which only one third of the Serbs would participate, cannot be valid for all Serbs in Croatia.

[GLOBUS] You often mention the president of the Republic. You were frequently described, by the Croatian opposition and other SNS critics, as a mere supporter of his views and the views of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. I have the impression that you did not confront such imputations.

[Djukic] No, I did not. In the beginning, the SNS was not even a parliamentary party, and even when we became that, at the last elections, we did not want to take joint action with opposition parties. If we had done that, we would have become the slaves of the opposition. The opposition would, through us, efficiently attack the ruling party. Perhaps that is the reason for the thesis that we support the ruling party...

[GLOBUS] Was that the reason why, along with the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], you were the only opposition party that, at the last Parliament session, did not leave the Parliament?

[Djukic] Yes. The SNS, as a parliamentary party, wants to discuss all issues in the Parliament and with the government, and as we know, the HDZ is the ruling party there. If Budisa and the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] had found themselves in the position of the ruling party, we would probably be reproached for being their extended hand. We will defend and support the opposition whenever we estimate that our views and interests are alike, even if that does not favor the leading party or if that would be beneficial to all citizens of Croatia, and Serbs as well. The SNS has three deputies in the Parliament, and no one can reproach us for being bad representatives of our nation. Why do the journalists never ask us how is it possible that we have always had correct reactions and that we have successfully predicted future events? We have never acted in a way to satisfy the public or ourselves regardless of who would like that, even when it is about the president of the Republic himself. We condemned the Maslenica action. We gave a clear evaluation of the negotiations with the Serbs in

Topusko and we realized, in advance, what could happen with the idea of continuing them in Zagreb, and we predicted that it would come to the referendum on the union of rebel "krajinas." In the environment in which we presented this, people said that it was in bad taste. We also predicted the destiny of the Vance-Owen plan, and we said what would happen to Bosnia. You cannot say that we dared say all that just because we are the extended hand of the HDZ?

[GLOBUS] A part of the animosity toward you was created by the public opinion that President Tudjman keeps searching for "his Pribicevic [pre-World War II centralist politician]"—whether it is you, Milorad Pupovac [president of the League of Social Democrats], or Simo Rajic—but also due to the opinion, created in this war, according to which the Serbs cannot be trusted because they will always be considered either traitors or toadies.

[Djukic] Some say that Tudjman's list of "Pribicevics" has some four or five names already. You also mentioned some. I am not a Pribicevic, nor do I want to become one. Pribicevic would be dangerous for the Serbs in Croatia and for Croatia itself. Those who are searching for one should think more carefully about it. The old Pribicevic cannot be found among the Serbs in Croatia, nor is he necessary for Croatia...

Regarding the solution of the Serbian question and the relations with the "krajinas," we did not exhaust all possibilities. We frequently discuss military actions toward the "krajinas." The SNS has, for a long time, been against the military option, because it is not possible to make war without making the delineation between the two internationally recognized states...

[GLOBUS] But the referendum might cause new military conflicts.

[Djukic] That is correct. But we must take into consideration the fact that achieving the desired goal—the return of the occupied areas—means that we should kill almost the entire Serbian population in the occupied areas. Since they are the citizens of the Republic of Croatia, just as we are, we are loosing this war in advance, in the eyes of the international public... Our only way out is to solve the problem in a peaceful, political way. We do not have a political concept for treating the so-called Krajinas.

[GLOBUS] How do you, then, view the negotiations with the Serbs from the occupied areas?

[Djukic] We must welcome the attempts for a peaceful solution of the conflict and for the reintegration of occupied areas, for the re-establishment of the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. Talking about the opening of the highway Zagreb-Belgrade or the railway line Zagreb-Split is not the solution, until we have shown those people that the Croatian state wants welfare for them as well. We have to offer them a development program, because everything is destroyed down there, they need an adequate welfare program, they should be given their pensions and be able to get medical treatment in the free areas of Croatia. Priests should be able to hold services in abandoned churches, we should solve problems regarding the certificates of citizenship, as well as the problem of ownership of apartments of former military personnel of the Yugoslav National Army—I recently talked about that and made a proposal to the Constitutional Court of the Republic Croatia for initiating proceedings for the evaluation of the constitutionality of the regulation banning the free use of real property, and I made a proposal to the Parliament to confirm the agreement signed on 22 November 1992, between the government of the Republic of Croatia, representatives of the Yugoslav National Army, and the European Community... Therefore, we should show this people that the state wants the same for them as for the Croats and the Serbs in the free parts of the territory, so as to dispel their first level of distrust toward the authorities of the Republic of Croatia. This cannot be achieved only nominally, on the level of slogans and nice promises, on the level of presidential missives.

[GLOBUS] You mentioned religious rituals. A couple of days ago, the Pakrac Episcope Lukijan, who left that town with the chetniks, tried to come back. Other Orthodox episcopes also left Croatia together with the aggressor. Did you speak to some of them?

[Djukic] Where there are no priests and normal conditions for their activities, there are no conditions for the survival of the Serbs in Croatia. We also talked to some priests who are supposed to return to Croatia... We did not talk to the members of the part of the SPC [expansion unknown], which supports Milosevic's intentions. I would not like to comment, now, on the statement by Episcope Lukijan, which he made just before the war broke out or during the war... Croatia, if it wants to be a law-governed and strong state, will definitely have to be prepared to meet certain requirements of the Serbs and the SPC.

[GLOBUS] Drazen Budisa recently said that there should be no negotiations with Belgrade at all.

[Djukic] I think that the solution can be reached only by talking to parliamentary representatives of the Serbs in Croatia in the Parliament and with the government of the Republic of Croatia... We can talk to Milosevic only after the conditions for that have been created. The basic prerequisite is the mutual recognition of Croatia and Serbia, and the establishment of full diplomatic relations. And finally, the solution for the relations between the Serbs and the Croats is not the same as the solution of the problem of the "krajinas." "Krajinas" are artificial snowflakes that are being kept alive because Milosevic has no fixed attitude toward Croatia and toward the Serbs who live there, and because international factors are not determined to implement Resolution 769, which speaks about the international recognition of Croatian borders with only Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Montenegro as Croatia's neighbors. When we fulfill those conditions, the "Krajina" will remain just a part of Croatia, those citizens who were not there according to the census of 1991 will leave, heavy artillery will be transferred, and the remaining population will tie their destiny to the destiny of Croatia.

Commentator Views Strategic Situation

AU2506194993 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 93 pp 15, 16

[Commentary by Fran Visnar: "Agreement or Total Fatal War"]

[Text] The basic prerequisite for crushing the wings of Serbian rebellion in Croatia is the neutralization of numerous military installations on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by Radovan Karadzic's Serbs. Indeed, those areas make up a logistic chain, without which Knin could not last very long. The most interesting thing in this area, for a military analyst, is how much will the Serbian side profit from the possible union of all Serbian parts (Knin krajina, Eastern Slavonia, and Serbian cantons in Bosnia-Herzegovina) into an integral, political, and territorial whole, with the possibility of a subsequent annexation to "the mother country"—now almost a greater Serbia?

Local Serbian dukes in Knin, Petrinja, and Baranja, together with Radovan Karadzic, do the operative work that Milosevic would not dare do directly himself. A new para-state, with almost two million inhabitants, with Banja Luka as the administrative and Pale as the political center, presents a tangible danger and threat, first of all to Croatia. For example, only in the zones where, according to President Tudjman's initiative, the UN observers should be placed, the Serbs would, in their newly created state, keep 50,000 people in arms all the time, 400 heavy artillery guns and howitzers, 35 multiple-rocket launchers of the "Oganj" and "Orkan" types, eight to 12 firing pads type "Luna-2," 1200 mortars and recoilless guns of various calibers—thus forming the so-called regular Krajina troops with the officers coming from Banja Luka, Pale, and Bileca.

Even if Milosevic were against such a move, there is not much he could do. Karadzic's Serbs have so many weapons that, even without Belgrade, they would take over the role of the main protector of rebel Serbs in Croatia and impose themselves on Zagreb as the negotiation partner. At the same time, Karadzic does not decrease the quantity of military equipment, which keeps coming to Knin without problems.

When the Knin long-range artillery and multiple-rocket launchers fire volleys on Dalmatia, they are warning Croatia that "a strong Serb does not easily make concessions." And not only that. By increasing their aggression and by ostentatious artillery attacks, they want to show that they can afford to waste ammunition because they keep getting new supplies from Drvar and Bosansko Grahovo. For Bosnian Serbs, the poorly armed Muslims do not present a particular problem. According to Karadzic, the Muslims reached the very bottom of defeat, while, on the other hand, General Ratko Mladic hopes that the Muslim units (three men sharing one riffle) will embark on "a suicidal assault," so that the Serbs would be able to rip open (Mladic's military terminology) the remaining Muslim enclaves, and swallow any Muslims who would put up some resistance, together with their bones and skin.

"Anger and Anxiety"

Moreover, the Serbs in Banja Luka think that the time has come for an agreement with the Croats—according to their ideas, they would get all of Herzegovina with another one to five percent (of their own) territory conquered by the Serbs in the Orasje corridor and 15 percent of the Muslim territory in central Bosnia as a "free hunting ground." In return, the administration of the "Serbian republic" in Banja Luka will take over the "protection" of "Serbian Krajinas" in Croatia.

An ordinary man in Croatia will, apart from anger, probably also feel some anxiety, which crawls upon the soul like ants crawl on arms. For, the Serbs are serious about all this. Isolation, sanctions, moral condemnation, and political loneliness in relation to the world mean nothing to them—even that is better than a broken leg—that is, the consequences of an efficient military intervention of the US and the allies, which Pale and Banja Luka no longer count on happening in the near future. Indeed, Bosnian Serbs think that they are winning the race against time.

Their leaders, the main culprits for the terrible massacre of the Muslims, show impertinence and an incredible lack of scruples. For them, time is the biggest of all sponges, which absorbs unpleasant memories as if they were sea water. Karadzic, for example, keeps repeating in English the same ("poetic") phrase: "And then you throw away the sponge and the bad memories are gone."

This is the chance for Croatia to openly dispel some earlier widespread illusions. We must finally admit that the Serbs are a dangerous, calculated, well-organized and persistent opponent, who can be defeated only by an even better level of Croatian organization, military equipment, and carefully made plans that are operationally feasible. Secret diplomacy, political will, uncertain prognosis like the ambiguous wisdom of the Delphic oracle, or easily given public promises for internal use for a limited time in the style of "Oh, we will defeat those Serbs"—are no longer enough.

We can parallel Serbian intentions only by a comprehensive military effort of the entire nation and relying on our own resources, which, considering the present balance of powers, is not possible for another couple of weeks or two months. Limited, short-range operations like Maslenica would not do much good for Croatia. Creating strategic depth that protects the towns in Dalmatia, putting them out of range of the Serbian artillery is the only safe investment for putting in motion the Croatian Army. But even then, without mobilizing 80,000 to 100,000 men, there are no chances of a complete success.

Let us consider, for a moment, the way in which Banja Luka prepared for the military intervention of the allies. Ratko Mladic, proven expert on petty Serbian heroism over a weaker opponent, is still counting on the main dilemma of the West, which is "Is the intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina a joint military operation of NATO, moderate in scale with few casualties, or a new Vietnam, as the synonym for a never ending conflict?" It is more dangerous to any army to wait without a clear goal than to attack with clearly defined plans. At the same time, Mladic thinks that the conflict of the United States with Serbia and the Serbs does not constitute an advantage for the United States, i.e. any significant strategic advantage, but that it demands the engagement of strong ground and air forces. The final reach of the Serbian analysis is the following conclusion: "Why should the United States protect the administrative borders of the former Yugoslavia?!"

That is the reason why the graduality in threatening to use force did not prevent the Serbs from further military and territorial actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor from keeping the status quo in Croatia. The Serbian side is used to suffering and reducing the peace-time needs. It is, relatively quietly, expecting the new phase of using more force to see whether it can endure that, also including a Croatian mass infantry attack. Extremely efficient, but selective, air bombing alone did not crush the Vietnamese in the south nor in the north of the country. And this is where the Serbs see their alibi. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the success can be achieved only by attacking both from the air and from the ground. The Greeks would find themselves in a tight place then and they would probably comply with the conditions imposed by the world.

"Russian Roulette"

Let us point out the following as well. The time of hiding canons and soldiers in bushes and caves far from town centers has long gone. The Serbs are withdrawing all their valuable technology and masking it in densely populated towns and vital industrial settlements, so that military targets are so intermingled with the civilian ones that the entire game is like "Russian roulette." If they pull the trigger, the Americans must launch an attack on 115 primary military and political centers and kill at least 50,000 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina to make them give up the planned strategy of endurance.

Even Bill Clinton yielded before this dilemma, the man whose political philosophy was based on playing it safe, on nonviolence, and on patient political fighting throughout his entire life. In the White House, those presidential advisers prevailed who posed a series of questions similar to the train of thought of Ratko Mladic: "How many Serbs do we have to kill? Why would we do that? How will we benefit from that? What is our exact target? How to get out of that?" The threshold of Iraqi fighting endurance in occupied Kuwait was 100,000 dead soldiers and an unknown, perhaps double that number of civilian casualties (killed, heavily wounded, and missing) on the native Iraqi territory, which suffered equally fierce bombing, especially in the greater area of Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

If Croatia should soon go to war and step over the borders of the "krajinas," and, in order to realize a series of tactical goals, has to consider the death of at least 15,000 local Serbs, not counting its own casualties and exhaustion, it would not be welcomed in the world. However, the international moroseness is not the main problem. After the first offensive moves into the depth of the occupied areas, the reaction of powerful Mladic's army is much more important for Croatia, as well as the behavior of the majority of the Serbian armed forces in Milosevic's Serbia and Montenegro, where the leadership has just confirmed and strengthened its authority.

The possibility of a Croatian liberation operation escalating into a total war of dramatic proportions, in which our country would be facing panSerbian armed forces and the West would look on impassively—is quite real. However, we are already feeling the heat of summer and all the Croatian problems are where they were in the beginning of 1992. We should, therefore, understand the nervousness of Zagreb. Croatia cannot patiently sit on an active volcano for ever.

Present Situation, Future Options Discussed

AU2706174593 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jun 93 pp 5, 6

[Interview with Josip Manolic, chairman of the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Parliament, by Davor Butkovic and Dubravko Grakalic; place and date not given: "Boljkovac Is Travelling to Negotiations in Belgrade, We Are Travelling to Knin, and the Politicians From Knin to Zagreb"]

[Excerpts] Josip Manolic, the chairman of the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Parliament, became the main protagonist of the recognizable line of the state policy which supports the peaceful solution to the problem of the "Krajina" in Croatia and which opposes the policy of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is why Manolic is still the most important target for attacks coming from the supporters of other political options in the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), from the government, and the President's Office. The fact that somebody dared to tap the former chairman of all Croatian security services best illustrates that Manolic is a disturbing factor for some influential colleagues.

[GLOBUS] Will the announced merger between the so-called Krajina and the Serbian republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a unique state be a new cause of the war in Croatia?

[Manolic] This merger has been an issue since the Serbian rebellion in Croatia and consequently in Bosnia-Herzegovina started. The Bosnian and the Croatian Serbs have the same reasons for their rebellion. We are not surprised by the announcement of the referendum on a kind of "merger," but the question is what is the basis of this referendum. Like the Serbian rebellion in the "Krajina," this referendum is illegal, too. All this is dictated from the same place with the same aim. Naturally, it cannot be expected that the rebel Serbs will pass a different decision in this referendum than before.

[GLOBUS] Do you not think that this "merger" could cause a war if the Serbs decide to break off the negotiations and present the ultimatum to Croatia to recognize the "Krajina?"

[Manolic] I think that the Serbs have not reached the point where they could break off all negotiations with the Croatian state. The international factors clearly said that the Serbian issue was a question of their relations toward the Croatian state and that these relations could be regulated only within Croatian borders. This will surely sober up the organizers of this referendum. [passage omitted]

[GLOBUS] Is the information correct that Mr. Boljkovac, a member of the Committee for the Normalization of Relations Between Serbs and Croats, went to negotiations held in Belgrade?

[Manolic] Not only was Boljkovac in Belgrade; there have also been intense contacts between Zagreb and Belgrade, Zagreb and Knin, Zagreb and Pakrac, etc. since this committee was founded. We have all had many contacts with the opposing side.

[GLOBUS] Can you tell me who Mr. Boljkovac contacted in Belgrade?

[Manolic] He did not talk with ghosts, but with people who are interested in normal relations between Serbia and Croatia. I cannot tell you, though, who he talked to. This question has to be answered by the other side.

[GLOBUS] Why is there general mobilization in Knin? Is this perhaps the answer of some politicians in Knin to the Croatian offers for peace?

[Manolic] I think that the general mobilization was proclaimed because of the preparations for the referendum. It is not easy to carry out a referendum today in which the Serbs living in occupied areas should decide on their separation from Croatia. Such a decision must be supported militarily, and this is achieved by the mobilization. At the same time they want to show the Serbian people and the world that there is danger coming from the Croatian state.

[GLOBUS] Taking into consideration the present international situation, can Croatia with its military power start a war for the final liberation?

[Manolic] Before you start a war, you have to have a clear political situation. Since we have not exhausted all peaceful solutions to the crisis yet, and since this problem has become an international issue, we have to discuss all political solutions first. The negotiations are still going on; neither side has completely broken off the negotiations. The presidents of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina will talk about this issue on 15 June, which means that the negotiations are being intensified and not diluted. [passage omitted]

[GLOBUS] Prime Minister Valentic said in a television interview on Saturday [12 June] that Croatia was not ready yet to wage a war for the occupied territories.

[Manolic] I think that there are no technical obstacles for the defense of the country under the present conditions. The prime minister's statement has to be interpreted in this light.

[GLOBUS] It was promised during the presidential campaign that these territories would be returned under Croatian sovereignty. When?

[Manolic] Formally, they have been returned already—by the Croatian Constitution and by international resolutions, which see this problem within Croatian borders. The problem is to materialize these decisions. Something is being carried out now, take for example, the agreement concluded in Daruvar which should solve the problems in western Slavonia. Such agreements should be reached for every UN protection zone. We are doing our best. [passage omitted]

[GLOBUS] For how long could the new UN Protection Force mandate last?

[Manolic] This depends on how efficient the UN Protection Force is and on the success of the negotiations. If we succeed in solving the problem through negotiations, the UN Protection Force will not be necessary any longer. In that case the present UN Protection Force role will cease in a month's time. If we reach an agreement with the Serbs, it will be enough that the international community retains check points in this territory in order to control the implementation of the agreement there. [passage omitted]

[GLOBUS] The Croatian authorities allegedly refused to give the Krajina Serbs the same status Kosovo had in Serbia. Is this true?

[Manolic] We cannot speak on such terms. We can only speak about the quality of the autonomy as it was defined by the respective Croatian constitutional law. We can compare the autonomy of Kosovo with the "Krajina." We have offered the Serbs everything according to the Constitution, and we cannot offer them more. This constitutional law regulates the legislative problems in these areas as well as the problems of the executive authorities, which are almost completely Serbian, because the Serbs are autonomous in these areas.

[GLOBUS] If all negotiations fail and if it comes to a military conflict, do you think that Serbia would get involved?

[Manolic] Judging by the present Serbian behavior, it can be concluded that Serbia would get involved, unless the international community prevents it by its influence.

[GLOBUS] Do you think that the Serbian politics on the whole, especially now since Cosic was deposed, would support a new war against Croatia?

[Manolic] Cosic was not deposed unanimously; it was a result of the disunity of the Serbian policy. It came to a differentiation in Serbia between the forces which support a peaceful solution and those which support a war. Not even the war option is unique—it changes depending on the international position and the relation of powers in Serbia.

[GLOBUS] Does this mean that Milosevic and Seselj are supporting the same option?

[Manolic] No, neither by their program, nor by their actions.

[GLOBUS] Can Croatia negotiate with both of them?

[Manolic] Croatia can negotiate with everybody who has power in Serbia. All negotiators are important for us. We have to search for a solution with all of them. We should also talk with the opposition, it also participates in the official power.

[GLOBUS] How would you assess the legal security of the Serbs in those territories which are controlled by Croatia?

[Manolic] There were cases when the Serbian national rights were violated in those territories where Croatia has complete control, but I think that we should make no conclusions based on these single cases. When a Croat loses a job, his right to work is violated; when a Serb loses a job, his national right is violated! Very many people lose their jobs, there is no violation of national rights here. Admittedly, there are revenge actions, such as burning down of houses. This really is a violation of Serbian national rights, but the legal system responds, investigations and trials are carried out. It has to be said that the protection in general is not efficient.

[GLOBUS] The situation in Bosnia is very complicated. Do the conflicts between Croats and Muslims and the establishment of "protection areas" mean the final end of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Manolic] It would be too early to speak about disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state. There are several reasons for that. First, I think that the global international politics does not support the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina because in this case a sovereign state would be deprived of its right to defend itself, and the international community would be forced to admit that a sovereign state does not have international protection, which is the basic right of every state. This is the main principle of the international community, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a part of it. As far as the relation of powers in this country—between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims—is concerned, I think that at least one of the three sides opposes the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is the Muslim side, and the Muslims are the largest population there (44 percent). Radical Serbs want Bosnia-Herzegovina to disintegrate in order to fulfill the plan of "greater Serbia." I have to say that there are also in Croatia people who see the solution to this problem in the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One thing is certain, though—the Croatian community in Bosnia-Herzegovina accepted the Vance-Owen plan on the unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

[GLOBUS] Is it true that Zagreb is supporting the dismissal of Mate Boban?

[Manolic] Zagreb can go very far in its support of the change of policy which led to catastrophic consequences for the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whether the war should be left to the policy or the policy to the war, is not the most important thing for us. A policy which has opened three fronts and has not closed a single one is surely dangerous.

[GLOBUS] Do you not think that Boban receives political instructions from those politicians in Zagreb who were born in Herzegovina?

[Manolic] You have to ask them how powerful their influence is on the politics which led us into open conflict with the Muslims. I cannot estimate how strong their influence was, because I have not been involved in the Bosnian issue for the last year.

[GLOBUS] If Boban is dismissed, who could become the leader of Bosnian Croats?

[Manolic) Changes in politics have to be organized. It is necessary to recognize the mistakes, to eliminate them, and then to change the policy. I do not support quick decisions because they lead to anarchy. I do not like quick changes, either, but the political analysis of the state in Bosnia-Herzegovina will lead to personnel changes necessary for a new policy.

[GLOBUS] To what extent will Croatia be a victim of the policy of Bosnian Croats, who are the reason that the international community is threatening Croatia with sanctions?

[Manolic] One of the basic objections to Croatia is its policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. This issue is a burden for Croatian policy on the international level. We have to consider this objection, which is becoming more and more serious from day to day. Croatia will try to find an answer to this question without putting its sovereignty and international esteem in jeopardy.

[GLOBUS] Do you not think that Croatian policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the conflicts within the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]? Is not the policy in Bosnia the main bone of contention?

[Manolic] I do not think this is the main reason. The main reason lies in our internal problems, although it is not a secret that Croatian politics has to pass a big examination on the events in Herzegovina.

[GLOBUS] Is the conflict in the HDZ as fierce as it used to be three months ago, when this issue was the main topic for discussions?

[Manolic] I think that the conflict has not been resolved yet. On the contrary, under the pressure of the international community, the politics of the opposed sides is becoming more and more tense. [passage omitted]

Interview With Human Rights Chairman Cicak

AU2806185793 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jun 93 pp 143-145

[Interview with Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, chairman of the Helsinki Human Rights Committee in Croatia, by an unidentified DER SPIEGEL reporter; place and date not given: "Deportation as a Model"]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] U.S. Secretary of State Christopher accused Germany of causing the spreading of the Balkan war by urging Croatia's recognition. Could the war have been prevented by supporting the unity of Yugoslavia?

[Cicak] The war was unavoidable—but it would have been more difficult for Serbia' President Slobodan Milosevic without this recognition. The West's basic mistake was that it did not recognize all former Yugoslav republics as sovereign states at the same time. By forging ahead Germany doubtlessly tried to strengthen its leading role in the West, and France and England wanted to prevent that. The United States tried to prove with the example of Yugoslavia how disunited Europe is.

[DER SPIEGEL] In the meantime, Bonn has changed its attitude and the foreign minister is now also thinking of sanctions against Croatia.

[Cicak] We call Kinkel "Kinkelino," little Kinkel. He does not have any stature, and Germany no longer has a foreign policy concept. The whole world knew that Croatian President Tudjman was no democrat. Every child in our country knows that he deliberately sacrificed Vukovar to the Serbs in order to force Croatia's recognition.

[DER SPIEGEL] The conquest of Vukovar by the Serbs claimed in excess of 1,000 lives. Could the Croats have held the town at the Danube?

[Cicak] There is a tape recording of a radio conversation in which Mile Dedakovic, the commander of Vukovar, begs Tudjman for permission to evacuate 2,000 injured and children. Tudjman interrupts him angrily and shouts: No, no—no way!

In September 1991 Tudjman ordered all children sent away for rest and recreation to return to Vukovar. They were supposed to constitute the background for his scenario of the downfall.

[DER SPIEGEL] You also claim there are tape recordings of secret agreements between Milosevic and Tudjman about the division of Bosnia.

[Cicak] From the first day of this war onwards there were agreements between Belgrade and Zagreb. In March 1991 in Karadjordjevo Tudjman and Milosevic discussed the ousting of then Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic and the division of Bosnia. This talk was recorded by the military intelligence service. The lieutenant, who presented the tape to the federal government at that time, allegedly committed suicide a few weeks ago. There are several copies of this tape; the original is in the hands of a former high-ranking Croatian functionary.

[DER SPIEGEL] How specific were these alleged agreements?

[Cicak] There is a detailed map of them. At the same time, a secret committee was established. Right at the first meeting the Croats were told that Serbia has a NATO document that says the deportation of the Muslims is desirable, and therefore one does not anticipate any international resistance.

[DER SPIEGEL] This sounds rather strange, but why was there a coalition between Bosnians Croats and Muslims then?

[Cicak] It never existed. Before the war Tudjman called the Muslims "dirty, stinking Asians" and the Serbs "our Christian brothers." In the minds of Milosevic and Tudjman there are no Muslims but only unbaptized Serbs and Croats.

[DER SPIEGEL] It is undeniable though that Muslims and Croats at first fought the Serbs together.

[Cicak] I, as a Catholic, have every respect for the Muslims for suffering so much humiliation from the Croats. Tudjman confiscates half of the humanitarian relief supplies destined for the Muslims. The goods then go the Croatian Army and the black market. Croatia also kept the bulk of the weapons that arrived for the Muslims and were transported by the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in return for enormous bribes.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will Croatia try to get the territories the Serbs have occupied back?

[Cicak] How could Croatia do it? This would lead to a mass of sanctions. In addition, our army is demoralized, badly equipped, and poorly trained. And arms supplies are stagnating because the West is delivering far less now.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where do you see differences between Milosevic and Tudjman?

[Cicak] In intelligence and in exercising power. Tudjman is no match at all for Milosevic, who is a negative political genius, like Hitler or Stalin. Tudjman is a bad Tito imitation—arrogant, intolerant, authoritarian. He avenges himself on anyone who dares to criticize him even a little. We have war and oppressive poverty but Tudjman buys planes and builds a gigantic government palace. Tudjman is a political zero.

[DER SPIEGEL] Well, then the opposition should be very well off.

[Cicak] In Croatia the opposition exists only in theory. We are all products of the former communist system; we cannot break out of this vicious circle. All parties are infiltrated by Tudjman's cadres and former agents.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can the division of Bosnia into three parts, as now planned, lead to peace?

[Cicak] The European politicians believe they have prevented war by approving Serbia's conquests. The opposite is true. The Muslims know that their destruction is certain as a result. Whoever is not killed or driven away must choose between the Catholic or Orthodox faiths.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will the Bosnian conflict spread?

[Cicak] This is unavoidable. The end of the Croatian and Serbian experiment in Bosnia will then be civil war in Serbia and Croatia. Or do you really believe that the Serbs will stop voluntarily if no one stops them?

[DER SPIEGEL] They are already threatening Croatia in strategically important places.

[Cicak] They can divide Croatia into three parts with only two divisions. Peace is impossible here without military intervention from the outside, either against Serbia or against all three parties in the conflict. The Balkans must be demilitarized, because its citizens do not have any responsibility in handling weapons. They may be trusted only with a 4 cm-long pocket knife—for peeling apples.

[DER SPIEGEL] You left the UN human rights conference just held in Vienna in protest. Why?

[Cicak] Because there they mainly talked about the rights of homosexuals and lesbians, not about Bosnia. In a world in which deportation is approved as a model and genocide and ethnic cleansing are the prospects of the future, human rights become an illusion.

Poll on Future Makeup of Bosnia-Herzegovina

93BA1107B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 28 May 93 pp 10-11

[Article by Franka Sola: "Doubts About the Survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina"]

[Text] The division of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the subject of a telephone survey conducted on 22 May. We were interested in what the public in Pula and Zagreb think about this and how they differ. We found that people in Pula and Zagreb think very similarly about almost all aspects of the problem put to them. Most of the citizens of Pula and Zagreb believe that the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina is unfeasible, while slightly less than a fourth of those polled think the opposite. Also, a majority in both cities thinks very similarly in holding that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not survive as a state, but will be divided. We did not test the difference between people in Pula who think this and those who think that division of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not occur, but we did among people of Zagreb. Much as with the previous question, even though we did not establish significant differences of opinion between the public in Pula and Zagreb, the Pula public is divided on this issue, while in Zagreb the opinion nevertheless prevails that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not survive.

An absolute majority of people in both Pula and Zagreb do not support the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is the only question where we established the difference in thinking between Pula and Zagreb. There are more people in Pula than in Zagreb against the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most of the respondents believe that the Serbs will be the gainers if Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided, while the Muslims will be the losers.

An absolute majority of citizens in both cities believe that it would be better for Croatia if Bosnia-Herzegovina remains sovereign, and only a small percentage think that it would be better for it if Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided.

It is interesting that in the responses to almost all questions a relatively high percentage opted for "Do not know." Although the conclusion can be drawn that almost the entire public of Pula and Zagreb withhold support for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and believe that it would be better for Croatia if that state remained sovereign, their opinions on the survival of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state are divided.

Do you think that the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina can be carried out in the field?

	(In percentage)	
	Zagreb	**Pula**
Yes	24.3	23.5
No	55.1	50.0
Do not know (no answer)	20.6	26.5

Will Bosnia-Herzegovina survive as a state?

	(In percentage)	
	Pula	Zagreb
Yes	37.2	32.0
No	40.7	44.4
Do not know (no answer)	22.1	23.6

Will Bosnia-Herzegovina be divided?

	(In percentage)	
	Pula (+/- 4%)	Zagreb (+/- 2.7%)
Yes	42.1	44.7
No	36.8	31.7
Do not know (no answer)	21.1	23.6

Do you support the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

	(In percentage)	
Yes	15.4	6.4
No	68.7	79.9
Do not know (no answer)	15.9	13.7

Who would win and who would lose if Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided?

	(In percentage)	
	Pula	Zagreb
Winners		
Serbs	39.2	47.1
Do not know (no answer)	38.9	33.7
No one	14.7	6.2
Croats	6.9	5.7
Others	8.3	3.5
Muslims	0.5	2.0
Everyone	1.5	1.7
Losers		
No one	1.0	0.5
Serbs	1.0	3.0
Others	3.9	5.5
Everyone	22.5	10.9
Croats	6.4	15.9
Do not know (no answer)	23.0	34.0
Muslims	42.2	30.3

Would it be better for Croatia for Bosnia-Herzegovina to be divided or to remain sovereign?

	(In percentage)	
	Zagreb	Pula
Divided	13.4	9.8
Remain sovereign	70.7	72.6
Do not know (no answer)	15.9	17.6

We are grateful to all the individuals who agreed to talk to us. The survey was conducted on two independently random samples in Zagreb (403) and in Pula (204). L. Rossa and F. Sola are the authors of the research, and A. Jelaska did the computer processing and graphics.

Peterle: Muslim Threats To Be Taken Seriously

AU3006081593 Vienna KURIER in German 30 Jun 93 p 3

[Margarethe Kopeinig dispatch from Brussels: "Muslim Terrorist Threats Must Be Taken Seriously"]

[Text] "The threat, by Bosnian Vice President Ganic, to react to the policy pursued by Paris, Brussels, and London with attacks must be taken very seriously," warns [Slovene Foreign Minister Lojze] Peterle. "I have always told the politicians that they should make a fair policy. If not, the Muslims will react like radical PLO members." A people that is threatened in its existence, loses its home and its relatives, and does not have any prospects for the future, is always ready to use terrorism, Peterle is convinced. The Slovene foreign minister calls the international policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina "immoral." He also regrets that the EC was not willing to interfere more actively in the conflict at the beginning. "If the diagnosis is wrong, the therapy cannot have any effect," he says, analyzing the EC's behavior toward Bosnia. "Now it is too late for everything." The war will unavoidably spread to Kosovo. "Then there will be an additional 2 million refugees and the great danger that the war will spread to the neighboring countries."

Peterle is more optimistic regarding Slovenia. Exactly two years after the war and the republic's declaration of independence, the small country is beginning negotiations in Brussels about a European agreement with the EC (a cooperation agreement was concluded at the beginning of April). It is not certain whether Slovenia will be in the group of those countries to which the EC has signaled the possibility of membership before the turn of the millennium. "The list is not yet definite, Slovenia has good prospects to be included," the responsible EC commissioner, Hans van den Broek, told KURIER. Slovenia's progress toward a market economy and democracy is enormous, he said.

DM From Arms Sales Found in Defense Ministry

LD2906164293 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1307 GMT 29 Jun 93

[Text] Ljubljana, 29 Jun (TANJUG)—The Slovene Defense Ministry and Defense Minister Janez Jansa were making several million German marks [DM] from each arms delivery to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the overall value of the intermediary services amounted to around $1 billion, it is claimed in an article entitled "Where are the Bagful's of German Marks?" published by the Slovene weekly 7 D.

It was said that Slovenia was selling "Kalashnikovs" confiscated from the JNA [former Yugoslav People's Army] by the Slovene territorial defense, for DM900 each. When the stockpiles became depleted, it purchased the AK-47's in Romania for DM500 each and sold them for DM900.

Convoys of trucks were transporting infantry and artillery weapons and ammunition to Croatia and Bosnia. Many deliveries were handed over according to the "gross-for-net" system—trucks and all—while payments were made in German marks carried in handbags by intermediaries to Slovenia.

The 7 D weekly also writes that such a bagful of marks was discovered in the attic of Jansa's Defense Ministry by members of Slovenia's intelligence and security service, that is, secret police, while they were "fumigating the building."

Because of such assertions, the Defense Ministry has brought criminal charges against the author of the article—editor in chief Mirko Munda—for "smearing the honor of the Republic of Slovenia."

Federal

'Regret' Over Victims of U.S. Attack on Iraq

LD2906120493 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1139 GMT 29 Jun 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, June 29 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) has with great surprise learned about the U.S. missile attack on Baghdad and stated regret over the innocent victims among the civilian population and over the great damage incurred.

In a talk with Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Aziza Tuesday, Deputy Foreign Minister Radoslav Bulajic repeated the F.R.Y.'s principled stand for all international conflicts and disagreements to be resolved by peaceful and political means without the use of force.

As set out, the Iraqi charge d'affaires informed the Yugoslav official with the consequences of the U.S. missile attack on Baghdad.

He also handed a copy of the announcement of Iraq's Revolutionary Command Council stating the details about the U.S. missile attack and strongly condemning this "aggressive act" which caused a number of casualties and great material damage.